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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellate appearing at all times in propria persona recognized by and in pursuance
to this Court's Adopted Rule of Rule I 0(a)(l) of the I.R.C.P. and concurrent polices of the State
of Idaho that this appeal is brought pursuant to Section 9 of Article V of the Constitution of the
State of Idaho which states that "The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon
appeal, any decision of the district courts" and in accord with the laws of this State as codified in
chapter2 of Title I, more specifically described as Idaho Code§§ 1-202(2), 1-204 and 1-205 and
are incorporated herein by their reference.
August 23rd, 2010, Appellant instituted a suit in the Small Claims Department of the
Magistrate's Division in the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho against Respondent for
breach of contract on a promissory note. R Vol I, page 027. On October 6th, 2010 the presiding
judge found for the Appellant and issued a judgment in an amount of $5,066.00. R Vol I, page
034.
On November 5th, 2010, Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. R Vol I, page 035. On
December 1st, 2010 Appellant's Counsel filed two motions - Motion to Amend Complaint
requesting additional relief over $10,000 at the trial de nova and Motion to Transfer. R Vol I,
pages 041-057. The Appellate Judge was changed and re-assigned to Magistrate Debra A. Heise.
Magistrate Heise in Error granted both motions on December 22, 2012. R Vol I, page 069-072.
The Appeal was transferred to District Court and finally the appeal was re-assigned to
Judge Simpson after Judge Yerby voluntarily disqualified himself. R Vol. I, page 075. June of
2012 a Trial de novo was conducted and a Memorandum Decision was submitted by Judge
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Simpson on July 25th, 2012. R Vol. II, 284-288. Judgment was filed on October 31st, 2012
against Appellant in an amount of $11,885.50 after being riped-off by Respondent to the tune of
over $25,000.00. R Vol II 316-317.
On April 5th, 2013, Appellant filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney
Fees and Costs with accompanying Affidavit and Brief in Support, challenging the District
Court's jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the Small Claims Department. Motion - R Vol. II,
pages 325-326; Affidavit - R Vol. II, pages 327-346; Brief - R Vol. II, pages 347-368. Respondent
filed an Amended Response to Appellant's Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney
Fees and Costs on May 2nd, 2013 R Vol. II pages 388-396; In Respondent's original Response
there was an Affidavit in Support. See R Vol II, pages 380-384. Appellant filed a Reply Brief on
May 23rd, 2013. R Vol II, pages 397-418.
Through a freak occurrence of errors the case was re-assigned from Judge Simpson to
promoted Judge Barbara Buchanan to Judge John T. Mitchell. On May 28th, 2013, Appellant's
Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs with accompanying Affidavit
and Brief in Support; Reply Brief and Respondent's responses were heard by Judge John T.
Mitchell. See Tr. of Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs filed into
the record on September 12, 2013, pages 1-13. The Order Denying the Motion to Vacate
Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs was filed on June 11th, 2013. R Vol. II, pages
4 I 9-420. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on July 22nd, 2013. R Vol. TL pages 421-425.
The issues on Appeal is centered directly on the issues and responses to the Motion to
Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs with accompanying Affidavit and Brief
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in Support, challenging the District Court's jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the Small
Claims Department emanating from the two motions which were granted by Magistrate Heise on
December 22, 2012 and which continued through to the filing of this Appeal.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Four questions are asked for determination by the Justices of the Supreme Court of the
State of Idaho: First - Whether it was Error for Judge Heise to grant the Motions to Amend
Complaint and Motion to Transfer. Second - Whether the District Court acted in excess of its
lawful jurisdiction to hear and determine an appeal from the Small Claims Department while
acting in its appellate capacity? And if so, then, Third - Are the judgments issued by the District
Court acting in its unlawful appellate capacity void? Fourth - Whether the District Court failed to
correct a jurisdictional defect by denying Appellants Motion to Vacate Judgment based on the
Court's oral finding of facts and conclusions of law?
In addition there are several ancillary issues concerning the return of monies extracted
under duress, if this Court finds that the District Court acted in excess of its lawful jurisdiction to
hear and determine an appeal from the Small Claims Department while acting in its appellate
capacity and that the judgments issued by the District Court acting its unlawful appellate capacity
void.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Appellant claims attorney fees pursuant to I.A.R Rule 40 in conjunction with chapter 1 of
Title 12, more specifically described as I.C. § 12-114.
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Additionally, Appellant claims Attorney Fees pursuant to I.A.R. 41 (d) which states in part
to wit:
The claim for attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may include
paralegal fees shall be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the method of
computation of the attorney fees claimed.
For a great part of this case the Appellant has secured the assistance of a
paralegal/specialized legal assistant to do most of his writing, research, and preparation of oral
arguments before the court. Appellant asserts that should he prevail on Appeal he should be able
to get attorney fees for his services as provided by the paralegal/specialized legal assistant.
ARGUMENT

Appellant re-submits the filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees
and Costs with accompanying Affidavit and Brief in Support, challenging the District Court's
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the Small Claims Department. Motion - R Vol. II, pages
325-326; Affidavit - R Vol. II, pages 327-346; Brief - R Vol. II, pages 347-368. Respondent's
filed Amended Response to Appellant's Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees
and Costs on May 2nd, 2013 R Vol. II pages 388-396; Respondent's original Response there was
an Affidavit in Support. See R Vol II, pages 380-384 and Appellant filed a Reply Brief on May
23rd, 2013. R Vol II, pages 397-418, as part of Appellant's Argument and are incorporated herein
by its reference.
A transcript of the hearing on the Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees
and Costs was conducted by Judge John T. Mitchell on May 28th, 2013 and was filed into the
record on September 12, 2013, pages 1-13 and is incorporated herein by its reference.
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Appellant re-asserts all the basis for challenging the jurisdiction of the District Court to
hear the Appeal brought from the Small Claims Department and asserts new challenges for the
District Court to hear the Appeal brought from the Small Claims Department based upon the
findings of fact and law placed orally by Judge John T. Mitchell forming the Order of Denial to
Appellant's Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs.
Appellant begins with the presiding Judge Mitchell's announcement of his decision with
oral findings of fact and law, quoted directly from the transcript itself, to wit:
The Court:

All right. I'm going to try to address all the issues raised in this
motion, but I am going to, with all due respect, deny the motion to
vacate judgment and award of costs and fees for the following
reasons: First of all, I'm not persuaded that the Supreme Court
does not have the ability to raise the jurisdictional amount as it did,
and while I appreciate Ms. Evans citing my own case in
Drumwright v. Scherr, which only serves to underscore how old
I'm getting, that decision was eight years ago, and I reread that
decision last night but I didn't read it with the idea of a
jurisdictional issue in mind, and I was just reading through my
analysis, and one thing I didn't find is that a District Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear a small claims appeal. I do discuss at length
where a small claims appeal properly lies, but that's not saying that
a District Court Judge lacks jurisdiction, and Judge Simpson when
he handled this case and made his decision had general
jurisdiction; in other words, a District Court in the State of Idaho
can do everything that a Magistrate Judge can and more, and so
Judge Simpson, I am finding specifically, had jurisdiction to enter
the orders and judgment that he entered in this case.
Even if he didn't then I do find that the plaintiff [Appellant]
in this case specifically asked this court to accept jurisdiction, and
the Doctrine of Estoppel would apply. The Doctrine of Invited
Error would apply.
Also, I do specifically find, as an alternative ground, that
the case is moot, that the judgment's been paid, the judgment being
Page 5 of 31
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satisfied.
I'm not overly persuaded by the timeliness argument, but
certainly a great deal of time did pass, and I think that really goes
towards the issue of estoppel more than a strict time limit that was
blown by, so I do specifically find there was jurisdiction by Judge
Simpson to do what he did; even if there weren't, there are various
alternative grounds for denying the Motion to Vacate Judgment of
Award of Costs and Fees, so Mr. Mclaughlin, if you be so kind as
to prepare an order to that effect, I'll sign it. Tr. page 8, lines 9-25,
page 9.
Before the Appellant disputes the Court's findings by Judge John T. Mitchell, paragraph
by paragraph, the Appellant asserts that the standards to hear a Motion to Vacate Judgment
pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(4) is non-discretionary. However, relief from a void judgment
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) is nondiscretionary. Meyer v. Meyer, 135 Idaho 460, 462, 19 P.3d
774, 776 (Ct.App. 2001); Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 644, 647, 991 P.2d 369, 372
(Ct.App.1998); Knight Ins., Inc., v. Knight, 109 Idaho 56, 59, 704 P.2d 960, 963 (Ct.App.1985).
In order for a judgment to be considered void under Rule 60(b )( 4 ), there generally must
have been some jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment, because the
court lacked either personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction.

Puphal v. Puphal, I 05

Idaho 302,306,669 P.2d 191, 195 (1983); Dufur v. Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., 128 Idaho 319,
324, 912 P.2d 687, 692 (Ct.App.1996).

Accord Cockerham v. Zikratch, 127 Ariz. 230,619 P.2d

739, 743 (Ariz.1980); Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791, 795 (Utah 1988).

Additionally, a

judgment is void when a "court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of power constituting a
violation of due process." Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1995); accord Dike v. Dike, 75
Wash.2d 1,448 P.2d 490, 494 (1968); I I char/es A. Wright et al., wright Miller & Kane, Federal
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Practice & Procedure § 2862, at 326-29 (2d ed.1995). c.f Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho
644, 647, 991 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct.App.1998). See also Appellant's Brief in Support of Motion to
Vacate Judgment and Award of Costs And Fees R. Vol II, page 348-349.
The word "discretionary" wasn't even added to the lexicon in Black's Law Dictionary
until the 7th Edition. Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Edition defines "discretionary" to wit:
"(Of an act or duty) involving an exercise of judgment and choice, not an
implementation of a hard-and-fast rule."\
Then the term "non-discretionary" would mean to be "(Of an act or duty" not involving an
exercise of judgment and judgment, an implementation of a hard-and fast rule." Whether a court
has jurisdiction over a cause are hard-and-fast rules, the court either does or it does not, there is
no gray area to it.
In addition, Appellant asserts the following legal principals attributable to the question of
jurisdiction of a court. The first is - The Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho has
held that " The right to Appeal and procedure on appeal are provided for in the Constitution and
fixed by statute, and it is not within discretion of court to hear an appeal or not to hear it." Long

et al. v. State Insurance Fund, 90 P.2d 973, 974-5 (1939); Daw v. School District 91 Board of
Trustees, 136 Idaho 806, 41 P.3d 234 (Idaho 2001) ("the right to appeal is statutory. Stiebeck v.
Employment Sec. Agency, 83 Idaho 531, 366 P.2d 589 (1961 ); Miller v. Gooding Highway
District, 54 Idaho 154, 30 P.2d 1074 (1934 )"); Matter of Estate of Spencer, l 06 Idaho 316, 678
P.2d 108 (Ct.App. 1984) ("The right of Appeal is statutory.

Villages of Eden and Hazelton v.

Idaho Board of Highway Directors of Departmenr of Highways, 83 Idaho 554, 367 P.2d 294
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(1961 ); Stiebeck v. Employment Sec. Agency, 83 Idaho 531, 366 P.2d 589 (1961 ); Haines v. State

Insurance Fund, 65 Idaho 450, 145 P.2d 833 (1944 ); See also Evans State Bank v. Skeen, 30
Idaho 703, 167 P. 1165 (1917); Utah Assn. of Credit Men v. Budge, 16 Idaho 751, 102 P. 390,
rehearing denied 16 Idaho 75 8, 102 P. 691 (1909). ")
The Constitution of the State of Idaho, has several provisions applicable here, the first is
Sections 20 of Article V and section 13 of Article V of the Constitution of the State of Idaho
which these provisions states respectively, to wit:
"Section 20. Jurisdiction of district court. The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and such appellate
jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." [Emphasis Added]
and
"Section 13. Power of legislature respecting courts. The legislature shall have no
power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which
rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government; but the
legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, when
necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the
courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without conflict
with this Constitution, provided, however, that the legislature can provide
mandatory minimum sentences for any crimes, and any sentence imposed shall be
not less than the mandatory minimum sentence so provided. Any mandatory
minimum sentence so imposed shall not be reduced." [Emphasis Added)
Constitution of the State ofidaho, Article V, sections 20 and 13.
The point being is that the Legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals and that
such appellate jurisdiction dependent upon the laws of this State. Daw v. School District 91 Board

of Trustees, 136 Idaho 806, 41 P.3d 234 (Idaho 2001); Miller v. Gooding Highway District, 54
Idaho 154, 30 P.2d 1074 (1934); Smith-Nieland v. Reed et al., 231 P. 102 (1925).
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In the Appellant's Brief in Support of Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Costs And
Fees, Appellant thoroughly asserted and shown that an appeal from the Small Claims Department
lies only with the Magistrate's Division and the Magistrate's Division only has such jurisdiction.
R. Vol II, page 347-348, 351-359.
In addition, Appellant, included Judge Mitchell's Memorandum Decision and Order from
the Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575, which Judge Mitchel clearly and succinctly describes
why an appeal from the Small Claims Department lies solely with the Magistrates Division and
that the Magistrates Division only has such jurisdiction. R. Vol II, page 360-368. Appellant also
supplied excerpts from the Appellate manual written in part by Judge Judd and excerpts from the
Supreme Court's Juror Manual in the Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Vacate Judgment and
Award of Costs And Fees, R. Vol II, page 401-402 and 410-415.
Let's take it from another angle. Respondent alleged that the District Court can assume
jurisdiction generally under Idaho Code 1-705. Historically this statute was passed prior to the
State's Admission as one of the several States in the united States of America. The Session Laws
indicate that this section was amended in 1969, in chapter 107, page 362, the legislature sought it
fit to amend the District Court's appellate jurisdiction to include "all cases assigned to the
magistrate's division of the district court."
Also in the Session Laws of 1969 in chapter 103, pages 348-353, the legislature created
the Small Claims Department in the Magistrate's Division in which all appeals were directly taken
to the District Court.
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In April of 1985 this court decided the case of Gilbert v. Moore, l 08 Idaho 165, 697 P.2d
1179 concerning small claims appeals. The situation in this case was a catalyst for the legislative
to change an appeal from the Small Claims Department in the Magistrate's Division specifically
removing all inferences to the District Court and replacing the District Court with the Magistrate's
Division in the Session Laws of 1985, chapter 167 amending I.C. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312.
So, now I.C. § 1-2311 reads as follows:
"1-2311. APPEAL TO DISTRICT JUDGE LAWYER MAGISTRATE. If either
party is dissatisfied he may within thirty (301 days from the entry of said judgment
against him, appeal to a district judge of the county in which said court is located
lawyer magistrate other than the magistrate who entered said judgment; and if the
final judgment is rendered against him by such district judge lawyer magistrate,
then he shall pay, in addition to any judgment rendered in the magistrate's
division, an attorney's fee to the prevailing party in the sum of twenty-five dollars
($25.00), provided, however, that appeals from the small claims department shall
only be allowed in such cases as appeals would be allowed if the action were
instituted in the magistrate's division as is now provided, and further provided that
the appeal shall be heard in the county wherein the original small claims was
filed."
And, I.C. § 1-2312 reads as follows:
"Such appeal shall be tried in the district court magistrate's division without any
further pleading than those required in the magistrate's division small claims
department originally trying the case, all papers in the case shall be certified to
said district judge lawyer magistrate as is now provided by law in other cases of
appeals in civil actions to the magistrate's division, provided, however, that said
district judge lawyer magistrate may require such other or further statements and
information as he may deem necessary for the proper consideration of said
controversy." Idaho Session Laws of 1985, chapter 167, pages 443-444.
See Addendum A which has Idaho Session Laws of 1969, chapters 103, pages 348-353; chapter
107, page 362; Idaho Session Laws of 1985, chapters 167, pages 443-444.
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This was specifically recognized by Judge Mitchell in his Memorandum and Order from
the Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575. R. Vol. II, page 366, lines 5-8 to wit:
"The law changed just after Gilbert was decided. In, 1985, Idaho Session Law,
Chapter 167, § 1, page 443 changed I.C. § 1-2311 and the small claims appeal
process. Today the law requires an appeal from the small claims department to be
heard as a trial de novo before an attorney magistrate. LC. § 1-2311; I.R.C.P.
8l(n); 81(o)(2); 83(b). The rules state that an appeal from small claims
department shall be conducted as a trial de novo before an attorney magistrate.
I.R.C.P. 8l(n); 8l(o)(2); 83(b)."

Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575. R. Vol. II, page 366, lines 5-8.
Further evidence that a District Court is without jurisdiction to conduct an appeal from the
Small Claims Department in the Magistrate's Division, starting from Sections 13 & 20 of Article 5
in the Constitution of the State of Idaho, various statutes in chapter 23 of Title 1 Idaho Code,
court rules in I.R.C.P. 81(n); 8l(o)(2); 83(b), State of Idaho Appellate Manual and depicted in the
Juror Manual, and Court case opinions. It can also be demonstrated through the rules of statutory
construction. "The rules of statutory construction also provide that a more recently enacted law
has precedence over the older statute." Malcolm v East Detroit, 437 Mich 132, 139; 468 NW2d
479 (1991); Travelers Ins v U-Haul of Michigan, Inc, 235 Mich App 273, 280; 597 NW2d 235
(1999) "This rule is particularly persuasive when one statute is both the more specific and the
more recent." Id.; Another rule of statutory construction is that the more recent statute supercedes
the older statute. State v. Harris, 494 N.W.2d 619,622 (S.D.1993). Rule of statutory construction
that the more recent statute has priority over the earlier one, Shelton v. United States, 83
U.S.App.D.C. 32, 165 F.2d 241,244 (1947); In addition, under Arkansas law a more recent statute
prevails over an older statute because a court must assume that the general assembly was aware of
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the earlier act when it passed the later one. See Johnson v. State, 331 Ark. 421, 961 S. W.2d 764,
766 (1998); Cole v. Harris, 1330 Ark. 420, 953 S.W.2d 586, 588 (1997); Kyle v. State, 312 Ark.
274,849 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Ark. 1993).
And the second is the principle that a more specific statute will be given precedence over a
more general one, regardless of their temporal sequence. Freiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,411
U. S. 489-490 (1973). Moreover, the rule that a specific statute should govern over a general
statute should not be lightly disregarded. As the Court explained in Simpson v. United States, 435
U.S. 6 (1978); A rule of statutory construction is that the more specific statute governs the more
general statute. Faircloth v. Raven Indus., Inc., 2000 SD 158, 620 N.W.2d 198, 202-03; Dahn v.

Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, 576 N .W.2d 535, 539; Meyerink v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 391
N. W.2d 180, 184 (S.D.1986); Likewise, even where chronology is not at issue, the specific statute
will always take precedence over the general statute where their provisions conflict. Greenbriar

Hills Country Club v. Director of Revenue, 935 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Mo. bane 1996); Goldberg v.
Administrative Hearing Comm 'n, 609 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Mo. 1980); Cantwell v. Douglas County
Clerk, 988 S.W.2d 51, 56 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999).
Based upon the foregoing and chronology the more recent statute of I.C. §§ 1-2311 and 12312 has precedence over the older statute of I.C. § 1-705 based upon the rules of statutory
construction. Also the more specific statute of I.C. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312 has precedence over the
general statute of I.C. § 1-705 based upon the rules of statutory construction too.
Therefore, looking back at the transcript of the hearing (page 5 of this brief) of Motion to
Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs Tr. page 8, lines 9-25, page 9, lines 1-6,
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three things come to mind:
1)

Judge Mitchell incorrectly stated that "one thing I didn't find is that a District Court lacks

jurisdiction to hear a small claims appeal." In his Memorandum and Order from the Drumright v.

Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575. R. Vol. II, page 366, lines 5-8 Judge Mitchell specifically recognized
that the District Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a small claims appeal, to wit:
"The law changed just after Gilbert was decided. In, 1985, Idaho Session Law,
Chapter 167, § 1, page 443 changed I.C. § 1-2311 and the small claims appeal
process. Today the law requires an appeal from the small claims department to be
heard as a trial de novo before an attorney magistrate. LC. § 1-2311; I.R.C.P.
81(n); 81(o)(2); 83(b). The rules state that an appeal from small claims
department shall be conducted as a trial de nova before an attorney magistrate.
I.R.C.P. 81(n); 81(o)(2); 83(b)."

Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575. R. Vol. II, page 366, lines 5-8; and
2)

Judge Mitchell stated that: "Judge Simpson when he handled this case and made his

decision had general jurisdiction; in other words, a District Court in the State of Idaho can do
everything that a Magistrate Judge can and more, and so Judge Simpson, I am finding
specifically, had jurisdiction to enter the orders and judgment that he entered in this case." This is
an incorrect finding of fact and law as demonstrated by the rules of statutory construction, the
more recent statute of I. C. § § 1-2311 and 1-2312 has precedence over the older statute of I.C. § 1705 and the more specific statute of I.C. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312 has precedence over the general
statute of I.C. § 1-705.
Therefore the District Court had no general jurisdiction over an appeal from the Small
Claims Department of the Magistrate's Division in which I.C. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312 controls the
appellate process to an attorney magistrate over I.C. § 1-705 under the rules of statutory
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construction.
3)

It is an incorrect statement that "the District Court in the State of Idaho can do everything

that a Magistrate Judge can and more," due to the facts and the law indicates that the legislature
specifically prescribed appellate jurisdiction for an appeal from the small claims department to be
heard as a trial de novo before only an attorney magistrate and not the district court. See I.C. §§ 12311 and 1-2312. This Court has recognized that the jurisdiction for an appeal from the small
claims department to be heard as a trial de novo before only an attorney magistrate by adopting
Rules of Court of I.R.C.P. 81(n); 81(o)(2); 83(6). All his findings of fact and law by Judge
Mitchell on the Motion to Vacate judgment and Award of Costs and Fees in this paragraph are in
error of the facts in this case and law and requires this Court to correct them.
GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT: a) Party asked court
to accept jurisdiction; b) Parties stipulated to jurisdiction; c) Doctrine of Estoppel and
Invited Error.
From the Transcript of the hearing (page 5 of this brief) on the Motion to Vacate Judgment
and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs, Tr. page 9, lines 7-10, Judge Mitchell committed more
errors of fact and law, when he said,
The Court:
"Even if he didn't then I do find that the plaintiff [Appellant] in this
case specifically asked this court to accept jurisdiction, and the Doctrine of
Estoppel would apply. The Doctrine of Invited Error would apply."
This was clarified by Appellant by asking Judge Mitchell a question to wit:
"Evans:
Okay. So in your opinion then that an appeal in a small claims - - in
a small claims court does not have to be heard by the attorney magistrate? It can
go to a District Court?
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The Court:
Well, I think in this case - - well, I'm finding that Judge Simpson
had the jurisdiction to hear the appeaL especially when the parties stipulated to
amend the complaint to exceed $10,000 jurisdictional amount."
Tr. page 10, lines 8-16.
Appellant asserts that even if Appellant asked this Court to accept jurisdiction by
amending the complaint to exceed $10,000 jurisdictional amount, such an act violated the
mandatory jurisdictional requirement specifically prescribing appellate jurisdiction for an appeal
from the small claims department to be heard as a trial de novo before only an attorney magistrate
and not the district court. See I.C. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312. This Court has recognized that the
jurisdiction for an appeal from the small claims department to be heard as a trial de novo before
only an attorney magistrate by adopting Rules of Court of I.R.C.P. 8l(n); 8l(o)(2); 83(b). See

stare decisis of Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575. R. Vol. II, pages 360-368. As Judge
Mitchell's own actions in Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575 concur that the Motion to Amend
the Complaint and Motion to Transfer should have been denied and the appeal remanded to the
Magistrate's Division for further proceedings. That what he did in Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV1999-1575 and it was error on Judge Mitchell's part to not have taken the same actions again in
this case.

It is worth noting that Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575. R. Vol. II, pages 360-368, a
case decided by District Court Judge John T. Mitchell is stare decisis to all magistrates of the
Magistrate's Division. With that in mind Magistrate Heise knew what the case of Drumright v.

Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575 decided, before she granted the Appellant's Motion to Amend the
Complaint and Motion to Transfer in error.
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More on Jurisdiction

"Subject matter jurisdiction is a key requirement for the justiciability of a claim and
cannot be waived by consent of the parties. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 626,
586 P.2d 1068, 1070 (1978). See R. Vol II, page 349. See also H & V Eng'g, Inc. v. Idaho State

Bd. of Prof! Eng'rs and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 57 (1987) (parties
cannot confer jurisdiction upon the court by stipulation, agreement, or estoppel. Johnson v.

Assured Employment, Inc., 277 Or. 11, 558 P.2d 1228 (1977); Hollister Convalescent Hospital,
Inc. v. Rico, 15 Cal.3d 660, 125 Cal.Rptr. 757, 542 P.2d 1349 (1975); 4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error§
43 (1981)); State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 664, 239 P.3d 462 (Ct.App. 2010) (A court's lack of subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by a party, and the parties cannot consent to the court's
assumption of jurisdiction through conduct or acquiesecence, nor be estopped from asserting its
absence. State v. J. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct.App. 2008)); Chester v. Chester,
172 Or.App. 462, 18 P.3d 1111 (Or.App. 2001) (We consider jurisdictional issues regardless of
when they are presented. Baty v. Slater, 161 Or.App. 653, 656, 984 P.2d 342, on recons., 164
Or.,App. 779, 995 P.2d 1176, rev. den., 331 Or. 191 (2000). "Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by
the parties by consent, nor can the want of jurisdiction be remedied by waiver, or by estoppel."

Wink v. Marshall, 237 Or. 589, 592, 392 P.2d 768 (1964). Likewise, subject matter jurisdiction is
not susceptible to the principle of invited error. St. Johns v. Yachats Planning Commission, 138
Or.App. 43, 46, 906 P.2d 304 (1995)).
See also Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs with
accompanying Affidavit and Brief in Support, challenging the District Court's jurisdiction to
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entertain an appeal from the Small Claims Department. Motion - R Vol. II, pages 325-326;
Affidavit - R Vol. II, pages 327-346; Brief - R Vol. II, pages 347-368; Appellant's Reply Brief on
May 23rd, 2013. R Vol II, pages 397-418 and are incorporated herein by its reference.
Additionally, "Courts have the power to inquire into their own jurisdiction; they are
obligated to ensure their own subject matter jurisdiction and must raise the issue sua sponte if
necessary." In re City of Shelly, 151 Idaho 289, 255 P.Jd 1175 (2011); Laughy v. Idaho

Department ofTransp., 149 Idaho 867, 233 P.Jd 1055 (2010). "A court has a sua sponte duty to
ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case." State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 244
P.Jd 1244 (2010). "The a court lacks jurisdiction to hear a case is a question of law, and maybe
raised at any time." Dunlap v. State, 146 Idaho 197, 192 P.Jd 1021 (2008). "The question of
jurisdiction is fundamental and cannot be ignored; even if jurisdictional questions are not raised
by the parties, the Supreme Court must address them on its own initiative." State v. Hartwig, 150
Idaho 326, 246 P.Jd 979 (2011). "A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored
when brought to the attention of the court and should be addressed prior to considering the merits
of an appeal." State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 80 P.Jd 1083 (2003).

Invited Error and Estoppel
"The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or
her own conduct induces the commission of the error. Thomson v. Olsen, 14 7 Idaho 99, 106, 205
P.Jd 1235, 1242 (2009). One may not complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in.

Id. In short, invited errors are not reversible. Id. This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as
well as rulings made during trial." State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462,465, 788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App.
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1990). In other words the doctrine of invited error issues are derived from the trial court and
complained about in an appellate proceeding.
The phrase "trial court" means "A court of original jurisdiction where evidence is first
received and considered." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, page 1349; 6th Edition, page
1506; 7th Edition, page 360. The trial court in this case was the Small Claims Department of the
Magistrate's Division.
The Motion to Amend the Complaint and Motion to Transfer were submitted while the
case was on Appeal in the Magistrate's Division in accord with I.C. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312. The
Notice of Appeal was filed by Respondent on November 5th, 2010. R Vol I, page 035. Almost a
month later on December 1st, 2010 Appellant's Counsel filed two motions - Motion to Amend
Complaint requesting additional relief over $10,000 at the trial de novo and Motion to Transfer,
while the case was in Appellate proceedings in the Magistrate's Division in accord with I.C. § 12311. R Vol I, pages 041-057. So, the doctrine of invited error does not apply in this situation.
Besides the citation of Chester v. Chester, 172 Or.App. 462, 18 P.3d 1111 (Or.App. 2001)
supra., the question of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by the Court sua sponte. State,
Department of Law enforcement v. One 1955 Willys Jeep, 100 Idaho 150, 152 n. 1, 595 P.2d 299,
301 n. 1 (1979). See R. Vol. II pages 350-351 for other case citation from the Brief in Support of
Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs and are incorporated herein by
its reference.
Further, since both estoppel and the doctrine of invited error are part of Equity. There are
maxims of Equity. One such maxim is "Equity follows the law." In the case of Allen v. Ketchen,
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100 P. 1052 (1909) the Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho stated this maxim
under these terms to wit:
"Courts of Equity are as much bound by positive enactments of law as are the
courts of law. It was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hedges v.
Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 14 S.Ct. 71, 37 L.Ed. 1044: "Courts of equity can no
more disregard statutory and constitutional requirements and provisions than can
courts of law. They are bound by positive provisions of a statute equally with
courts of law, and where the transaction or the contract is declared void because
not in compliance with express statutory or constitutional provision, a court of
equity cannot interpose to give validity to such transaction or contract, or any part
thereof." And likewise in Magniac v. Thomson, 56 U.S. 282, 14 L.Ed. 696, it was
stated 'that wherever the rights or the situation of parties are clearly defined and
established by law, equity has no power to change or unsettle those rights or that
situation, but in all such instances the maxim equitas sequitur legem [equity
follows the law] is strictly applicable."'

Magniac v. Thomson, 56 U.S. 282, 14 L.Ed. 696 (1853) 15 How. 281. "In all such instances,
equity must follow, or in other words, be subordinate to the law." Magniac v. Thomson, 56 U.S.
282, 14 L.Ed. 696 (1853) 15 How. 281. Appellant requests the Court to TAKE JUDICIAL
NOTICE of the following cases and its citations to wit:
"Yet another maxim provides that 'equity follows the law,' I.LE. Equity§ 22. In
application, this means that 'an equitable right cannot be founded on a violation of
law.' Noble v. Davison, 177 Ind. 19, 96 N .E. 325, 330 (1911 )." Hopper Resources,
Inc. v. Webster, 878 N.E.2d 418, 422 (Ind.App. 2007) [9]

"It is also frequently stated as a maxim of equity that equity follows the law. By
this is meant that equity obeys and conforms to the law's general rules and
policies whether the common law or statute law. See e.g. Provident Building &
Loan Ass'n v. Pekarek, 52 Ohio App. 492, 3 N.E.2d 983 (1936)." Jarvis v. State
Land Department, I 06 Ariz. 506, 479 P.2d 169 ( 1970).
"The reason inheres in the maxim of equity that 'Equity follows the law.' This
maxim in 30 C.J.S. Equity, p. 503, § 103, is explained generally as follows: 'In a
broad sense the maxim means that equity follows the law to the extent of obeying
it and conforming to its general rules and policies whether contained in the
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common law or statute law.' Again as pointed out in 30 C.J.S. Equity, p. 503, §
103, 'The maxim is strictly applicable whenever the rights of the parties are
clearly defined and established by law, especially defined and established by
constitutional or statutory provisions."' Dawson County Irrigation Co. v. Stuart, 6
N.W.2d 602, 605-06 (1942)
See Addendum B - Hopper Resources, Inc. v. Webster, 878 N.E.2d 418, 422 (Ind.App. 2007);

Jarvis v. State Land Department, 106 Ariz. 506, 479 P.2d 169 (1970); Dawson County Irrigation
Co. v. Stuart, 6 N.W.2d 602, 605-06 (1942) and are incorporated herein by its reference.
The doctrine of invited error does not apply to questions of subject matter jurisdiction.
Appellant requests the Court to TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE of the following cases and its
citations to wit:
"The invited error doctrine, however, does not apply to subject matter jurisdiction
issues. As we earlier noted, Washington courts have long held that '[p)arties
cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court by agreement between
themselves; a court either has subject matter jurisdiction or it does not. In re
Marriage of Furrow, 115 Wash.App. at 667, 33 P.3d 821 (emphasis added)."
Angelo Property Co., LP v. Hafiz, 167 Wash.App. 789, 274 P.3d 1075 (Ct.App.
Div. 2 2012)
"Further, under the doctrine of invited error, if a party induces action by the court
or an agency, he will not be heard on appeal to argue error based upon that action.
Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., Wyo 1974, 519 P.2d 972, 978. However,
there is an exception to that rule. As noted in Matter of Various Water Rights in
Lake DeSmet Reservoir, Wyo. 1981, 623 P.2d 764, 767, a challenge to a court's or
a quasi-judicial body's jurisdiction over the subject matter can never be waived.
'[I]t is open for consideration by the reviewing court whenever it is raised by any
party, or it may be raised by the court of its own motion.' Gardner v. Walker, Wyo.
1962, 373 P.2d 598, 599." Appeal of Williams, Wyo. 1981, 638 P.2d 564 at 571.
"Even if the confusion caused by KDR amounted to invited error, the invited
error does not apply where the error is jurisdictional. Thompson v. Amis, 208 Kan.
658,661,493 P.2d 1259 (1972)." In Re PEC, 134 P.3d 661,665, (Kan. 2006).
See Addendum C - Angelo Property Co., LP v. Hafiz, 167 Wash.App. 789, 274 P.3d 1075
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(Ct.App. Div. 2 20l2);Appeal of Williams, Wyo. 1981, 638 P.2d 564 at 571; In Re PEC, 134 P.3d
661,665, (Kan. 2006) and are incorporated herein by its reference.
Based upon the points and authorities submitted in the Motion and herein, that it was error
for Judge Mitchell to deny the Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs
on the basis that "plaintiff [Appellant] in this case specifically asked this court to accept
jurisdiction, and the Doctrine of Estoppel would apply. The Doctrine of Invited Error would
apply" or on the basis that "Judge Simpson had the jurisdiction to hear the appeal, especially
when the parties stipulated to amend the complaint to exceed $10,000 jurisdictional amount"

GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT:
In the Alternative - Mootness.
Going back to the Transcript of the hearing (page 5 of this brief) on the Motion to Vacate
Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs, Tr. page 9, lines 11-13, Judge Mitchell added
another baseless alternative ground for not granting Appellant's Motion to Vacate Judgment and
Award of Attorney Fees and Costs for jurisdictional issues duty bound to do. Judge Mitchell said,
"Also, I do specifically find, as an alternative ground, that the case is moot, that
the judgment's been paid, the judgment being satisfied."
"Under the mootness doctrine:
This Court may dismiss an appeal when it appears that the case involves only a
moot question. A case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live
or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. A case is moot if it
presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no
practical effect upon the outcome.
State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410,419,272 P.3d 382, 391 (2012) (quoting Goodson v. Nez
Perce Cnty. Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 851,853,993 P.2d 614,616 (2000)). See also State
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v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338,343, 127 P.3d 954, 959 (2005). There are three exceptions:
(1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the
person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade
judicial review and thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot
issue raises concerns of substantial public interest.

Koch v. Canyon Cnty., 145 Idaho 158,163, 177 P.3d 372,377 (2008) (quotingAmeritel Inns, Inc.
v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 851-52, 119 P.3d 624, 626-27 (2005)). See also
State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 682, 99 P.3d 1069, 1072 (2004)." State v. Long, 153 Idaho 168,
280 P.3d 195 (Ct.App. 2012).
In this case, whether a favorable judicial decision would result in any relief depends on
whether the court rendering the judgment had subject matter jurisdiction of the action and the
parties. If the District Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, then its judgments are void.
"[V]oid judgments can be attacked at any time. Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d
502, 508 (2003). Generally, the Court may declare a judgment void only for defects of personal
jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction. Catledge v. Transp. Tire Co., 107 Idaho 602, 607, 691
P.2d 1217, 1222 (1984). However, a judgment is also void if the 'court's action amounts to a plain
usurpation of power constituting a violation of due process.' Dept. of Health and Welfare v.

Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 90 P.3d 321,325 (2004)" Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,221 P.3d
81 (Idaho 2009).
In this case we have both issues a court acting arbitrary and capricious lacking in subject
matter jurisdiction and a court's action amounting to a plain usurpation of power constituting a
violation of due process.
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This appeal is an appeal specifically challenging the District Court hearing an appeal from
the Small Claim Department of the Magistrate's Division in which constitutional and statutory
provisions specifically preclude the District Court from such subject matter jurisdiction.
Therefore the issues presented are not moot because the parties have a legally cognizable interest
in the outcome surrounding jurisdiction, legal fees and costs returned of $10,000.00, legal fees
and costs paid by Respondent on this Appeal of a few thousand dollars, and due process on an
appeal before a court of competent jurisdiction to uphold my judgment initially won in the Small
Claims Department of $5,066.00. How much interest do I need?
The dollar amount for attorney fees and court costs was challenged before the District
Court who did not have appellate jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the Small Claims
Department of the Magistrate's Division. See R. Vol. II pages 303-307 and is incorporarted herein
by its reference.
Additionally in the Reply Briefing on the Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of
Attorney Fees and Costs, Appellant demonstrated that she was under duress by Respondent to pay
the amount or legal action was threatened. See R. Vol. II, pages 399-400 &406-407.
Coupled with the subject matter jurisdictional question was another question relating
directly to the first question of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists for appellate review to be
conducted by a district court, especially, when the constitutional and statutory provisions
specifically denying a district court jurisdiction from appellate review, by legislative amendment
of LC. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312, as demonstrated earlier herein.
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According to the Court of Appeals for the State of Idaho in the case of Matter Of

Kappelman, 114 Idaho 136, 754 P.2d 449 (App. 1988) held that Court rules have the force of law
in which the Court said to wit:
On the other hand, more recent cases, which we choose to follow, hold that rules
of the court have the force of "law." Mann v. Cracchiolo, 38 Cal.3d 18, 210
Cal.Rptr. 762, 694 P.2d 1134 (1985); Department of Finance v. Sheldon, 381 Ill.
256, 44 N.E.2d 863 (1942); State v. Mitchell, 672 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1983); Goldston v.
Karukas, 180 Md. 232, 23 A.2d 691 (1942).
If then, including the fact that there are court rules that states that the jurisdiction for an
appeal from the small claims department to be heard as a trial de nova before only an attorney
magistrate by adopting Rules of Court of I.R.C.P. 8l(n); 8I(o)(2); 83(b), then, Magistrate's
Heise's error of granting the Motion to Amend Complaint and Motion to Transfer becomes even
greater. And it also becomes even a greater issue that Judge Simpson didn't even question whether
he had subject matter over the appellate process from an appeal from the Small Claims
Department. And when jurisdiction was squarely questioned, Judge Mitchell of all people who
wrote a decision specifically on point on the issue in Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575,
failed to correct and perpetuated the error.
As an ancillary issue Appellant challenged this Court's adoption of I.R.C.P. Rule 82(c)(2)
(A) on constitutional grounds. Appellant re-asserts this challenge and re-submits the original
briefing from the Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs. R Vol. II,
pages 325-326; Affidavit - R Vol. II, pages 327-346; Brief - R Vol. II, pages 347-368. Changing
this rule to be in conformity with legislative statutory jurisdiction limitations would alleviate all
circumstances of amending complaints while on appeal from the Small Claims Department.
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CONCLUSION

Judge Mitchell's statements of finding of facts and law, decisions to deny Appellant's
Motion to Vacate Judgment was a deliberate act of non-discretion to violate well established laws
of this State concerning Appellate Jurisdiction from Small Claims Division of the Magistrate's
Division and a complete failure to keep his duty to the laws of this State and the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
"The question of jurisdiction is fundamental and cannot be ignored. Even if jurisdictional
questions are not raised by the parties, the Court must address them on its own initiative."
Diamond v. Sandpoint Title Ins., Inc., 132 Idaho 145, 148, 968 P.2d 240, 243 (1998) (citing H &
V Eng'g, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of Prof! Eng'rs and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d
55, 57 (1987)). See also State v. Wilson, 41 Idaho 598, 242 P. 787 (1925) wherein the justices of
the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that: "The question of jurisdiction is primary and
fundamental in every case, and cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked by the court."
(Apache State Bank v. Vzoght, 61 Ok!. 253, 161 Pac. 214; Mansfield C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan,
111 U.S. 379, 4 Sup. Ct. 510, 28 L. ed. 462; Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 9 Sup. Ct. 289, 32 L.
ed. 690.)" See R. Vol II, pages 350-351.
See also Fairway Development Co. v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 121, 804 P.2d 294
(1990) wherein it was held "Defense of lack of jurisdiction is never waived and must be asserted
by court if it finds that it lacks jurisdiction of subject matter."; State v. J Armstrong, 146 Idaho
372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct.App. 2008) ("A court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived
by a party, United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002); State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223,
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227-28, 91 P.3d 1127, 1131-32 (2004), and parties cannot consent to the court's assumption of
jurisdiction through conduct or acquiescence nor be estopped from asserting its absence. Fairway
Development Co. v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 121, 125, 804 P.2d 294,298 (1990). Accordingly,
a party may assert a lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on appeal, Idaho State
Ins. Fund v. Turner, 130 Idaho 190,191,938 P.2d 1228, 1229 (1997); State v. McCarthy, 133
Idaho 119, 122, 982 P.2d 954, 957 (Ct. App. 1999), and the issue may even be raised sua sponte
by a trial or appellate court. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999);
State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482,483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003); State v. Lopez, 98 Idaho 581,
585, 570 P.2d 259, 263 (1976); State v. Murray, 143 Idaho 532, 534, 148 P.3d 1278, 1280 (Ct.
App. 2006)." State v. J Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct.App. 2008).
Judge Simpson failed in making sure that he had jurisdiction to hear an Appeal from the
Small Claims Division of the Magistrate's Division. Magistrate Heise failed in abiding by Stare
Decisis of Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575 decided by District Court Judge John T.
Mitchell and well established laws of this State concerning Appellate Jurisdiction from the Small
Claims Division of the Magistrate's Division.
What's worse is that they knew or should have known the law and chose to ignore it to the
detriment of the Appellant and in violation of Section 18 of Article I of the Constitution of the
State of Idaho. Section 18 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Idaho states to wit:
"Justice to be freely and speedily administered. Courts of justice shall be open to
every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property or
character, and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or
prejudice."
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Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho. Judge Mitchell also failed in his
duties to me as a litigant, the people of this State and to preserve the integrity of the judiciary of
the State of Idaho, thus violating his Oath of Office. This Court is equally duty bound to correct
errors of jurisdiction sua sponte and remand the case back to the Magistrate Division to
Magistrate Heise for further proceedings.
Further this Court is obligated to award to the Appellant Costs and fees on Appeal and
issue all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction for the
return of the $10,000.00 paid under duress to Berg & McLaughlin Law Offices, counsel for the
Respondent, pursuant to section 9 of Article V of the Constitution of the State of Idaho and in
conformity with Section 18 of Article I of the Constitution of the State ofidaho.
Dated this 16th day of December, 2013.
(/

V t'U,,,lk..(_}._
Laur Evans, Appellant
Appearing In Propria Persona
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of December, 2013, I caused to be served and delivered the
original and Six (6) true and correct copies of the Appellant's Brief on Appeal with Addendums
and One (1) unbound, unstapled copy to the Supreme Court and Two (2) true and correct copies
of the Appellant's Brief on Appeal with Addendums to each party; and Certificate of Service; by
the method as indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Toby McLaughlin
Berg and McLaughlin
321 South First Avenue
Sandpoint, near [83864]
State of Idaho

[ ] U.S. Mail
[X! Hand Delivered
[ ] FAX Tel:

J><l U.S. Mail

The Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
Post Office Box 83 720
Boise, near [83720-0101]
State of Idaho

[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] FAX Tel:

By:
Errol Owen
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ADDENDUM A

Idaho Session Laws of 1969, chapter 103, pages 348-353;
Idaho Session Laws of 1969, chapter 107, page 362;
Idaho Session Laws of 1985, chapter 167, pages 443-444.
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the district court shall be jury sessions;

(g) arranging sessions, to the extent practicable, for the
trial of specialized cases, including traffic, domestic relations,
and other types of cases, and assigning district judges to
preside over these sessions so as to permit maximum
practicable specialization by individual judges;
(h) promulgating a schedule of offenses for which
magistrates and clerks of court or other designated persons
may accept written appearances, waivers of trial, and pleas of
guilty, and establishing a schedule of fines and bails therefor;

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

(i) assigning magistrates to temporary duty outside the
county of their residence, but within the district;
as chairman of
commission of the district; and,

the

district

349

NOTICE OF CLAIM; PROVIDING VERIFICATION OF CLAIM BY
REAL CLAIMANT AS A CONDITION OF RECOVERY;
PROHIBITING THE USE OF COUNSEL IN ANY ACTION IN SAID
DEPARTMENT; PROVIDING THAT FORMAL JUDICIAL
PLEADINGS ARE NOT A NECESSARY CONDITION;
PROVIDING FOR JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT IN ANY
ACTION OF SAID DEPARTMENT; PROVIDING FOR APPEAL OF
AN ACTION TO THE DISTRICT COURT; PROVIDING FORM
FOR SAID APPEAL; PROVIDING FOR CERTIFICATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
IN SAID DEPARTMENT; PROVIDING A SEPARATE DOCKET
FOR SAID SMALL CLAIMS DEPARTMENT IN THE
MAGISTRATE'S DIVISION; JURY TRIAL PROHIBITED IN
SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE
DATE.

(f) arranging for the reporting of civil cases by court
reporters or other authorized means;

U) acting

IDAHO SESSION LAWS

SECTION 1. In every magistrate's division of the district
court of this state, the district court may create and organize
a "Small Claims Department of the Magistrate's Division,"
which shall have jurisdiction only in cases for the recovery of
money where the amount of each claim does not exceed two
hundred dollars ($200) and where the defendant resides
within the county of such magistrate's division. Either party
to an action may request a change of venue as provided by
chapter 4 of title 5, Idaho Code.

magistrates

(k) assigning to other district judges in the district various
powers and duties in this act provided.
SECTION 2. This act shall be effective at 12:01 a.m. on
January 11, 197 l.

SECTION 2. Actions in such small claims department
shall be deemed commenced by the plaintiff subscribing to,
verifying and filing a claim as hereinafter provided.

Approved March 11, 1969.

SECTION 3. Upon filing said complaint the magistrate
shall appoint a time for the hearing of said matter and shall
cause to be issued a notice of the claim, as hereinafter
provided, which shall be served upon the defendant by
personal service of process in the manner provided by law, or,
when request is made therefor by the plaintiff, service of
process may be made upon the defendant by mail, as herein
provided. The plaintiff may request service upon the
defendant by mail by endorsing in writing upon his
complaint, which request shall include the address to be used
in mailing. The magistrate shall mail to the defendant at the
address given in the endorsement a copy of the complaint

CHAPTER 103
(S. B. No. 1115)

AN ACT
CREA TING A SMALL CLAIMS DEPARTMENT IN THE
MAGISTRATE'S DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT;
PROVIDING FOR COMMENCEMENT OF SUCH ACTIONS;
PROVIDING FOR TIME, NOTICE AND FEE FOR ACTIONS IN
SAID DEPARTMENT; PROVIDING FOR FEE OF OFFICER
SERVING NOTICE; PROVIDING CONDITIONS TO THE FORM
AND CONTENTS OF SAID SMALL CLAIM; PROVIDING
CONDITIONS TO THE FORM AND CONTENTS OF SAID

l

·.'
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and a 1:1-agistrate summons. Service of process by mail is made
~y registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, and
1s c~mpl~te upon return to the office of the magistrate of the
re~e1pt SI~ned by the defendant. Service by mail is proved
pn~a fac1e by t~e signature of the defendant upon the return
receipt. The plaintiff must bear the cost of service of process
by mail.
The magistrate shall collect in advance upon each claim the
sum of five dollars ($5), which shall be in addition to the
costs necessary to bring service of the claim upon the
defendant.
~ECTION 4. The officer serving such notice shall be
entitled to receive from the plaintiff the same fees as are
all~wed for other service of process from the district court,
which sum, together with the filing fee named in section 3
shall be added to any judgment given the plaintiff.
'
SECTION 5. The claim hereinabove referred to shall
contain the name of the plaintiff and the name of the
defendant, followed by a statement, in brief and concise
form, of the nature and amount of said claim and the time of
the: accruing of such claim, and shall also state the name and
residence of the defendant, if same be known to the plaintiff,
for the purpose of serving the notice of claim on such
defendant.
SECTION 6. Said notice of claim shall be directed to the
defendant, naming him and shall contain a statement in brief
and concise form notifying such defendant of the name
addre~s, a1:1ount and nature of the alleged claim of plaintiff:
and directing and requiring defendant to appear personally in
court before the magistrate of said magistrate's division at a
time certain, which shall not be less than five nor more than
ten days from the date of service of such notice, said notice
~hall furthe~ provi?e that in case of failure to so appear,
Judgment will be given against defendant for the amount of
claim.
~ECTION 7. All claims must be verified by the real
claimant, and no claim shall be filed or prosecuted in such
department by the assignee of such claim.

C.103 '69
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SECTION 8. No attorney at law or any other perso'.1 than
the plaintiff and defendant shall coi:icem himself or m any
manner interfere with the prosecut10n or defense of such
litigation in said department, n_or. shall it be necess~y to
summon witnesses, but the plamhff and defendant_ m any
claim shall have the privilege of offering evidence m t~e1r
behalf, themselves and witnesses appearing at such h~anng,
and being duly sworn as in other cases, and the magistrate
shall render and enter judgment as in other cases.
SECTION 9. No formal pleading other than the said claim
and notice shall be necessary to define the issue between_ the
parties, and the hearing and dispo~ition of
su~h act10ns
shall be informal with the sole obJect of d1spensmg speedy
and quick justice between the litigants, prov~ded, how~ver,
that no attachment, garnishment or executio_n shall issue
from the small claims department on any claim except as
hereinafter provided.

.an

SECTION 10. If the judgment or order shall be again~t the
defendant, it shall be his duty to pay the same forthwith or
execution may ensue as in other cases.
SECTION 11. If either party is dissatisfied_he m~y, within
30 days from the entry of said judg~ent a~amst ~1m, appe~l
to a district judge of the county m which s~d co~nt 1s
located; and if the final judgment 1s rend~red ag~~nst him by
such district judge, then he shall ~ay '. 1_n_ addition to any
judgment rendered in the ~agistrate s dIV1s1on, an ~ttorney s
fee to the prevailing party m the sum of twenty-five dollars
($25 .00), provided, however, that appeals _from such small
claims department shall only be a!lowed 11: s~ch ca~es as
appeals would be allowed if the a~tion were mstituted m the
magistrate's division as is now provided.
SECTION 12. An appeal from the magistrate's division
may be in the following terms:
In the District Court for_ _ _ _-=_County,
Idaho, _ _ _ _ _ Plaintiff, vs.______ Defendant.
Comes now_ _ _ _ _ , resident of_ _ _ _---c:Cou1'.ty,
Idaho and appeals from the decision of the sma~l ~!~ms
department of the magistrate's d1v1s1on
for_ _ _ _ _ _County, Idaho, wherein a judgment
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for _____ dollars was awar d ed against
the_ _ _,day of_ _ _ _ _ , 19_.
(Signed)

C. 103'69

him

on

.
----Such appeal shall be fil
accompanied by bond w·
e~ with the magistrate and
pay~ent of such judgr:ite~~atisfactory surety, to secure the
rov~ded for in section 11 s' ~osts and attorney fees as
ist~ct court without . uc appeal shall be tried in the
requrred in the magistra~~7 o_t~~r pleadings than those
~ause, all_ papers in the case !hdIV1s10n O!lginally trying the
J~d_ge as_ is now provided b I all _be certified to said district
CIVll ac!10ns in the magisti t ~w l'.1 _o!her cases of appeals in
that said district judge
e s di~ision, provided, however
statements and information y ~equrre such other or furthe;
proper consideration of sa·d as e may deem necessary for the
i controversy.

m:
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such magistrate's division, and thereafter execution and other
process on execution provided by law may issue thereon as
obtains in others cases of judgments of magistrate's division
and a transcript of such judgments may be filed and entered
in judgment lien dockets in district courts with like effect as
in other cases.
SECTION 14. Each magistrate shall keep a separate
docket for the small claims department of his division in
which he sh~l make a permanent record of all proceedings,
orders and Judgments had and made in such small claims
department.
SECTION 15. No party may have his cause heard before a
jury in the small claims department of the magistrate's
division of the district court.
SECTION 16. This act shall be effective at 12:01 a.m. on

:::a!t

SECTION 13 If no a
.
t_aken by the defendant and
the defendant fails to
terms an~ conditions thereof et~udgm~nt according to the
sue~ heanng was had, ma
' e fr!agI~trate before whom
certify such judgment ins u st°n
_apphcat10n
of the form:
plaintiff,
antially
the following

b'

the Mag1·straes
t ' D w~oo
..
forIn
Of
----~County,
Idaho

C. 103 '69

th e District Court

January 11, 1971.
Approved March 11, 1969.

CHAPTER 104
(S. B. No. 1116, As Amended)

AN ACT

Plaintiff
V.

Defendant
In the Small Cl · D
This is to certify th t . aims ~partment
undersigned, had on ath{; :h~ertam action before me, the
19__ , wherei.:-----__day of_ _ _ __
was defendant jurisd· t'
was plaintiff and
'
personal servi~e (or ~fh::io\said defe~dant having had by
and there entered judgme t se ? as p~ovided by law I then
of
n against said defi d
· '
·--:-:-::-_ _ _ _ dollars which · d
en ant m the sum
JU of
gment
has
not
been
Witness my hand th:is_~_d ay
____ - , 19 paid
..
Magistrate sitting in the small c1a·ims d epartment
The magistrate of said ill' .
'
. . .
.
enter such judgment t
a!pstrate s d1V1s10n shall forthwith
ranscnpt on the judgment docket of

ESTABLISHING A MAGISTRATE DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT
COURT FOR EACH COUNTY; PROVIDING A DEFINITION OF
THE TERM MAGISTRATE; PROVIDING FOR ESTABLISHMENT
OF DISTRICT MAGISTRATES COMMISSION IN EACH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT, AND FOR THE MEMBERSHIP THEREOF;
PROVIDING FOR MEETINGS OF THE DISTRICT
MAGISTRATES COMMISSIONS, QUORUMS AND REQUIRED
AFFIRMATIVE VOTE THEREOF; PROVIDING FOR THE
DUTIES AND POWERS OF THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATES
COMMISSIONS IN DETERMINING THE NUMBER, LOCATIONS
AND SALARIES OF MAGISTRATES AND IN APPOINTING
MAGISTRATES, SUBJECT TO APPROVAL OF MAJORITY OF
DISTRICT JUDGES OF THE DISTRICT; PROVIDING
NECESSARY QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE OFFICE OF
MAGISTRATE WITH EXCEPTIONS FOR EXISTING PROBATE
JUDGES, JUSTICES OF THE PEACE AND POLICE COURT

362

IDAHO SESSION LAWS

C. 106 '69
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SECTION 2. This act shall be effective at 12:01 a.m. on
January I 1, 1971.
Approved March 11, 1969.
AME

"P
CHAPTER 107

H
"1

(S. B. No. 1119)

Af

AN ACT

Be I

AMENDING SECTION 1-705 , IDAHO CODE , RELATING TO THE
JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT, SO AS TO PROVIDE
THAT SUCH COURT HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN ALL
CASES AND PROCEEDINGS AND FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
CERTAIN WRITS, AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION IN ALL
CASES ASSIGNED TO MAGISTRATE'S DIVISION OF DISTRICT
COURT AND IN ALL OTHER MATTERS AND CASES WHEREIN
AN APPEAL IS ALLOWED BY LAW; AND PROVIDING AN
EFFECTIVE DATE.

SJ
sami
1cour

l.

2.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho :

3.
SECTION l. That Section 1-705, Idaho Code , be , and the
same is hereby amended to read as follows:

4:-

1-705. JURISDICTION
ORIGINAL AND
APPELLATE.-The district court has original jurisdiction :

SI
Janu

l. In all cases both at law and in equity and proceedings.

A

2. In all special proeeedings.

.;,.2. In the issuance of writs of mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, habeas corpus and all writs necessary to the
exercise of its powers.
-4:3. In the trial of all indictments and informations. Its
appellate jurisdiction extends to all cases arising in probate or
·ustie~' courts assigned to magistrate's division of the district
court; and to all other matters and cases wherein an appeal is
allowed by law.
SECTION 2. This act shall be effective at 12: 01 a.rn. on
January 11 , I 971.
Approved March 11, 1969.
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SECTION 5. There is hereby appropr iat ed from the Gene ral Account
for Public School Support an amount not t o exceed $¼,808,8888 25 ,000
for the Unemploymen t Insurance Pr og ram to be expended according t o
Section 72-1349C, Idaho Code, for t he period Jul y 1, 1984, through
June 30, 1985.
SECTION 6. There is hereby appropr iat ed from the General Account
for
Public
School
Support
an
amount
not
to
exceed
$~t,68z,38821,777,300 for deposit in the Soc ial Security Trust Account
to be expended accord ing to Sec tion S9-1115, Idaho Code, for the
period July 1, 1984, th rough June 30, 1985 .
SECTION 9. An e mergency exis ting therefor, whic h eme rg enc y is
hereby declared to ex is t , Sect io n 8 of t h is act sha ll be in full force
and effect on and afte r its passage and approval.
Law Without Si gnature.
CHAPTER 167
(S . B. No. 1011)
AN ACT
RELATING TO THE SMALL CLAIMS DEPARTMENT OF THE MAGISTRATE'S DIVISION
OF THE DISTRICT COURT; AMENDING SECTION 1-2311 , IDAHO CODE, TO
PROVIDE THAT AN APPEAL FROM THE SMALL CLAIMS DEPARTMENT SHALL BE
TO A LAWYER MAGISTRATE OTHER THAN THE MAGISTRATE WHO ENTERED THE
SMALL CLAIMS J UDGMENT AND THAT THE APPEAL SHALL BE HEARD IN THE
COUNTY WH EREIN THE ORIGINAL SMALL CLAI M WAS FILED; AND AMENDING
SECTION 1-2312, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE TH E FORM FOR APPEAL FROM
THE SMALL CLAIMS DEPARTMENT TO A LAWYER MAGISTRAT E AND TO ELIM INATE THE REQUIREMENT OF POSTING A BOND WITH SATISFACTORY SURETY TO
SECURE PAYMENT OF A JU DGMENT ON APPEAL.
Be It Enacted by t he Le gislature o f t he Stat e of Idaho:

cco unt
) r the
ict i o n
1e 30,
count
for
rding
cough
0

be ,

SECTION 1. That Sec t i on 1-23 11, I daho Code , be , a nd the same 1s
hereby amended to r e ad as follows:
1-23 11 . APPEAL TO BiSlRf€l- ~HB6E LAWYER MAGISTRATE. If either
party is dissatisfi e d he may, within thirty (302 days from the e ntry
of said j udgment against him, appeal to a distric t-jadge-0£-the- coanty
i n-whieh-sai d-eoart-i s-roca ted lawyer magistrate other than the magistrate who ent ered said judgment ; and i f the final judgment is rend e r e d
against hi m by s uch district - jcdge l awyer magistrate, then he s ha l l
pay , 1n addit io n to any judgment rendere d in the mag istrate's d i vis ion , an a t torne y ' s fee to t he prevai l ing pa r t y in t he sum of t we ntyfive dollars ($ 25.00) , prov i ded, however , t hat a ppea ls from s uch smal l
cl a ims depar t me nt s ha ll only be a llowed in such cases as appea l s would
be a ll owed if t he act ion were insti tu ted i n t he magis tra te ' s division
as is now provided, and further pro v ided t hat the appeal shal l be
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heard in the county wherein the original small claim was filed.
SECTION 2. That Section 1-2312, Idaho Code, be, and the same is
hereby amended to read as follows:
1-2312. FORM FOR APPEAL - - FILING AND DISPOSITION. An appeal from
the mag±strateis-division small claims department may be in the
following terms:
In the Magistrate's Division of the District Court for
County, Idaho, .... Plaintiff, vs, .... , Defendant. Comes now .... ,
resident of
County, Idaho and appeals from the decision of the
small claims department of the magistrate's division for .••• County,
Idaho, wherein a judgment for .•.• dollars was awarded against him on
the •••• day of •••• , 19 .••
. . . . • • • . • . • • . • • • . . • , .•.• , . , .• , , (Signed}
Such appeal shall be filed with the magistrate's division
and
aeeompanied--by--bond,-with-satisfaetory-sorety,-to-secore-the-payment
of-soch-jodgment,-eosts-and-attorney-fees-as-provided-for--in--section
±-r3±±. Such appeal shall be tried in the distriet-coort magistrate's
division without any

other pleadings than those required in the
magistrateis--division small claims department originally trying the
cause, all papers in the case shall be certified to said district
jodge lawyer magistrate as is now provided by law in other cases of
appeals in civil actions in the magistrate's division, provided, however, chat said district--jodge lawyer magistrate may require such
other or further statements and information as he may deem necessary
for the proper consideration of said controversy.
Approved March 21, 1985.

CHAPTER 168
( S. B. No. 10 21}

AN ACT
RELATING TO THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF IDAHO; AMENDING
SECTION 59-1310, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE SERVICE RETIREMENT ELIGIBILITY BASED ON AGE 65 REDUCED TO NOT LESS THAN AGE 60 ON THE
BASIS OF A RATIO THE YEARS OF SERVICE CREDITED AS A POLICE OFFICER
REPRESENTS IN RELATION TO YEARS OF TOTAL CREDITED SERVICE TO
REPLACE THE PRESENT PROVISION WHICH PROVIDES A SERVICE RETIREMENT
AGE BASED UPON MEMBERSHIP CLASSIFICATION AT THE TIME OF RETIREMENT; AMENDING SECTION 59-1319, IDAHO CODE, TO CLARIFY LANGUAGE
RELATING TO CREDITED SERVICE, A DEFINED TERM, SERVED IN EACH
MEMBER CLASSIFICATION; AMENDING SECTION 59-1321, IDAHO CODE, TO
PROVIDE FOR AN UNREDUCED EARLY RETIREMENT ALLOWANCE WHEN THE SUM
OF ACE AND SERVICE IN YEARS EQUALS NOT LESS THAN 80 AN_D GRADUATED
TO 90 BASED ON A RATIO OF YEARS OF SERVICE CREDITED AS A POLICE
OFFICER TO YEARS OF TOTAL CREDITED SERVICE TO REPLACE THE PRESENT

c. 168 1 85
PROVISION WHIC
EQUALS EITHER
THE TIME OF
PROVIDE A MET!
MEMBER'S RETH
CODE, TO PR(
WHICH IS UNClJ
FOR PAYMENT A'.
Be It Enacted by

t

SECTION 1.
hereby amended to
59-1310. CON!
member who--is-n,
vice-retirement-i i

five (5) years of
ship serviceT--~
e±igi bte-f or-s erv ·
at-±east-five-f5¾·
of--membership-se,

below, based upon
retirement ratio ,
(a} The numl
was classifie,
( b) The memb,
For service ro
0.000 to
0.101 to
0.301 to
0.501 to
0.701 to
0,901 to
A person who was ;
have a service
police officer or
ret i remenc

or

i:

been that of a po
(2) An activ,
is eligible for ,
least ten (10) ye.
membership servic ,
(3) An acti·
retirement or dis.
if he has at l ,
( 6) months of mem·
eligible for serv
gible for early r ,
provided by secti,
(4} An inact

ADDENDUM B
Hopper Resources, Inc. v. Webster, 878 N.E.2d 418, 422 (Ind.App. 2007)
Jarvis v. State Land Department, 106 Ariz. 506,479 P.2d 169 (1970)
Dawson County Irrigation Co. v. Stuart, 6 N. W.2d 602, 605-06 ( 1942)

Page 30 of31
Appellant's Brief on Appeal

418

HOFFER RESOURCES, INO. v .. WEBSTER ·

878 NORTH EASTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Ind.

Ind. 419

Cile as 878 N.E.2d 418 (Ind.App. 2007)

words of _the statutory definition and de~
terrriine the substance is a narcotic as a
matter of law." White v. State, 161 Ind:
App. 568, 316 N.E.2d 69f!, ., 702 (1974).
Further, it is well settled that. a ..statute
may adopt a p~rt 0~ . all of a~~th~r law or
statute, state pr federal, b,y a sp12cific, reference to the se~tion sought to be i~corporated. See id.. at 704. And the ~f{ect of
the incorp~rat;ion by ref~rence is the same
as if the law_p~ statute or the part thereof
adopted ' had been written into the adopting 'statute:· Siate v, Doane, 26~ Ind. 75,
311 N.E.2d 803, 805--06 (1974).
Here, the statute defining "legend,drug"
incorpor,ates by refeli'.ertce 21 U.S.C.
§ 353(b)(l); which does notinclude a 'list of
drugs, and the Orange Book, which expressly includes Ritalin .in its list ofdrugs.
While not a statute, the Orange Book is
promulgated by. a federal agency, arid we
hold that th12 statute properly incorpo~:;i_tl'ls
the Orange Book by reference. Because
of that incorporation, Ritalin is, ~s a matter 0~ law, specificaily listed ,a s a legend
drug under Indiana (;pdeSection ,1 6-i_g_:.
2-199. See White, 316 N,E.2d at 704. Accordingly, here, the trial court need only
refer to the statutory definition and cl_etermine that Ritalin is a legend drug as a
matter of law. See id. at 702; .Bari-(,et4
579 N.E.2d at 86. The State presented
sufficient evidence to support Porod's conviction.
Affirmed.
BAILEY, J., and CRONE, J ., concur.

w _ _ __
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HOPPER RESOURCES, INC,·,
Construction Division,
Appellant, .
v.

Wendell WEBSTER,.A,ppeHe.e '.·
No. 82A0~706-CV-309: .

Court of Appeals of Indiana.
Dec. 27, .2007.
Rehearing.Denied Feb. 14, 2008.-1
Background: Contractor brought ,(I·
to foreclose mechanics' Hen arid for- !
tional damages against homeowner.
bench trial, the Superior Court, V ,
burgh County, J. Douglas Knight;-J
tered judgment for homeowner. Cort
tor appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, D'
J., held that:
(1) trial court's refusal to grant fi:{
. sure of mechanics' lien w~s not cl .
erroneous, and
(2) homeowner did not breach
·. · struction contract.
Affirmed.
1'. Appeal and Error e,,,770(1), 901
When the appellee does not. ,
b,rief, the appellant may prevail by ~
lishi_ng a,prima facie. case of error.
2. Appeal and Error e=>901
· For purposes of an appellant's b
on · appeal · without an opposing bri
appellee, "prima facie error" is defitf
at first sight, on first appearance, on>
face ofit.
See ·publication·words and Phr- es for other judicial constructioriii
. and d!!finitions . ..
3. Appeal and Error e=>IOOS.1(4, 5)
The standard for the appellate r
of ,claims tried to the bench provides .
the reviewing court shall not set aside

. ,unless clearly erroneous; and
,shall'be given to the opportuni.trial court to judge the credibility
tnesses.
,1.

one who seeks relief"m ; a court of equity
must be free of wrongdoing in ,the matter
before the court.
·"
· · ·
See publication Wo,-ds,and Phrases for other judicial constructions
and definitions.
· ·· ·

:. •,. . :·,

al and Error e=>994(3), 101i.l.(2)

~l!'!rrn~ing whether \1 jud~~4i )~
, , . neous, the appellate c~urt_,:vv,ill 9.. Equity e=>62
'gh _tl.1e evidenc{l qr deterII\iP.e ,\h~
, 'Eqiiitable maxim that "equity follows
' of witnesses but will consid~r th'e' law'' means that an equitable right
e'vidence that suppor,ts t~eJµ_gg,,: cannot be founded ori!'a violation bf law.
.,the reasonable inferences .to -~ See publication Words and Phrasm'- that evidence.
es for other judicial constrnctions
and definitions.
,and Err.o r e=>996, 1008.1(5)·
ia patty appeals from a-negativ~ 10. Equity e=>65(2)
"it must demonstr-ate that' 'the
Trial court's judgrn~qt denying equitapoint& unerringly to a ·con&lusion ble relief to contractor riri claim to forem that · reached by · the · trial close mechanics' lien .on house on grounds
when the trial court ehtei:'s fihd- of contractor's un~lean hands was not
ii - and conclusions of law, the clea:rly erroneous; buiiding perinit was .re'.J_court may only reverse" if the qfiired to perfor~ the work, permit was
~i:' -conclusions are clearly erronec is~ued based on fraudulent homeowner af' •

J l,\nd Error e,,,1008.1(5)
,'.trial court's ju~gment is clearly
iW1ly if its findings of fact. do not
i , conclusions or its conclµsio!}s
J)port its judgment.

&
l ~nd Error e=>S50(1)
(~;{..

.

'

.

..

n ·,tht tri:;il court en~r,i? findings
, the specific findings contr.91
' ,'11es they cover, for pl.U'poses of
_;review under the clearly erronewhile a general . judgment
'aP,plies tp any issue not found by

aard;
'

.

,.

'

qliitable maxim that "one who comes
µl.ty must come with clean hands".is
pie that denies relief to one whose
concerning the matter-, in contro"
h been fraudulent, illegal, or unn le as . to another such that the
party is harmed, which means, that

fid~'vit signed by contractor in name of
home'owner, and contractor performed
"'."~rk without a valid pern'lit.

11.

Contracts e:,,312(1) ·

· , H6meowner did 1not breach · construction ;contract by refusing to allow contracto~ .to enter the property and refusing t.o
for the work performed in building an
additi~n; h~meowner refused 't~ :i.llow further work by contractor after building insp~ctC>r found that contractor's work fail~~
t6 c'drriply with the building code, honieown~r affidavit on which building permit
wa;, i,ssued required that a master installer
be 'employed to correct any code violations,
and contractor failed to sho:w that it had
credentials as a master installer.

pay

,Robert R. Faulkner, Evansville,- lN, Attorney for Appellant. .
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OPINION·
' DARDEN, Judge.

STATEMENT ·OF THE CASE
Hopper Resources, Inc., Construction
Division ("Hopper"), appeals the trial
court's order denying judgment to Hopper
on its claim asserted agaii:ist Vfe,nd~ll _Webster in a complaint Stlelting the foreclosure
of a tp.echanic's lien .aqd apditional damages.
We affirm.

ISSUE_
Whether the trial court erred in denying
judgment to Hopper·.

FACTS
John Shamo is a geologist and president
of }lopper Resources, Inc., which undertakes construction projects through its
Construction Division. Shamo learned
that Wendell Webster wanted to have an
addition built on his ~ome. . After meeting
with Webster, Shamo presented Webster
with a proposal date~ S.eptember 27, 2003,
from !'Hopper Construction, Inc., A Division of Hopper Resources, Inc.," as "Contractor," to "furnish all equipment, material and labor necessary" to add a finished
bathroom, pour a concrete patio adjoining
the finished bathroom and the back of
Webster's house, and extend the house
roof over both. (Ex. 7). The total cost for
the proposed work was $15,900.00. The
proposal was signed by Sham<,>, as President; and reflects that on October 8; 2003,
Webster signed his "acceptance of proposal" and "authorized" Hopper "to do the
work as specified." Id. Webster gave Shamo $8,000.00 as a down payment.
Hopper directed John Claspell, Tony
Dorris, and James Clark to perform the
contracted project at Webster's home.
"Half way [sic] through the project, Mr.

for the bathroom] be divided and .an e
rior .bathroom access" be installed, su
that the addition would also contain a h
bath that could be reached from the new
pout~d adjoinirig patio. (Tr. 29). Ari Ii
dendum" from Hopper, dated November
2·003, proposed'. to "furnish all equipmett
materials and labor necessary' to" add,
wall, and install and finish the reque~ .
half•bath 'for an additional cost )
$2,100.00. (Ex: 11). Webster signed ·
acceptance on November 5, 2003.
Sometime thereafter,. Shamo learn
that ther~ had been no building
obtained. for ~he work being done at,Jtl
ster's.-~ome, -On _November 21\, 200&,"
mo went-to the Building Commission o
and obtained an Improvement Loca •
Permit for the addition of a bathroqm
a porch to . Webster's residence. . Sh
completed a "Homeowner Affidavit"
ing that "Wendel [sic] Webster" the . ·
swore that "either [he] or a member
[his] immediate family" would "perfo
the . . . work" of adding the room
porch at his residence, "for which Bui!
Permit # 106771E" was being issued,
that he would not be "subcontracting 1
any of the work" thereon. (Ex. A). S
mo signed Webster's name on the affi'_.,, ·
The Commission then issued to "appli
Wendel [sic] Webster" building" 'pe
# 106771E authorizing the . "bathroorrf
, ,t·_·
porch addition" at Webster's residei:I
(Ex. 10). The permit in Web~ter's n .
for the work at the residence was there
ter posted on the site.
'-)t

The Hopper workers proceeded to cci
plete most of the work specified .in th
contracts. According to John Cl_aspell, ·
March 10, 2004 (Shamo believed it was a~
later date in March ,but could not iden ·
an exact date), he and other Hopper wor
ers went to the Webster home to install,
vapor barrier and pea gravel under

ordered by "Cod~ Enforce-

mit · by "pull[ing] a homeowner's permit"

to ." bring everything into [C]ode.''
82:, 25). Claspell testified that the
were told that Webster wanted
off the property and not to return.

and "forg[ing] · [Webster-J's name on the
homeowner's affidavit," and that Hopper
was ."not a licensed and bonded contractor
and his;,'tsic]fo1·ging of (\1/ebster]'s name
on
affidavit c_onstiiuted . fraud.''
(App.24).

~

f.pril 19, 2004, Shamo sent Webster
'1'voice from Hopper demanding
00 in payment for the workcomplet', May 13, 2004, Shamo signed and
l!.d a notice asserting· Hopper's entit, to a lie~ of $7,500.00 for HopP,er's
1, or . . . materials or machinery for
_,E;t~ents to" Webster's property, and
Hopper "performed labor on the 23rd
.ot . arch, ~004." (Ex. 15).

tober 19, 2004, Hopper filed a
nt on mec):lanic's lien, asserting
bster had refused to pay $7,500.00
: ·e, improvements and seeking judgof''foreclosure of the mechanic's lien
amount of $7;500.00, plus pre-judgt _'interest, attorney fees, and costs.
I) ·. ember 9, 2004, Webster filed an
r that also asserted the affirmative
.of "fraud." (App.14) . . On August
Webster , filed a co1mter-claim,
· g Hopper's breach of contract-;--by
_·.· · g "unworkm:i,nlike" and "inferi'tk that. "need[ed] to be razed" and
(App.16). On September 8, 2005,
.to
strike. both Web, filed
.
. a motion
.
.
, counterclaim and, affirmatiNe de.--.. Hopper asserted that the counter. ''i_ untimi:!ly, and was filed 'without
of the court; and that the affirmative
· failed to comply with Indiana Trial
)'s· requirement' that the· 'circum. constituting f~aud be .specifically
' on Januru·y 13, 2006, the trial court
·: ·· at Webster would !Je allowed to file
specific pleading of his affirmative
e. On January 24, 2006, Webster
· more specific affirmative · defense,
ng that Hopper had "held [it]self
to .be a licensed . and bonded contracth t Hopper obtained a building.per-

ari

At the. outset of trial on February, -8,
2007, the motion to strike Webster's counterclaim .,Was discussed. The trjal, court
ruled that the.late filed. caunterclaim was
denied and :stated, "[T]here isrno ·Counterclaim.'' (Tr.-·58). Hopper then presented
its case,,·with Glaspell and Shamo as the
only witnesses. Webster did not call witnesses ·but did introduce as an exhibit the
Homeowner Affidavit ·(during,its cross examination ·of Sharilo). On May 9, 2007, the
trial , caurt ·issued its judgment order,
which fincludes sita sponte findings· and
C\:mclusions. , Therein, the trial court found
inter alia that "a lawful permit was a
necessary -con'dition precedent ·to" Hoppe;r!s ·performance of work "and any recovery for, the value thereof'; that ·. because
Hopper ·"had :no· legal permit to perform
the work''. on Webster's residence, Webster "was .. justified in refusing to allow''
Hopper's workers "to return to the job site
and perform any further illegal· operations''; and that Hopper could "not benefit
from its/his · own wrongdoing." (App.37).
The trial court ..concluded .that Hopper was
not "-entitled to 1:ecover any further compensatory , damages" and entered "final
judgment against ,[Hopper] on [Hopper]'s
claim.'' Id.
0

DECISION
We note at the outset, that Web~
ster has not filed a brief in response to
Hopper's appeal:. When the appellee does
not file a brief, the "appellant may prevail
by establishing a prima facie case of error." Trinity Homes, LLC v. Pang, 848
N.E .2d 1065; 1068 (lnd.2006). Pri.mafac,ie
[1;·2]
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error in this context is defined as, "ati first

(lnd.1891) ("where a lien upon real e

sight, on first appearanee, or on the face of
it." Id.

is to be foreclosed the equity power .of th
court is called into exercise"). Hence,
begin by citing some "maxims of equity.
12 I.L.E. Equity (2001).

[3-7] The standard for the appellate
review of claims tried to th~ bench provides that the reviewing cour t shall not set
aside the judgment unless clearly erroneous; and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility · of ·the witnesses. Bennett v.
Broderick, 858 N.E .2d 1044, 1047 (Ind.Ct.
App.2006),. trans. denied. In determining
whether a judgment is clearly erroneous,
we will not reweigh the ,evidence or determine the credibility cif witnesses •but will
consider only the evidence that supports
the judgment and the·· reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. Id.
at 1048. Here, Hopper .b ore the burden of
proof on its complaint at trial .and; did not
prevail; therefore, it appeals from,a negative judgment. Id. When a party appeals
from a negative judgment, it must demonstrate that the evidence points unerringly
to a conclusion different from that reached
by the trial court. Id. Further., when the
trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law under Indiana Trial Rule
52(A), the reviewing court may only reverse if the findings · or conclusions are
clearly erroneous.- Butterfield v. Constantine, 864 N.E.2d 414, 417 (Ind.Ct.App.
2007). The, trfal court's judgment is clearly erroneous only if its findings .·offact do
not support its conclusions or its conelu~
sions do not support its judgment. Id.
However, when, as here, the trial .court
enters findings sua sponte, the specific
findings control only the issues they cover,
while a general judgment standard applies
to any issue not found by the court. Id.

We begin with the observation that Hops
per's action-which was styled "Complaint
to Foreclose Mechanic's Lien," (App,9)sought relief in equity. See Brighton v.
White, 128 Ind. 320, 27 N.E. 620, 621

uanee of "the requisite permit for · on Webster's residence is supported by the
rm.ing the work in question."
. 1 . 37). . The trial , co~, coqcluded
,"lawful per:mit was a condition prec1,tQ Hopper'~·_«perfbrmance of work
recovery for. the value _thereof.';
opper could "not benefit f~om its/his
ongdoil).g"; a~d that Hopper "had
aljd permi( to perform ..the work in
n." (App.36, 37).

[8] First, "one who comes into equit;y
must come with clean hands"; a principl
that denies "relief to one whose condu'
coricerning the matter in controversy '
been fraudulent, illegal; or unconscionable"
as to another such that the other party
harmed. Id. at § 24; see also Traylor ·
By-'-Pass 46 Steak House, Inc., 259 Ind.
224, 285 N.E.2d ·820, 822 (19'72) (citm,
Ferguson v. Boyd, 169 Ind. 537, 81 N.E. '7
(1907)). In application, this principl
"means that one who seeks relief in a co ·
of equity must be free of wrongdoing
the matter before the court." Commun'
Care Centers, Inc. v. Sullivan, 701 N.E
1234, 1242 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. d..

t

01! Hopper did not introduce into eviand in its arguments to the trial
. ,i t did not reference, the require19,f. the Evansville Zoning Ordinance
. · _g l,rnilding permits. However,
1'tentt:> <;>f the. : .\'lx;hibits introduced
,the inference that .a -~.uilding per·,pi;erequisite for work such as the
n to. Webster!,s .hc;mse, .and that _only
owner . rnay optain a permit. based
Hpmeowner's Affidavit. 1 The Affida. that. the homeown.e r or an imme. ily member, will perform the work
,residence in wtl,ich the hc;imeowner
' ., The Affidavit also in.eludes a re.; ent that the homeowner disclose
1 f. pcontr.acting out of .any work outin the permit iss,ued to [the ho.me,;, and further states in bold print
"all subcontractors must be licensed
erl;mrgh Cou~ty." (Ex. A). More~
, · 1;1hamo admitted that he was the
ri.who went to the Building Commisand signed Webster's name on
·1

nied.
Another maxim provides that "whomever seeks equity must do equity"; a prin
pie whereby "relief which ·involves pe~
tration of an injustice will be denied." ·
I.L.E. Equity § 25. Thus, "he who would
invoke the aid of a court of equity 'mu,
show that he has . done equity to him o
whom he complains.'" Shaw v. Mey
Kiser Bank, 199 Ind. 687, 156 N.E . 552,
554 (1927) (citations omitted):
r

0

'

,Wee

[9] Ye.t another maxipi provides th \
"equity follows the Jaw," 12 I.L.E. Equit
§ .22, In application, this means that "
equitable right cannot be founded on .·
vioiation of law.," Noble v. Davison, 17,'l
Ind. 19, 96 N,E. 325, 330 (1911).
The trial court found · Hopper "obtained
the requisite building permit ,by applying:
for and obtaining a homeowner's permit",,
that the application therefor was a "Home1'
owner's Affidavit" on which Shamo signed .
Webster's name as homeowner; and this- ·
affidavit led to the Building Commissio

p~eowner Affidavit.

.·

·

WI; the evidence supports the trial

:findings .that a building permit was
ary to perform the work, that the
't obtained was one issued based on a
. W)1er Affidavit signed by Shamo~p/'l~er, the homepwner. According-~.tria,) ,coi.µ-t's conclusion that Hopper
no v_al(9 . permit to -perform the work

W
1

1,,;e

Affidavit ;efers to provisions , of "Article
. S'.3'140 of the· Vanderburgh County Building
ode or Article 15.150.134 of the Municipal

findings. Moreover, given that Hopper's
complaint sought relief based on the trial
court's equity jurisdiction, and the trial
court's express conclusion that Hopper
could not profit from its own wrongdoing,
the 'trial court's judgment denying relief to
Hopper is not clearly erroneous.
Hopper p1:~sents a series of challenges
to the trial court judgment, but all seek to
persuade us to reverse the trial court's
judgmen:t·and remand for judgment in favor of Hopper on its claim to foreclose
mechanic's lien ' or breach of contract:
However, we ·find those arguments unavailing.
Hopper argues that the trial court co~mitted reversible efror "in failingto apply
an adverse . inference against W eb_s ter
based upon his failure'to testify and failure
to call any witnesses." Hopper's Br. at 9.
However, Hopper presents no authority
for the proposition thlit such shifts the
burden of proof. As the plaintiff, Hopper
bore the burden · cif proof: to establish its
claim by a preponderance of the evidence.'
The trial court concluded that it had failed ·
to satisfy its burden, and we agree.
Hopper next argues that .the evidence
does not support the trial. court's "conclusion that the ·work was being perfoi;med
illegality [sic]," and ,that even if that were
so, recovery may be had. Jd, We have
already found that the evidence supports
the trial court's findings and conclusion
that the addition to Web.ster's house required a building permit, · and that the
permit Shamo obtained for Hopper was
not a valid permit, i.e,,
work was being
performed illegally. Hopper cites Ph~nd

the

v. Midwest Engine~r:ing .and Equip. Co.,
93 Ind.App. 165, 177 N.E. 879 (1931), and
Code of Evansville" regarding the consequences "if the inspector should find work in
vi'olation of the Code." (Ex. A).
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Drost v. Professional Bldg. Serv. Corp.,

This result is exactly that obtained by

153 Ind.App. 273, 286 N.E.2d 846 (1972); trial-court's judgment here. ··,
for the proposition that there may be re-.
Hopper also argues that the trial' '
covery on a contract performed. in a man- erred in finding that Hopper ·"could 1
ner not allowed by law. However, such recover under the contract "based
authority does not establish error by the the principle of illegality" because We
t1ial court here, where the matter is within failed to expressly plead ''illegality" :','
equity jurisdiction and the facts establish affirmative defense. Hopper's Br. a"
the failure of Hopper's actions to meet the we ·again return to the f;ct that
standards of equity.
' ..
nature of its complaint; Hopper so.
Hopper cites Greenhaven Corp. v. equitable relief and that it bore the b.
Hutchcraft & Assocs., Inc., 463 N.E.2d 283 of proving its entitlement to relief.. T,)l
(Ind.Ct.App.1984), for the proposition that fore, this argument fails.
recovery ~ay be had on a contract conIn a similar vein, Hopper argues·:;·
taining specifics not in compliance with Webster "failed to meet his burde
local building codes. However, in Green- proof on his affirmative defense of · ·
haven, the parties had agreed as to the by not establishing all of the eleme
nonconforming code matter. There was fraud. Id. at 17. Inter alia, he
no evidence that w ebster agreed that the the lack of any "intent to· deceive'\ o· 1
construction need not meet Code require- part of Shamo, citing Shamo's · tes · ·.
ments.
that the staff of the Building Commis
Throughout its brief, Hopper argues office were aware "that he was ·not •W
that Shamo's signature of Webster's name dell Webster but John Shamo" arid ·
was with Webster's acquiescence an.d at rected" him "to execute the homeow'b
Webster's request. However, th!' credil?il- affidavit on behalf of Mi:. Webster" ail
ity of witnesses is a matter for the trial sign Webster's name. Id. at 19.
court. See Bennett, 858 N.E.2d ,at 1048. we note that whether this testimony ·
Further, the validity of .the Homeowner credible was a matter for the · trial
Affidavit rests on its execution in compli- Bennett, 858 N.E.2d at 1048. Mort
ance with its own terms, i.e., that it is Shamo's signing of Webster's name oil
executed by "the [o]wner" of the residence affidavit-swearing that he was Weba
to be improved. (Ex. A). Finally, we the owner of the residence to be impro
have found that if parties bear "equal and that he personally or a member
fault" in an "illegal contract," such as Sha- immediate family would perform the
mo and Webster agreeing that Shamo and not subcontract it out-would sup'
would sign an affidavit which not only stat- the reasonable inference that this con
ed on its face that it was being signed by was a fraud upon the Building Co
Webster but also that Webster would per- sion.
0

by

or

form work that had been contracted to be
Next, Hopper argues that the evid ' n
performed by Hopper, "justice would re- fails to support the trial court's fin
quire that we left the parties where we that Hopper's "work was performed in
found them, even where [the one party] defective manner and caused ·the· Buildin
had fully performed." Monsignor Bernard Inspector to require additional correc
P. Sheridan Counsel No. 6138 Knights of work:'' Hopper's Br. at 22. As recoqn
Columbus v. Bargersville State Bank, 620 in FACTS, Hopper's workers were
N.E.2d 732, 735 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). Webster's residence in mid-March to

(Tr. 53). Absent a showing that Hopper
on .as ordered by "Code Enforce~ ,:\',b ring everything into [C]ode."
) . This evidence supports the
Je infere.nce that constructio~
hj.ch fails to meet the construction
defective work.

held credentials to perform the corrective
work required by the Homeowner Affidavit,.the circumstances here did not require
that Webster allow Hopper worll-ers to
perform further work. ., Therefore, Hop"
per's breach of. contract. claims mueyt fail.

r argues that he "is entitled to
, on the mechanic'~ lien" because it
tially conforme[ed] with statutory
ents." Hopper's Br. at 24. HopPremier Investments :v. Suites of
644 N.E.2d 124, 130 (Ind.1994),
l)l'Oposition that "the purpose of
!sJien laws is to prevent the ineqptoperty owner enjoying the ben.the labor and materials furnished
That

·· Affirmed.

MAY, J ., and CRONE, J., concur.

L.H., Appellant-:-Respondtmt,

v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee,-,Petitioner.
No. 49A04--0701'..JV-45;.

Next, Hopper argues that it "was
: 6 recover on breach of contract,"

' · refuted evidence" that it "was
damages" in the
of $7,500.00 "as a result of Web!fching the parties' contract by
'~1,1iopper off the job and refusing to
' "ripper's Br. at 29, 30. The evi,.., that Webster refused to allow
·1work by Webster after the inspec'l:i that the work failed to coqiply
Olide. The Homeowner Affidavit .ex. provides that "if the Inspector
cf.tfod the work in the violation of the
tb .n [the homeowner] shall employ
er installer of the required trade or
to change, alter, .or repair the work
' i-n violation." (Ex. A). Hopper
cl,no evidence to establish that it held
credentials. . The only· evidence as to
· ing was Shamo's testimony that on
projects, Hopper had "worked under
body ·. else's license . . . many times."

'a ha[d]incurred

Court of Appeals of Indiana.
Dec. 27, 2007.
Juvenile was · adjudicated
delinquent in the Marion Sup.erior Court,
Geoffrey Gaither, Magistrate, and Marilyn
Moores, J ., of child molesting and battery.
Ju~enile appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Robb, J.,
held that:
(l) incorporating testimony, evidence, and
exhibits from child hearsay hearing
into fact-finding hearing denied juvenile fact-finding hearing to which he
was entitled, and
(2) ramification ·of the requirements of the
child hearsay statute not being met-is
not necessarily reversal if o_ther evidence is sufficient to support the adju' ditation.
Reversed_and remanded.
Background:

Kirsch, J., filed dissenting opinion.
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Appellant complains of the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain the submission
of an instruction to the jury by the lower
court on contributory negligence.
We have said the test of negligence is
whether in the light of existing dangers
one is exercising ordinary care for his own
safety, Bryant v. Thunderbird Academy,
103 Ariz. 247, 439 P.2d 818. We have also
said that if the evidence was such that reasonable men might differ as to whethi:r qn
act WqS performed while exercising ordinary care the decision was for the trier of
facts, Campbell v. English, 56 Ariz. 549,
110 P .2d 219. The question here is whether the facts of this case reasonably present
a question of whether the appellant was
exercising ordinary care for her own safety at the time of the accident.
As to this question, three witnesses testified to certain statements made by the
appellant immediately after her fall. One
witness testified:

"Q Did you overhear Mrs. Prophet
making any statements at that time, did
she say anything?
A Yes. While we were trying to
make her comfortable for the arrival of
t.he· ambulance, I asked her if she wanted
a drink of water and she said yes. I got
her a drink of water. And she said
'Oh, honey, don't worry, I will be ali
right. I have fallen in these shoes before.'
And she told her companion to take
these shoes and throw them just as far
as she can throw them."
Another testified
"Q

Can you tell me what, if anything,
she said about her shoes?
"A She said that she had fallen with
those shoes. She showed me: a
bruise or a scratch on the other
leg, knee or leg, where she had
It was scabbed
fallen before.
over.
"Q What did she say specifically, if you
can recall, about her shoes?
"A She just said these shoes, 'I have
fallen with these shoes before; I

should have thrown them away,
and I should have got some new
ones.' And she said that is why
she had come to the store, to get
new shoes.

tiy which compared the slipperiness of

"Q. Okay. Can you tell us what was
said by Mrs. Prophet?

tile in front of appellee's store with tile
la f.tont of another store. The testimony
1-'' to the effect that the comparison
wed that the results of rubbing the apllant's shoes upon the tile in front of
lloth ,stores was about the same. A comrlaon of the tile in front of appellee's
're with the tile in front of another store
ing that they were about the same in
ppcriness does not appear. to have any
rial significance to any issue in the
, But we do not think the failure to

A Some-they started to pick her up
and put her on the stretcher. And there
was some woman who I don't know it
was started to pull her shoes off. And
· she said, 'Throw those darn things away,
this is the second time they have made
me fall.'"

·c KWOOD, C. J., and UDALL, Mc·AND and HAYS, JJ., concur.

"Q -W ho was she talking to then?
To everyone around. We were all
standing there close, not directly, I
don't think her answers were to
anyone in particular."
A third testified:
"A

The general rule is that statements either oral or written made by or attributable to a party to an action which tend to
establish or disprove any material fact in
the case constitute admission against interest and are competent evidence in the action. Deike v. Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Co., 3 Ariz.App. 430, 415 P.2d 145;
Pope v. Pope, 102 Cal.App.2d 353, 227 P.2d
867; Casey v. Burns, 7 Ill.App.2d 316, 129
N.E.2d 440; Hallett v. Rimer, 329 Mass.
61, 106 N.E.2d 427; Lowen v. Pates, 219
Minn. 566, 18 N.W.2d 455; Dorn v.
Sturges, 157 Neb. 491, 59 N.W.2d 751;
Harrison v. State, 19 Misc.2d 578, 197 N.
Y.S.2d 662.
[1] When shortly after the accident the
appellant said that she had fallen before
with these shoes and should have. thrown
them away and should have got some new
ones, she made statements against interest.
Her admissions could have been taken ·by
the jury as establishing why she fell.
They, together with the type of shoes she
was wearing, were sufficient to present the
issue of contributory negligence. Vollstedt v. Vista-St. Clai r, Inc., 227 Or. 199,
361 P.2d 657.
[2] Appellant further complains that
it was error to fail to strike certain testi-
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over state lands. The Supreme Court, 104
Ariz. 527, 456 P.2d 385, granted injunction,
and landowners subsequently petitioned for
an order to show cause why injunction
should not be strictly enforced. The Supreme Court, Struckmeyer, V. C. J., held
that city could not transport water through
its pipelines to lands which lay within watershed but outside critical ground water
area from where· water was taken, but that
in view of statute giving priority to needs
of municipalities for approptiable wat,ers,
injunction would be modified to allow the
withdrawal of water from basin for municipal uses to same extent as water previously withdrawn for use of those lands
which city might purchase in basin, and
water could be withdrawn either from wells
on land so acquired or from city's existing
wells in the basin, but water could not be
withdrawn both for use on the lands and
for transport off the lands for municipal
purposes.
Petition granted.

106 Ariz. 506
V,, JARVIS, for and on behalf of himIf a-nd other persons or legal entitles
litt!tuting• a class too numerous to be
ani,~ as parties, Petitioners,

v.
t <!\TATE LAND DEPARTMENT, a Dertm ent of the State of Arizona, Andrew
Bettwy, State Land Commissioner of
lllt .State of Arizona; and . CITY OF TUN, a munlclpal corporation, real party
j1 h1terest, Respondents.
No. 9488.

'.,·,. ·supreme Court of Arizona,
In Banc.
Dec. 28, 1970.

Or-iginal proceeding by landowners for
I .ction to require State Land Depart11nd State Land Commissioner to canI Q'lly existing grants of rights-of-way
r:iatate lands by which city might trans' ,wnter and to enjoin Land Department
··. Land Commissioner from permitting
'-, to transport water through pipeline
,179 P.2d-111/2

William W. Nabours, Superior Court
Judge, sat in place of Udall, J., who disqualified himself.

I. Waters and Water Courses <S::>107(3)

Under injunction against city embodying rule that percolating waters may not be
used off lands from which they are pumped
if thereby others whose lands overlie common supply are injured, and that such waters can only be used in connection with
land from which they are taken, city could
not pump water from its wells and transport
water so pumped through its pipelines to
lands which were within watershed but
outside critical ground water area from
which water was taken.
2. Waters and Water Courses <S::>107(2)

A "critical ground water area" from
which the conveyance of ground waters off
the lands will be enjoined is a ground water
basin or subdivision not having sufficient
ground water to provide a reasonably safe
supply for irrigation of cultivated lands in
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the basin at the then current rates of withdrawal.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Waters and Water Courses cS=>IOI

F act that statute prohibited only new
irrigation or drainage wells in critical areas
did not evidence legislative intent to permit
pumping for municipal purposes without
restriction. A.R.S. § 45-301 et seq.
4. Waters and Water Courses cS=>l07(3)

Under injunction prohibiting transportation of ground waters by municipality to
municipality or elsewhere outside critical
ground water area, city was not prohibited
from delivering water to airfield for lawful
purposes where airfield supply was from
common basin over which it lay and from
which it could legally withdraw water by
sinking its own wells for domestic purposes.
5. Waters and Water Courses ,S::,107(3)
In absence of proof by municipal cor-

poration that its water customers outside
critical ground water area but within drainage area from which water was taken overlay water basin so as to be entitled to withdraw water from it, there were no equities
which would relieve city of injunction
against transportation of water to customers
outside the critical ground water area from
which water was taken.

uses to same extent as water previously
withdrawn for use of those lands which
city might purchase in basin, and water
could be withdrawn either from wells on
land so acquired or from city's existing
wells in the basin, but water could not be
withdrawn both for use on the lands and
for transport off the lands for municipal
purposes. A.R.S. § 45-147.

Elmer C. Coker, Phoenix, and Donald C.
Cox, Eloy, for petitioners.
Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Peter C.
Gulatto, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for respondent, State Land Commission.
Lewis C. Murphy, Tucson City Atty., by
Richard H. Day, Asst. City Atty., and Robert 0. Lesher, Sp. Asst. City Atty., T ucson,
for respondent, City of Tucson.
E vans, Kitchel & Jenckes, by Burton M.
Apker, Phoenix, amici curiae, American
Smelting and Refining Co.
Chandler, Tullar, Udall & Richmond,
Tucson, amici curiae, Anaconda Co. and
Boyd Land and Cattle Co.
T witty, Sievwright & Mills, Phoenix,
amicus curiae, Banner Mining Co.
F ennemore, Craig, von Ammon & Udall,
Phoenix, amici curiae, Duval Corporation
and Duval Sierrita Corporation.
STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice.

6. Eq u lty cS=>62

"Equity follows the law" means that
equity obeys and conforms to the law's general rules and policies, whether the common
law or statute law.
See publication Words and P hrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
7. Waters and Water Courses cS=>I07(3) ·

In view of statute giving priority to
needs of municipalities for appropriable
waters, inj unction prohibiting city from
transporting water to city or anywhere outside the critical ground water area from
where water was taken some 15 miles from
city would be modified to allow the withdrawal of water from basin for municipal

This is an original petition by W. W.
Jarvis and others, requesting that respondents, the City of Tucson and the State Land
Department, show cause why an injunction
heretofore. issued under the original jurisdiction of this Court, Constitution of Arizona, Article VI, § 5, A.R.S., should not be
strictly enforced. The petition is a continuation of the dispute Jarvis v. State
Land Department, City of Tucson, 104 Ariz.
527, 456 P.2d 385, wherein petitioners, who
cultivate 33,000 acres of land in the AvraAltar Valleys within the Marana Critical
Ground Water Area by means o f irrigation·
wells, invoked the original jurisdiction of
this Court to obtain an injunction against
the City and the State Land Department.

lo W69, Tucson drilled six wells
r Y.-1-lley for the purpose of pumpflln~pqrting water to its customers
~(n,~nd w;ithout the City, a distance
' 9£ fifteen miles. Our injunction
the State Land Commissioner to
snt~ of way across State lands for
' 'ti.01;1 of the waters from the AvraijC}'.;S to Tucson or elsewhere. In
en;,sircisron we said that upon ap:t&r~his Court accompanied by such
flfC:S . as would permit the legal
transportation of ground wai?,junction would be modi fied or
s .the facts warranted.

,#d

n re in the present action now as-

·.e, City of Tucson, although not
~ . '.w ater to Tucson prope-r, has
"ii:><pump water from its wells and
u'ated water to areas both within

'ea

in violation of the Court's in,. '.f1\lcson acknowledges that it is
t1,r from its wells and is delivert to an installation known as Ryan
I ·n the Marana Critical Ground
.ea and to certain residences out,;:\\: farana Critical Ground Water
but..,:within the Avra-Altar Valleys'
,,11rea. Several questions which it
csi-:pertinent have been propounded
tjbners in order that there be a final
ion of the dispute between the par'f '

·;,court's second decision in Bristor
Htham, 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P .2d 173
) 1 ·lhe doctrine of prior appropriation
' wat ers was rej ected and the docf ·ri:asonable use was adopted. In
()~_cision in this case we pointed out
~Pristor it was alleged that the plains! been the owners since 1916 of cerflls f~om which they had supplied
_.es with water for domestic purn 1949 the defendant sank a numf !n~ge irrigation wells which by their
I t[Qn sucked the ground water from
r_t~e plaintiffs' lands, thereby destroyJlli!illtiffs'· supply fo r thei r wells. Deda.1\t transported the water a distance

of three miles where he developed agricultural lands not theretofore irrigated. W e
held in Bristor, which holding was repeated
in our first decision here, that this was not
a reasonable use of ground waters.

In our first decision here, we also held
that the American rule of reasonable use
permitted percolating water to be extracted
for the beneficial use of the land from
which it was drawn. W e emphasized this
aspect of the. doctrine o f reasonable use by
requoting from Bristor tha t part of the decision in Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87, to the effect that the modern decisions are nearly
harmonious in holding that a property owner may not convey waters off the lands
from which they a re pumped if the wells of
another are thereby damaged or impaired.
Th is limitation on the use of ground waters
has the overwhelming support of American
precedent. Percolating waters may not be
used off the lands from which they a re
pumped if thereby others whose lands overlie the common supply are injured. See
Midway Irrigation Co. v. Snake Creek Mining & T unnel Co., 271 F. 157 (CCA 8th,
1921 ) , a ff'd, 260 U.S. 596, 43 S.Ct. 215, 67
L.Ed. 423 (1922); Katz v..Walkinshaw, 141
Cal. 116, 70 P. 663 ( 1902), on rehearing, 74
P. 766 (1903); Cohen V . La Canada Land
& W ater Co., 151 Cal. 680, 91 P. 584 (1907) ;
B~rr v. Maclay Rancho W ater Co., 154 Cal.
428, 98 P. 260 ( 1908) ; City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 198
P. 784 (1921) ; Koch v. W ick, 87 So.2d 47
(Fla.1956) ; cf. Willis. v. City of Perry, 92
Iowa 297, 60 N.W. 727 (1894) ; cf. Barclay
v. Abraham, 121 Iowa 619, 96 N .W. 1080
(1903) ; Schenk v. City of Ann Arb9r, 196
Mich. 75, 163 N.W. 109 (1917) ; Bernard
v. City of St. Louis, 220 Mich. 159, 189 N .W.
89 1 (1 922) ; cf. Stillwater Water Co. v.
Farmer, 89 Minn. 58, 93 N .W . 907 (1903) ,
and 99 Minn. 119, 108 N.W. 824 (1906);
Erickson v. Crookston W aterworks, Power
& L ight Co., 100 Minn. 481, Ill N.W. 391
( 1907) ; Meeker v. City of E ast Orange, 77
N.J.L. 623, 74 A. 379 ( 1909); Crane v.
Borough of Essex F ells, 67 N.J.Super. 83,
169 A.2d 845 ( 1961), aff'd, 36 N .J . 544, 178
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A.2d 196 (1962); Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 18 App.Div. 340, 46 N.Y.S. 141 ; 54
N.E. 787 (1897); Westphal v. City of New
York, 34 Misc. 684, 70 N.Y.S. 1021 (1901),
aff'd, 75 App.Div. 252, 78 N.Y.S. 56, aff'd,
177 N.Y. 140, 69 N.E. 369 (1901), rearg.
den. 177 N.Y. 570, 69 N.E. 1133; Forbell
v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E.
644 (1900); Dinger v. City of New York,
101 App.Div. 202, 92 N.Y.S. 1120, aff'g. 42
Misc. 319, 86 N.Y.S. 577 (1903), aff'd 182
N.Y. 542, 75 N.E. 1129 (1905); Hathorn v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., .194 N.Y. 326,
87 N.E. 504 (1909); Rouse v. City of
Kinston, 188 N.C. I, 123 S.E. 482 (1924);
Volkmann v. City of Crosby, 120 N.W.Zd 18
(N.D.1963); Canada v. City of . Shawnee,
179 Oki. 53, 64 P .Zd 694 ( 1937) ; City of
Enid v. Crow, 316 P.Zd 834 (Okl.1957); cf.
Ross Common Water Co. v. Blue Mountain
Consol. W. Co., 228 Pa. 235, 77 A. 446
(1910); Horne v. Utah Oil Refining Co.,
59 Utah 279, 202 P. 815 (1921); Glover v.
Utah Oil Refining Co., 62 Utah 174, 218
P. 955 (1923).
Such waters can only be used in connection with the land from which they are
taken. See Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron
Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511, 165 So. 764
(1936), reaff'd on sub. app., 236 Ala. 173,
181 So. 276 (1938); Sycamore Coal Co. v.
Stanley, 292 Ky. 168, 166 S.W.Zd 293
( 1942); Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 251
Md. 428, 248 A.2d 106 (1968); Smith v.
City of Brooklyn, 18 App.Div. 340, 46
N.Y.S. 141, 54 N.E. 787 (1897); State
ex rel. Ericksen v. McLean, 62 N.M. 264,
308 P.Zd 983 (1957); Bayer v. Nello L.
Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.Zd 552
(1962); Volkmann v. City of Crosby, 120
N.W.2d 18 (N.D.1963); Canada v. City of
Shawnee, 179 Oki. 53, 64 P.Zd 694 (1937);
Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co.,
339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87 (1940); Silver King
Consol. Mining Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 297,
39 P.Zd 682 (1934); Evans v. City of Seattle, 182 Wash. 450, 47 P.Zd 984 (1935) .
[ 1] Tucson questions whether it may
pump water from its wells and transport
the water so pumped through its pipelines

to lands which lie within the watershed but
outside the Marana Critical Ground Water
Area. From what has been said concerning the American rule of reasonable use,
the answer to Tucson's question is, of
course, that it may not.
"There is no apparent reason for saying that, because defendant is a m_unicipal corporation, seeking water for the
inhabitants of the city, it may therefore
do what a private owner of the land may
not do. The city is a private owner of
this land, and the furnishing of water to .
its inhabitants is its private business. It
is imperative that · the people of the city
have water; it is not imperative that they
secure it at the expense of those owning
lands adjoining lands owned by the city."
Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 196 Mich.
75, 163 N.W. 109, at 114 (1917).
(2) We also pointed out in our first
decision in this case that the Avra-Altar
Valleys are a part of a critical water area,
being included within the Marana Critical
Ground Water Area. For the reason that a
critical ground water area is a ground water
basin or subdivision "not having sufficient
ground water to provide a reasonably safe
supply for irrigation of the cultivated lands
in the basin at the then current rates of
withdrawal," we held that additional users
would necessarily deplete the supply of the
existing users. Consequently, the conveyance of ground waters off the lands on
which wells in the Avra Valley are located
impairs the supply of the other land owners
within the critical area.
[3) Tucson argues that since by statute
A.R.S. § 45-301 et seq. only new irrigation
or drainage wells in critical a reas having a
capacity of more than 100 gallons per
minute are prohibited, the Legislature must
have intended to permit pumping for municipal purposes without restriction. But
the illegality of the use of ground water is
not dependent upon whether the Legislature has not forbidden the sinking of wells
as a source of supply to be used for municipalities. The right to exhaust the common supply by transporting water for use

Ariz.

173

Cite as 479 P.2d 169

l;rnds from which they are pumped
pf law controlled by the doctrine
onable use and protected by the con0 ' ·.
the state as a right in property.

nd

of

1 ;irncson

questions whether on equiprmciples it should be prohibited from
Ytrl~g ;water to Ryan Field. Ryan Field
r'field which we understand has ex.Jtast as 'long as petitioners have
i .
~ •ln agriculture. Its lands overlie
vri:!A!'tar water basin and geographilt 'lies· within the Marana Critical
Water Area so as to entitle it to
raw water from the common supply
purposes except agriculture. Tucson
li6t be prohibited .from delivering
to' Ryan Field for lawful purposes
lh~ ,iRyan Field supply is from the
i>asin over which it lies and from
h ,could legally withdraw water by
u,.?wn wells for domestic purposes.
'l'li'cson's delivery of water to pur• :w'ifhin the Avra-Altar drainage
ut 'out~ide the Marana Critical Ground
r Area is, however, without equitable
• . There is no indication in the
t~11t these customers of Tucson overwater basin so as to come within
rh1ciple applicable to Ryan Field. UnOn"can establish that its customers
,; the Marana Critical Ground Water
\It within the Avra-Altar Valleys'
· areas overlie the water basin so
-entitled to withdraw water from it,
rf 'no equities which will relieve it
. )l\i\ption heretofore issued.
1i:'·~etitioners request this Court to
e whether Tucson by acquiring
ln):ultivation in the Avra-Altar Val:"t, .remove the ground water used
lh9sc lands to other areas contrary
· '4-octrine of reasonable use. The
·' 'n<l Department joins petitioners in
ing that the first Jarvis decision be
rited by clarifying the rights of the
It . in this respect. Tucson also asks
to pass upon a like question alII h'. in somewhat a different form.
lol 0C11riae, however, oppose the request

·;;rt

of the parties that the Court expand on the ·
legal rights in question.
_
We think, however, that the problem is
critical to municipalities in Arizona and so
justifies our consideration even though not
strictly embraced . within the limits of t:he
issues of the original lawsuit. As indicated,
Jarvis' action invoked this Court's equitable
jurisdiction. We issued the injunction but
stated that we reserved the right to modify
or dissolve upon application accompan ied
1:iy a showing of circumstances as would
permit the legal pumping and transportation
of ground water by the City. Our decree
was consistent with the almost universal
rule that a court of equity when requested
will determine all the equities connected
with the main subject of the suit and grant
all the relief necessary to a complete adjustment of the litigation:
"It is a prirn;iple of equity that it does
justice completely and not by halves.
When a bill had been brought in good
faith to obtain relief within the jurisdiction of the court, the bill may be retained to do complete justice with rderence to the subject matter, even thou1~-h
upon the facts the specific relief pqyed
for cannot be given, and a bill wo1,1l,ci ,. ~9t.
lie for the sole purpose of obtainil'\g ·t~J
specific relief that is given. Reynolds v.
Grow, 265 Mass. 578, 580, 164 N.E. 650;
Booras v. Logan, 266 Mass. 172, 175, 164
N.E. 921 ; Degnan v. Maryland Casual ty
Co., 271 Mass. 427, 430, 431, 171 N.E.
482; Peerless Unit Ventilation Co., Inc.,
v. D'Amore Construction Co., 283 Mass.
121, 125, 126, 186 N.E. 280 ; Geguzis v.
Brockton Standard Shoe Co., 291 Mass.
368, 371, 197 N.E. 51; Somerville National Bank v. Hornblower, 293 Mass. 363,
368, 199 N.E . 918, 104 A.L.R. 1107."
Fields v. Othon, 313 Mass. !15, 46 N.E.2d
546, at 547 (1943).
[6, 7) It is also frequently stated as a
maxim of equity that equity follows the
Jaw. By this is meant that equity obeys and
conforms to the law's general rules and
policies whether the common law or statute law. See, e. g., Provident Building &
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Loan Ass'n. v. Pekarek, 52 Ohio App. 492,
3 N.E.2d 983 (1936). By A.R.S. § 45-147
the relative value of uses in appropriable
waters has been fixed by the Legislature
as first, · domestic · and municipal uses, and
second, irrigation and stock watering. The
creation of such a priority clearly evidences
a legislative policy that the needs of agriculture give way to the needs of municipalities. Hence, we hold that the decree in this
case will be modified if Tucson purchases or
acquires the title to lands within the AvraAltar Valleys which are now cultivated and
uses the water which would have been used
in cultivating such lands as a source of
supply for its municipal customers. Tucson
may withdraw an amount equal to the annual historical maximum use upon the lands
so acquired.

application to the installation known as
Ryan Field.

The · record in this case compels the conclusion that underlying the Avra-Altar Valley floor is a basin of gently percolating
waters. It is our decision, therefore, that
if Tucson acquires lands within the AvraAltar Valleys overlying th e Marana Critical
Ground Water Area it may withdraw water
from the basin for municipal uses to the
same extent as water prev iously withdrawn
for use on those lands. The water withdrawn may be either from wells on the lands
so acquired or from Tucson's presently existing wells, but in no event may water be
withdrawn both for use on the lands and
transported off the lands for municipal purposes. Any withdrawals shall be through
water metering devices available for inspection by all parties to this litigation
or their agents, and the devices will indicate
the current rates of withdrawal together
with the quantity of water withdrawn
monthly. Tucson will furnish quarterl y
records of its water withdrawals to the
Office of the State Land Commissioner
where they will be held available for examination by the public.

106 Ariz. 511

The injuncti on heret ofore issued will be
continued in effect except insofar as it has

LOCKWOOD, C. J., McFARLAND
and HAYS, J ., and WILLIAM W . NABOURS, Judge Superior Court, concur.

inequitable
of, evaluation.
clsfon of Court of Appeals vacated,
Inf of Superior Court reversed and

Ide/ and

matter remanded.

\ruckmeyer,
J ., not participating.
;
·'

NOTE: The Honorable JESSE A.
U DALL, J ., having disqualified himself,
the Honorable WILLIAM W. NABOURS,
Judge of the Superior Court of Yuma County, was called to participate in his stead.

w..__ __
0

~ KlY NUHIU SYSfH4

T

.

tlon

¢=>494(1)

ldlary does not have function of
I ting tax assessment regulations in
o f ijudicial opinions, but rather has
on ·with respect to such area of taxaf reviewing actions of administrative
nd ·o f superimposing its opinion only
i that agency has abused its legi sla• tegated duty.
Oh @=>543(8)

NAVAJO COUNTY, Arizona, Mohave Coon•
ty, Arizona, Apache County, Arizona, CO·
conlno County, Arizona, Yavap·a1 County,
Arizona, and State Department of Prop·
erty Valuation, Appellants,
v.
FOUR CORNERS PIPE LINE COMPANY,
Appellee.
No. 10139-PR.

ti,tution by trial court, in action by
owner against five counties and
~rtment of property evaluation to
ad.· valorum taxes on pipeline paid
,Jlt,o,test, of court's method of evaluatli at of department exceeded court's
cdon, absent finding, or evidence
nt to warrant finding, that Depa rthad employed inherently unjust or
ble method of evaluation. A.RS.
12;t01, 42--147, 42-147, subsec. B, 42-

Supreme Court of Arizona,
In Banc.
Dec. 31, 1970.

Pipeline owne r brought action against
five counties and state department of property valuation to recover ad valorum taxes on pipeline paid under protest. From
judgment of the Superior Court, Maricopa
County, Morris Rozar, J., in favor of pipeline owner, counties and department appealed. The Court of Appeals, 12 Ariz.
App. 348, 440 P.2d 496, affirmed. Qn petition
for review, the Supreme Court, McFarland,
J., held that substitution by trial court of
such court's method of evaluation for that
of department exceeded court's jurisdicti'o n,
absent finding, or evidence sufficient to
warrant finding, that department had em-

' Carlock & Ralston by George Read
F . Wilder, Phoenix,
l)ee.

~.,,and
. William
f·

Justice.

tan

petition £or review of a decision
, tate Court of Appeals, 12 Ari z.App.
:p.zd 496 which affirmed the judg' ~f the Maricopa County Supe rior
ft fn favor of the Appellee, Four Corlpe Line Co,, (hereinafter referred to
-Company) and adverse to the ap11nd the defendants in the court
< (Navajo County, Mohave County,
. hi! County, Coconino County and Ya-
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vapai County, hereinafter referred to as
the State) . The Company is the ownei: of
certain property involved in this case which
consists of a 16-inch diameter pipe-line
originating in the Four Corners area of
Arizona and thence crossing the counties involved into the Los Angel es area and which
is used primarily for the gathering and
transportation of crude oil. The pipe-line
was constructed in 1958 at the approximate
cost of $45,000,000.00. In 1967 it was valued
by the Interstate Commerce Commission
for rate making purposes at $35,000,000.00.
It has been stipulated by the parties here
that the portion of the pipe-lin e which is in
Arizona represents 45.4% of the total system. The sole question involved in this
ma tter is the valuation of the pipe-line by
the State Department of Property Evaluation for the purposes of ad valorem taxes.
It is contended by the Company that the
proper valuation should be $8,141,128.00.
On the other hand the State takes the
position that the valuation made by the Department was properly assessed at $19,799,985.00.
The Company, in accordance with the
statutes paid the taxes that were levied
against it by the State on behalf of the
various counties and then appealed the
taxation to the Superior Court. After a
lengthy trial, having heard witnesses from
both sides, it decided in favor of the Company that the proper assessed valuation
was, as claimed by the Company, $8,141,128.00. From this judgment the State appealed. The Court of Appeals sustained the
lower court and it is now before this Court.

In the lower court the Company raised
the question of the constitutionality of the
taxing system, claiming that they were deprived of due process of law in that a valuation, or method of evaluation, was pla ced
upon their property differing from that
used for other similar busin esses. This has
not been an issue in the appellate courts
and apparently has been abandoned by the
Company on appeal. However, the question
of du e process as far as taxation of companies, such as railroads and pipe-lines, has
recently been answered by this Court in the
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son "or" another without words of joint
tenancy or right of survivorship is not
within the provisions of the statute. To so
hold would require us to overrule the Johnson case.
[5-7] In that case, decided 14 years ago,
we expressed our views of the legislative
intent. We reiterated that statement in the
Kehl case eight years ago. We see no error
in the conclusions announced in those cases.
W_e feel that the Legislature intended by
this act to get away from the "confmion,
contradiction and perplexing distinctions"
and the uncertainties, resulting in such
transactions, occasioned by the judicial
opinions in the various states on this subject. The Legislature passed an act which
we have construed. Our construction has
not been since questioned by the Legislature.
The construction which we have placed
upon the act has been accepted and followed
by banks in their dealings with depositors
and by depositors in their dealings with the
banks, each other, and in their handling and
disposing of their funds. That construction
has become a rule of property in this state.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

ties or by answer in nature of cross-action
in same action, and sufficiency of evidence
to support such portion of decree may not
be considered on appeal from another portion thereof.
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, for all other definitions of
"Law of the Case'-' and "Res Judicata".
3. Limitation of actions <S:->55(5)

Where possession of land by corporat!on, claiming easement therein for irrigation canal, began ten years or more before
c?mmencement of corporation's suit to quiet
htle to such easement, right of action of defendants or their predecessors in interest
for damages was barred by statute of limitations at time of filing of their answer
claiming damages. Comp.St.1929, §§ 20207, 20-212.
4. Equity <!P66
L.imitation of actions .g::,155

A litigant, asking affirmative equitable
relief, will be required to do justice with
regard to any equity, arising out of subject
matter of action, in his adversary's favor,
and statute of limitations is no bar to imposition of such condition.
5. Pleading <!Pl48

0

i

t:·',EYc,No,UMc-:B-:cER-SY_S_TE""M

T

DAWSON COUNTY IRRIGATION CO. v.
STUART et al.

No. 31441.
Supreme Court of Nebraska.
Nov. 27, 1042.
I. Easements <!P7(2)

An "easement by prescription" cannot
be acquired except by open, notorious, exclusive and adverse user for ten years.
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, for all other definitions of
"Easement by Prescription".
2. Courts <!P99(1)

Judgment <!l=>720

A portion of decree not appealed from
becomes "law of the case" and is "res
judicata" as to issue decided thereby when
raised in another action between same par-

Under the Code, chancery practice is
so enlarged that answer in nature of crosspetition may properly seek affirmative relief beyond t_hat which is merely defensive,
and such rehef need not be based on equitable grounds, but matters set up in such
answer must be germane to original suit.
6. Adverse possession <!Pl

The right to "title by prescription"
comes into being by lapse of time under
conditions which have been fulfilled, and
every incident thereof must have ripened
before commencement of action to quiet
such title.
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, for all other definitions of
"Title by Prescription".
7. Equity <!P62

The maxim that "equity follows the
law" means in broad sense that equity
follows the law to extent of obeying it and
conforming to its general rules and policies,
whether contained in common or statute
law.
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, for all other definitions of
"Equity Follows the Law".

DAWSON COUNTY IRRIGATION CO. v. STUART
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8. Equity e:::>62

5. Affirmative relief, under our chancery
The maxim that "equity follows the practice, sought in an answer in the nature
law" is strictly applicable whenever parties' of a cross-petition must be germane to the
rights are clearly defined and established by original suit.
law, especially by constitutional or statu6. The maxim "Equity follows the law"
tory provisions.
in its broad sense means that equity follows
the law to the extent of obeying it and con9. Equity <!P66
The maxim that "he who seeks equity forming to its general rules and policies
must do equity" does not justify imposition whether contained in common or statute
of arbitrary conditions in order to carry out law.
what would amount to substantial justice
7. "The maxim is strictly applicable
between parties in chancellor's individual whenever the rights of the parties are
opinion, but only requires plaintiff to do clearly defined and established by law, es"equity", that is, what he should be required pecially when defined and established by
to do on established legal principles, and constitutional or statutory provisions." 30
should never be applied so as to require C.J.S., Equity, p. 503, § 103.
plaintiff to perform an act not devolved on
8. A claim for damages having been
him by such principles.
barred by statute of limitations, the maxim
See Words and Plu»ses, Permanent
"Equity follows the law" prevents i,ts asserEdition, for all other definitions of
tion in an answer in the nature of a cross"Equity" and "Ile Who Seeks Equity
petition in an action to quiet title to an
Must Do Eqnity".
easement obtained by prescription.
10. Equity <!P87(3)

Where claim for damages for taking of
land for irrigation canal and reduction of
value of adjacent lands not taken is barred
by statute of limitations, maxim that "equity
follows the law" prevents assertion of such
claim by answer in irrigation company's
equity suit to quiet title to easement for
such canal. Comp.St.1929, §§ 20-207, 20212.

Appeal from District Court, Dawson
County; Nisley, Judge.

Action in equity by the Dawson County
Irrigation Company against Leonard J,
Stuart and others to quie.t title to an easement for an irrigation canal, in which defendants affirmatively claimed damages fo:r
taking of land for the canal and reduced
Syllab·us by the Court.
value of adjacent lands. From a judgment
1. An easement by prescription cannot be awarding defendants damages, plaintiff apacquired except by open, notorious, exclu- peals.
sive and adverse user for a period of ten
Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
years.
Lyman M. Stuckey, of Lexington, 'for
2. A decree from which no appeal has been appellant.
taken becomes the law of the case, and is
Cook & Cook, of Lexington, for appel·
res adjudicata as to the same issues raised
by answer in the nature of a cross-action. lees.
Heard before SIMMONS, C. J.,_ and
3. "If a litigant asks affirmative equitable
relief, he will be required to do justice him- EBERLY, CARTER, MESSMORE and
self with regard to any equity arising out YEAGER, JJ.
of the subject-matter of the action in favor
of his adversary, and the statute of limitations is no bar to the imposition of such
YEAGER, Justice.
conditions." Bank of Alma v. Hamilton,
This is an action in equity by Dawson
85 Neb. 441, 123 N.W. 458, 133 Am.St.Rep. County Irrigation Company, a corporation,
676.
plaintiff and appellant, against Leonard J.'
4. Under the Code our chancery practice Stuar,t and Winifred S. Stuart, husband and
has been so enlarged that an answer in the wife, Wilfried V. Stuart and Mary T. Stu..
nature of a cross-petition may properly art husband and wife, Charles Francis
.~eek affirmative relief beyond that which is St~art and
C. Stuart, first real
merely defensive, and such relief sought name unknown, husband and wife, and
need not necessarily be based upon equitable Helen Stuart and - - - H. Stuart, first
grounds.
real name unknown, wife and husband, de-
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fendants and appellees. On the pleadings,
in form and substance, the plaintiff sought
to have title quieted to an easement for an
irrigation canal extending in an irregular
course and direction across the south onehalf of section thirty-six, township ten
north, range twenty-one west of the sixth
P . M., in Dawson county, Nebraska, and the
defendants denied the right of the plaintiff
to the easement claimed, and affirmatively
claimed damages for the value of the land
actually taken for the irrigation canal, and
for damages to adjacent lands not taken but
the value of which was reduced by reason
of the construction of the canal. Defendant Leonard J. Stuart is the owner of two. fifths of the land, and defendants Wilfried
V. Stuart, Charles Francis Stuart and
Helen Stuart are each owners of one-fifth
thereof.
The case was tried. to the court and
decree was entered quieting title in · the
plaintiff or its successors· in interest so long
as the easement shall be used for the irrigation purposes of the irrigation system, and
for ten years after abandonment of its use
in case it shall be abandoned. In case of
abandonm.e nt for t en years the easement
shall revert to the then owners of the land.

The theory on which plaintiff presented
its case and obtained the decree favorable
to it was that a prescriptive ·right had
ripened in its favor, that is, that it had
possession of the land involved for ten
years or more before the commencement of
the action under factual and lega l conditions, which entitled it to have title to an
easement declared therein by decree of
court.

(l] An easement by-prescription cannot
be acquired except by open, notoriou s, exclusive and adverse user for ten years.
Roe v. Howard County, 75 Neb. 448, 106
N.W. 587, 5 L.R.A.,N.S., 83 1; Agnew v.
City of Pawnee City, 79 Neb. 603, 113 N.W.
236; Dunbar v. O'Brien, 117 Neb-. 245, 220
N.W. 278, 58 A.L.R. 1033; Onstott v. Airdale Ranch & Cattle Co., 129 Neb. 54, 260
N.W. 556.

The defendants have not appealed, but
the plaintiff has appealed from the judgment rendered against it for damages.

(2] Whether or not this portion o f the
decree was supported by sufficient evidence
may not be considered here. From it, as
has been pointed out, no appeal was taken,
hence, it, to that extent, becomes the Jaw
of the case and is res adjudicata as to that
issue in another action between th e same
parties, or as to the same issue raised by
answer in the nature of a cross-action in
the same action. Wilch v. Phelps, 16 Neb.
515, 20 N.W. 840; Morgan v. Mitchell, 52
Neb. 667, 72 N.W. 1055; Wittenberg v.
Mollyneaux, 60 Neb. 583, 83 N.W. 842;
State v. Savage, 64 Neb. 684, 702, 90 N.W.
898, 91 N.W. 557; Shepard v. City of
Friend, 141 Neb. 866, 5 N.W.Zd 108.

Plaintiff bases its right to have the
judgment rendered against it reversed on
the proposition that the statute of limitations bars a right of recovery of damages
for taking and for reduction of value of
lands not taken. The theory of the defendants is that the action of the plaintiff being
in equity, and though it has a prescriptive
right to the easement which it has a right
to have enforced, the court may require
payment of damages as a condition of
qui eti ng titl e to the easement. They contend that this condition may be enforced
under the maxim of equity that he who
comes into equity must do equity.
The obvious effect of this contention is
that a court of equity solely and alone under
the authority of this maxim, without the
interposition of other considerations or conditions, has power to suspend the operation
of a statute of limitations against an action
at Jaw.

[3] The court in its decree found that
plaintiff's possession began ten years or
more before the commencement and, a
fortiori, found that the right of defendants
or their predecessors in interest to damage
accrued with the entry into possession under conditions which would ripen into an
easement with the lapse of time.
It must follow then that the right of
action claimed by defendants for damages,
since no continuing damage was claimed
but only for taking and depreciation in
value, accrued more than ten years before
the filing of the answer. It also follows
that the right of action of the defendants
or their predecessors in interest had expired long before the commencement of
this action and the filing of the answer.
See section 20-207, Comp.St.1929; also section 20-212, Comp.St.1929.
In support of their contention that they
have a right to their damage, the action of

As a part of the decree the defendants
were awarded judgment against the plaintiff
in the sum of $785 for the taking and damage to land.
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plaintiff being in equity, notwithstanding articles of adoption by which she was made
at law their action was barred by the statute
of limitations, the defendants cite Hobson
v. Huxtable, 79 Neb. 340, 116 N.W. 278;
Bank of Alma v. Hamilton, 85 Neb. 441,
123 N.W. 458, 133 Am.St.Rep. 676 ; Pettit
v. Louis, 88· Neb. 496, 129 N.W. 1005, 34
L.R.A.,N.S., 356; Bell v, Dingwell, 91 Neb.
699, 136 N.W. 1128; Love v. Park, 95 N eh.
729, 146 N.W. 941; Wis eman v. Guernsey,
107 Neb. 647, 187 N.W. 55.

an heir of th e estate. The defendants'
answer asserts, by way of defense, that the
plaintiff is a trustee ex maleficio. Th_e
effect of that defense is to define and hmit
the title interest which the plaintiff claims.
The statute of limitations would not be
avai lable to th e plaintiff to prevent such
a defense. * * *
"Though 19 years have elapsed since the
death of Anthony Shovel, it appears that
Susan Shovel, his widow, is still living and
[4] In the first paragraph of the sylla- had become entitled to a dower interest and
bus in Bank of Alma v. Hamilton, supra, possessory rights in the property. During
the rule is laid down as follows: "If a her Ji fetime there was no urgent reason
litigant asks affirmative equitable relief, he why the matter of the interests of ·:he
will be required to do justice himself with plaintiff and the defendants should be
regard to any equity arising out of the sub- settled. There is no suggestion that the
ject-matter of the action in favor of his plaintiff ever repudiated the trust or deni ed
adversary, and the statute of limitations is that James Shovel or his heirs were enno bar to the imposition o f such conditions."
titled to an interest in the estate, until the
An examination of the opinion discloses commencement of this suit. It was not unthat the action was to quiet ti.tie in plaintiff til that time th at the defendants became
as mortgage e in possession. The defendant apprised of the fact that she w~s auemptclaimed an equity in the land which plain- ing to exclude them from th e mhentance
tiff insisted was barred by the statute of and that she did not intend to carry out
limitations. It will be seen that this was the implied promise contained in the adopa situation where there were conflicting tion agreement. It is not suggested that the
equitable interests in and to th e same sub- defendants were aware of her attitude prior
ject-matter.
to that time nor that they were guilty of
In the eighth paragraph of the syllabus any !aches i~ failing to assert their right_s.
in Wiseman v. Guernsey, supra, it is stated: The statute of limitations does not begm
'-'Where a party comes into a court of to run against the rights of the h:neficiaries
equity asking affirmative equitable relief, he of such a constructive trust until they are
may be required to do equity w_ith regard to apprised of the fact that the t~u~tee did not
the subject-matter of th e action, and the intend to carry out the prov1s1ons of . the
statute of limitations is not available to him trust. In this case, they were not ~ppnsed
as a defense against the imposition of su ch of that fact until the trustee repudiated 1t.
The statute of limitations, therefore, had
requirements."
The action here was to quiet title by an not run against the claim of the defendadopted child to lands which had belonged ants."
to the adopting parent, who was deceased at
We do not discuss th e other cited cases
the commencement of the action, against since they are not in point from the standthe heirs of one who claimed the right to point of either fact or law.
take from the deceased adopting parent
[SJ It is ,true that under our Code the
under an agreement for adoption.
chancery practice has been so enlarged _:hat
From an examination of the opinion it a·n answer in the nature of a cross-petition
is apparent that the syllabus is but the state- may properly seek affirmative _relie f bey ond
ment of an abstract principle. No such that which is merely defensive, and that
question was decided by the court. In the
such relief sought need not necessarily be
opinion appears the following:
bas ed on equitable grounds. Armstrong v.
"Plaintiff pleads the statute of limitations Mayer, 69 Neb. 187, 95 N.W. 51. Howas a bar to any claim of interest by the ever the matters set up m such answer
defendants to the property in question. mus~ be germane to the original suit.
The defendants, however, did not bring this
No decision of this court has been found
action to establish a constructive trust in
which passes upon the question of whether
the property, but have set .up such a trust in
or not the claim of defendants here for
defense of the plaintiff's action. The plaindam ages is germane to the subject-ma.tter
tiff claims under the agreement in the
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of plaintiff's cause of action. Reason supports the view, and there is authority sustaining it, that the two are not germane.
51 C.J. 237, sec. 198.
[ 6] The right to title by prescription is
a right which has come into being by lapse
of time under conditions which have been
fulfilled. If it exists at all, every incident
of the right has ripened before the com mencement of the action to quiet title based
upon the right. Moreover, in an action at
Jaw for ejectment by another from the
lands held, holding by prescriptive right
would be available as a defense and it need
not, agreeable to good authority, even be
pleaded specially. It may be proved under
a general denial. 1 Am. Jur. 924, sec. 235.
Furthermore, the action to quiet title is an
action in rem and the action for damages
is in personam, each pertaining to entirely
different subject-matter.

[9)

In the case of Alexander v. Shaffer,

38 Neb. 812, 57 N.W. 541, 542, the defendant set up in hi s answer a cl aimed li en obtained by reason of purchase of tax certificates on which he had not obtain ~d tax
deed, nor had he foreclosed his lien within
five years which was the statutory period
within which he was required to take .a tax
deed or foreclose the lien. D emurrer to th e
answer was sustained. The court said:
"It seems therefore established by the
statute and by the later decisions of this
court that the limitation fixed in the revenue
law is not merely a limitation as to the
right of action, but it is a limitation upon
the duration of the li en its elf, and that,
upon the expiration of the period, it is not
merely the remedy to enforce the lien which
expires, but the lien itself is extinguished
absolutely.
"The max im that 'he who seeks equity
.must do equity' has never been so applied
as_to justify a court in imposing arbitrary
conditions in order to carry out what, in the
individual opinion of the chancellor, would
amount to substantial justice between the
parti es. The rule only requires the plaintiff
to do 'equity;' that is, to do what, upon
established legal principles, he shou ld be
required to do. It has sometimes been applied in cases where the defendant was not
in a position to affirmatively seek relief
himself, but the vast preponderanc e of
authority is that the maxim should never
be applied so as to requir e that th e plaintiff
should perform an act not devolved upon
him by established legal or equitable prin ciples."

[7, 8] There is another convincing reason why defendants may not have their
claim for damages in this action. The reason
inheres in the maxim of equity that "Equity
follows the law." This maxim, in 30 C. J .
S. Equity, p. 503, § 103, is explained gene rally as follows: "In a · broad sense the
maxim means that equity follows the law to
the extent of obeying it and conforming to
its general rules and policies whether contained in the common or statut e law."
Again, as pointed out in 30 C. J. S. Equity,
p. 503, § 103, "The maxim is strictly applicable whenever the rights of the parties are
clearly defined and established by law, especially when defi,ned and est ablished by
[10] The claim of def endants for damconstitutional or statutory provisions."
ages having been barred by the appropriate
This court, following th e principl es thus statute of limitations, the maxim " Equity
announced, in a case not similar as to facts follows the law" prevents its assertion in
but comparable in principle, stat ed: "When the answer in this case.
The decree of the district court to the
it is determined that the fund is an asset
of the bank in the hands of th e receiver, a extent that it awa rded judgment in favor
court of equity must follow the banking law of the defendants is reversed and the claim
specifically dealing with it as such." J or- of the said defendants is dismissed. Othgenson v. Department of Banking, 136 Neb. erwise the decree is affirmed.
1. 284 N.W. 747, 749.
Reversed in part. Affirmed in part.
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Application of THOMSON.
.THOMSON v. NEBRASl<A STATE RAIL·
WAY COMMISSION.

limited amount of shipping, th e fact th at
no essential shipping service _wou!d be discontinued, and the prospective mconvenience to few shippers concerned.

Railroads ¢:::>225
.
.
While income of a railroad stat10n_ 1s
Supreme Court of Nebraska.
an element to be considered in determmmg
whether an agency shall be d1scontmued,
Dec. 4, 1942.
it is not in itself controlling but must. be
I. Public service commissions €::=>32
considered with all other elem ents bearmg
On appeal from order of railway c_um- upon reasonableness under the circummission the only questions to be determmed stances.
are whether commission acted within scope
of its authority and whether order com- 6. Railroads P9(2), 2 25
The ruling of railway comm1ss10n _o r
plained of is reasonabl e, and where act10n
of commission is not arbitrary and does of Supreme Court on quest10n. of c.1snot exceed -its powers or violate a_ rule continuance of an agency at any given time
of law the Supreme Court will not mter- does not a mount to an adjudication for : he
fere ;ith commission's findings of fact future, but is only a judgment O',' the condisince they involve "administrative" and tions presented by the apphcat 10 ? . a nd re" legislative" rather than "judicial ques- la tes only to the time and cond1t10n presented.
tions".
No. 31449.

See Words and Phrases, P ermanent
Edition, for all other definitions of
''Administrative
Question",
"Judicial
Question" and "Legislative Question".
2.

Rallrnads €::=>225.

The matter of time necessary to be devoted to performance of duti_es by an agent
of a railroad is important m determ1mng
whether railway commissi on acted arbitrarily in denying an application for discontinuance of an agency and substitutmg
caretaker's service.
3. Carriers €::=> 11

5.

Syllabus by the Court.
"On an appeal to th_e supreme
court from an order of the ra1_lway co1'.1mission administrative or leg1sl at1v e_ m
nature, the only questions to be. determmed
are whether the railway comm1ss1on acted
within the scope of its authonty and if
the order complained of is reasonable and
not a rbitrarily made. Where the actwn
of the railwa y commi ssion is not unreasonable or arbitrary and does not excee_d
its powers or violate a ru!.e o_f law, _this
court will not interfere with its ~ndmgs
of fact for the reas on that they mvolve
administrative and legislative rather than
judicial questions." Furstenberg v. Omaha
& C. B. Street R. Co., 132 Neb. 562, 272 N.
1.

A "common carrier", in addition to
being a commercial a?d tra~spor~ation enterprise for profit, 1s a public service
facility" with duti es owing to the domam
it traverses, and to the people resident and w. 756.
commercially engaged in areas tnbutary 2_ The matter of time necessa ry to be
to the carrier, and the necessities, require- devoted to the performance of duties . by
ments and convenience of tributary areas a n agent of a railroad is a matter of immust be considered and reasonably pro- portance in determining whether _or not
the railway commission . acted arbi_tranly
tected.
and unreasonably in denymg an apphca t10n
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, for all other defi_u itions of
for the discontinuance of an agency.
"Common Carrier" and "Public Service
3_ Historically and legally a common
Facility''.
.
· ,a·d dition to being
earner,
1n
. a commercial
. .
and transportation enterprise for_ profit, is
4. Railroads €::=>225
a public service facili ty with duties owmg
The railroad commission's denial of to the dom ain it traverses and to th e
authority to railroad's trustee to discontinue people resident and commercia lly engaged
se rvi ce of an agent and to substitute ther~- in the areas tributary to the earner, and
for a caretaker was arbitrary und er . evithe necessities, requirements and - convendence disclosing the amount of service re- ience of the tributary areas must be ·conquired of an agent, the saving to be efsidered and reasonably protected.
fected by substitution of caretaker, the
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city requested numerous , corrections to an
application, but had not yet issued a decision.
129 W:ash.i\pp. at 58~1, 590, 120 P.3d 110.
The court .stated, "Sympathetic .though :we
may be to the CaHfases' frustration ove; four
years of delay, we c:mnot read chapter 64.40
RCW as pei,nitting a ge1wral caU;,e of-action
for .arbitrary and capricious administrative
delay "1, pro~essing a permit app,lj_c~j;io~.''.
Id. a~ 592, 120 P.3d 110. We eJqJlahie<f.that,
"dela:ir ip , processing or granting a permit
may be ac.tionable under chapter 6_4.40
as__ an 'ar)Jiti:~ and capricious,' final .decision, or an 'ar,pitrary
capricious' f;iiiure
to ac_t .within t~e time limits estiibl,ished by
lav,::' _Id. at 596, 120 P.3d 110.2 But, the
claim her~ is not what was contemplated by
that statement.
·· · ·

-~cw

and

nal decision prong that occurred prior, to ·
fmal decision-.
11 23 . Insofar -as Birnhaurn's claims
e
based ;\!po_n arbitrary an_d capricious req ·
fm,-,,mqre informatioi:i aI!d,:delay prior to .
nnal d_ecis~on, · the. _c la~,.s.eeks ,damages
recoy/lrablf:l um;ler thi;l prong .of the tatµ
Qis.II\issal of these clai:tns,,under CR l,2(b
W!l,S.proper.

n ..''The-Adequate Relief Theory
.. .

r , ,;:

!1 -

.i

.

,

•

'

,

' , .

'.' ( •

-~ 24 '.fh,~ tri~ coru,:t 'iietimni~,eg 'thll -.,.
~ -~~e, the pe~t -'r~: ~a11,~g l3irn~ ,
~e1yl~d, ;~?eq\lfte .re\ief ,fnd, PW:~~1~~
was n.ot ent1tl~d_t;o daJI1age~ ,u .
ch;iptiir. 64.,W RCW. Tl'ie Browers .
sh~h,_v]at application with'th~ Pierce;
II 21 .,Rather, the Hayes and ·l\,1.issi011,
Plam:ung and Lands Servi.ce· De
Springs, Inc. v: City of Spokan~, ..134Wash.2d 947, 954 P.2d 250 (1998) decisions (PALS). : ~rower, 96 Was~.Ap~-' a( ~
_They, belie~ed;tii~f lp;ir,fcff
are examples of how the statute 'applie.~ ;;;; P.
to an existing access road Would tie ' ex
delay damages under the ,fina\ decision
from ' wetlands review.
at 56i,
prong. In Mission Springs, the city c9uncil
1036, But, PALS did not gtaiit the well
vo~d to with~old a grading permit from an
review exemption becausi it determin '
appHcarit,, that had a legally vested right t{J_
access point was just a dirt p'ath, 'lriot'
the permit. 134 Wash.2d at 953-54, 954 P.2d
exisf}ng
~oad: Id. The Broi#ers·app-eai'
250. The applicant sued for delay cia'mages
within 30 days of the vote, and the ' city P 4S ·decislon to :a; hearin~ wmillef'!
Tl'ie .hearirig" examiner reversed, coriclu
ultjn:!ateiy rescinded its vote . ..J:G-,Id. at 954,
that: the iirtlprovements were' exempt" ,
957, 954 P.~d 250. The Supreme Court dewetlari'dsreview. "Id. The Btowers -,i.to
termined that the applicant could p~rs~e desilant to ,chitpter 64.40 RCW fo ds:magee·
lay damages. Id. at 961-62, 954 ' P.2d' 250.
"the· expense of defa·y 'and either harms- '
But, those danil\ges were only incµrred after
·curred subsequent ' to the hearing e
the city COU!f Cil :nade a final . decision by
affirmatively voting to withhold the _pe'rnrit. decfaicin during the administrative :ap
h
Likewise, the Hayes court allowea' d:(rii~kes,
but th~. damages were incurred after,t'.~f c_
i~ ~11 25. This court reasoned -that ah i~p
council placed ari arbitrary restrictioh.on' 'th'e cant ll'annot ibring a claim unless {l)i
permit. 131 Wash.2d at 717-18, 9lll'fl:za' have ;exhausted: all administrative rerti1
1179.
. . .
and (2) :the relief granted by the ad · ·
II 22 Under the final decision d~img, · the tive remedy·· is inadequate. Id.: at,,
final decision is the act which triggers the 984 P.2d 1036. ,The .Browers dministn
cause of action. The definition of d~rnages ly appealed the adverse wetlands exem
limits recovery to those damages 't hat occur decisfon and obtained the reliefthey
after the cause of action accru~~: ffollply reversal. Id. at 561, 984 P:2d 1036: ''Becll
put, the statute does not conteniplate ·dam- the l;lrowers received .adequate reiief::
ageg.....;.for delay or otherwise-under the ·fi- had no cause of action-and no right fu··:

1!:w'«(~r1

Qq

:~?.W?~· ·

ta.

~qil
934·'

u

'sou

2.. Callfas stated, "[i]ndeed, a permit applicant
like the Callfases would have a claim under
chapter . 64.40 RCW for delay damages, as' .we
noted above, without a writ once the tardy permit was issued." Ca l/fas, 129 Wash.App. at 597,

120 P.3d 110. This statement is not reconci\o
:.:-with the. statutory definition of damages, ·w '
tha~ opinion had no occasion r0 analyze. · .
respectfully reject it.

s-while exhausting:administrative reine;
• l;d. at 566, ,984 P.2d;1036..; · ··
26 -However, Brower does not stand for
tbll proposition that, as a matter of law the
'o f :a permit >is adequate relief .,;hich
p.recludes . every· action for damages under
i,apter 64:40 RCW. 'Fhe Brower court was
~t asked to decide that question,,, Hllre,
adequ~w relief from exhaustion of administia.tiv'e remedie's w~ riot' availdble.· ··unlike
B~ . ; the County's allege_d 'arbitrary' and
p:ricious ·requests for' tnore ' inforitfation
ere part and · parcel 'of the j:Jennit1 review
.
and ·were 'not the ·subject' of ·arf ad~
lfative· ap·p'eal or other forrifof 'el'L'
· s·
"-'1a·u
. ll of administrative iemedy'.
Likewise,
tbere :.~!!11 no , adtninist,r11tiv~ , remedy ,.t<J .,exa_u st t;o~_the claiIJ?ed vio)atio.ripf the 120 clay
~ ; _~1-, ' Brdwer does !lot··
hef e·

grant

0

~p}\f

• ·,·Ill, Collateral Attack
.;'

· 'toppe'l

·

and Collaterat11!Jl1
i"' :-. . ··':rt,, ;

...II 27 The County also argues · that J3irn~ ·s laws1;1it is an impermissibl,e, colillteral
. erig~ .. tQ _the 2006 decision -that,-should
~ ve bee11 ~rQught as a l,~nd '!)s~ P~titi~n
i\ct -;(~UPA), chapter 36.7QQ ,RCW,.,,.cl~m.
li'11rt~n!r, it 3-\'gues that the la,wsuit is. barred
collateral estoppel because challenging
hearing exafoiner's ' 2006' decision , -re~
questing more 'information would be,a second
Jitigition of issues already decided.
.:•·· II 28 The 2006decision stated! .
0Th~-request for a conditional use permit to
.., anow _establishment of'a·camp-ground and
; '·' a~!lodfated recreational uses 'is ·hereby i-e.' .. tumed
Pierce County Planning. arid
Lai:id Sertices and the· Pretce County Enc
' 'vfronmetital Official for furll'i~i: review as
'. ....1.zj9set forth above. In the ai;,,;;rnative',' the
' applicant 111ay consider .-this decision a final
d,~ni11I of th~ conditional use application f~r
pUrp0S!JS, Of appeal. :(Jp9n 'cpmpletion .Of
r¢view or'th~ abqye ite.m,s an'd the prepara,
.,.tj9n of a more _detailed site plan, this mat. fer, may be ' rescheduled for hearing wi~)l
notice as in the 'first instance and 'specific
written notice to parties of record.
·
Birnbaum diif not treat it as a 'final decision
· and exercise her option to appeal. She exercised her option to· submit a revised plan,
which the County treated as part of · the

to

original application,mot;as ·a ._new .application.
+\'loreover, Birnbaum ,is challenging -the
Coun.t y's requ~i;;ts .for more ,'information: that
occurred):>e~een, ~he 2006.!leaision allfthe
2010 approval, not tbe ,request for more -i!l.format1on in the 2o06' decision itself. . .b~lies logic to say thatbet' dai~{ w~re: b;;;~d
before the County even made cthe .r,equlist's:
11 29 We agree that if this were a -c'hafti!hge
to , the -2006 decisiQll it wo1;1ld , qe , prr,i(!Juded
1Wd er · one o:r more· tr.,e9tj~s_,J,i · ,fl<i;,yeve,r,· the
County's argum~ptilHl,t~:Pll-~ed _on a mis~haracterization cif Birnbaum's claims. Accordingly,·'Bitnbaunfr1awsuit' i~ ·not ari imperniis·1-1
, , the -- 2006 ,''decision
s11;,e
coII ateral .a:ttack·,,m
that; should have :been brought as ·a L UPA
claim., .Likewise, her claim is not collaterally
estopped.

it

·, IV. Atiorn_ey's Fees_
11 30 ~oth parties · reHu~~~i ,a~torney',S-,,fees
pursuant to RAP 18.1 and. RCW 64.40.020(2),
w~ich provides tjlat_,' ~~e ;prevailing party
"may . be entitled .to reasonable CQ~fu and
attorney's fells." Because''\.he County is the
prevailing party, we award it reasonable
costs and fees. .. ·

1131 We affirm.
WE CONCUR: SPEARMAN, A.C.J:, and
BECKER; J.
w.

.

0 -~ IUY NUMBER SYSTEM
T

1_67 Wash.App. 789

ANGE:(.,o PROPERTY co., LP,

a ,,

.Wa,shingto11Jimited pajner~pip,
.

Respol)dent,
v.
I-

,.

Maged HAFIZ, an individual
dba''The Nile; A:ppellant.
No. 4086&--S--:IL
Court of Appeals of y\lashjngton,
Divisiori Z:
·
: r-i -

April 17, 2q12. :.
B.ackground; Landlord· brought unlawful
detainer action against tenant, and tenant
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ii 51 Maged!/!. return )o Angelo of hath set forth the legal basis for the trial
actual and legal possession· of the property first .to "convertt>,65 the unlawful detainer;
resolved . the "right to possession" and extin- tion iii.to an ordinary civil action for d
guished the trial court's narrow subject mat- and then to hear his counterclaims undeIV·
tel' .. jurisdiction conferred by the unlawful trial: court's general subject matter j ·
detainer statute; therefore, . the trial court tion; (3) ·he di~not invite the trial courl
.Jac}{ed authority to ,issue any;,,_WZadditional 'f'hybrid[ize]'" 66 its jurisdiction .over, UDla
orders, rulings, and, factual determinations ful detainer matters or to apply the•·wro
while the case remaine<l an ·unlawful detainer degal ·rule:in determining which,counterc
,action. We _reitel'.ate; "[i]n: an ·unlawful de- it could hear under its statutory unla
_tainer action, the coµr.t ,sits .l!/i! ·a special statu- detainer-jurisdiction; and (4) it was .A
tory tribunal to summarily d~c;ide the \~sue~ that persuaded the trial court that··
authorized by. statute ,and -.rwt,as a court .. of was .•still asserting a "[legal] right to
general jurisdiction )\4th .the po~er to hear sion" and that the court needed to retain
and determine 9ther) ssue,s !' . Gr.ana4 99 ,unlawful detainer jurisdiction, even . tb,o ·
Wll!lh.2d at 571; ,6.(\3 P.2d .83!),- .Acc_ordingly, Maged had clearly relirrquished.- all po
we vacate (1) ,pai;t fouqif t)le trial court's TY rig4ts to .property. Angelo's invite.cl,
A,ugust .15, 2()0@ .o{del.', conclud)ng the "issue argument.fails:
,.
.
,.,
of legal poss~~:'.~n to ,the ..[property]. is n_ot / _ [1 4, 151 ,r 53 The invited error d ,'
yet ,~esolved , _and (2) all of the tn~ ':::?.'prohibit[s]a party 'froni setting up an'
courts orders, · rulings,_ and_factual .detenru- at trial and then complaining of il ori.
nations entered after August 15, ·including, ·peal.' " City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 w
not limi,ted t~, the tri~l court's_s~mmary 71 71 720, 58 P.3d 273 (2002) (quoting s
Judgm~nt d;smi;i~_:!1 ":t~ preJudice . of Pam, 101 Wash.2d 507, 511, 680 P.2d
'."1aged s. construc~~e . eVIct10~ · counterclaim, (l9S4), overru/.ed on other grounds by s
1\,, final order and Judgment m favor of Anv. Olson, l26 Wash.2d 315, 893 P.2d ·
~elo, and its aw~d to ~pilo of attorney fees (1995)). The invited error doctrine, h~w~
mcurred after this date.
does not apply to subject matter jurisdic
issues. As we earlier noted, . Wash{ri
F. Invited Error Doctrine Not Applicable
~ourts have l~ng hel.d that "[plartim,;., , ,
11 52 Angelo .argues that, to _the extent the confer subject . matter jurisdiction oni
,trial court erroneously ruled on a Jurisdic- court by agreement between themselv :
tional issue, we s-hould excuse the error be- ·court either has subject matter· juristll,'c.
cause Maged allegedly "invited" the error by or it does not." In re Marriage oJ F , ·
filing his motion to am~n.d his ans"1Ver and_ to 115 Wash.App. at 667, 63 P.3dS21 (emp
include counterclaims.64 . Br. of ·Resp't at 18. added). Angelo has cited no autih6rity ho
Maged responds that (1) he did not ask the ing that that the invited . error doctrinliJ
-.
.'trial court to hear his coliliterclaims under its plies to a trial court's eri;pr in
u,nl.awful detainer jurisdiction; (2) instead, he jurisdiction that it does not have. 67

?~t

\

hearing when it granted Angelo authority to re
let the property. thus, fully resolving the "right to
possession,". terminating tlie unlawful detainer
action. and opening the option of converting the
unlawful . detai~er proceeding into an ordinary
civil action for damages to consider Maged's
counterclaims.
62.

Angelo provides no argument to support its
bald assertion that the invited err.or doctrine may
excuse a trial court's error based on lack of

.64.

subject matter jurisdiction. Beca\)se this'.
assertion fails to comply with the RAP 10.3(
requ,i rements, we do not further consider.it.,,

65.

Reply Br. of Appellant at 7.

.66. Reply Br. of Appellant at 6 (quoting V -~
29),
'

CP at 102 .

63. See infra pp. 35- 36, in the Attotney Fees section of this analysis.

Wash.
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67. We ac~owledge, however,. Division One!i
cent explanation .that article 4, section 6 of '
state constitution grants the .superior c
broad jurisdiction over ·real estate disputes/ n,
compassing even a landlord's failure to fol
chapter 59.12 RCW's statutory--requirementid
commencing an unlawful detainer action. H

.. ~154, Angelo

baldly asserts that -Maged
:?llked the trial coµrt to, c,oi:isider his counl{l.r,l!laims a!ter , as~grting unl~:-ivful detainer j~_risdiction under chapter 59.12 RCW. This
argument
however,
mischaracterizes
Maged' re 'est, which was that the trial
court ' rst needed to convert the unlawful
det · er action, into an ordinary civiLaction
under Munden .and then it co.uld . hear his
_<;~~n~rclaim_s: Accordingly, we ,holci that t)ie
,invjted error doc;trine does JiOt .apply J:ier~.
II. ,'

REMAINING AsSJGNMENtS OF ERROR

' ,i 55 In addition to ~ther e~qrs sub;ume\l
1
in the arguments :µready ,adch:rssed, M_age1
also assigns error to the following trial court
actions
August · J.5, 2008:(1) striking
· ·Maged'.s, supplemental affidavit in opposition
to summary-judgment, (2): denying Maged'.s
-motion for revision·under:CR 54(b),..(3) strik·ing Maged's affidavit in support. of his ,motion
· ;for revision, (4) striking ;Maged's a'.ttorneyis
post-hearing declarati1m; (5); enter,ing1at,final
order and judgment agajnst . N.(aged, ~nd_(~)
several of the trial coiiri's firtdings ·of'fact 'and
conclusions of law.· ' ·
·. . 156 In vacating the tria! court's summary
judgment for Angefo arid ,, dismissal ?f
Maged's counterclaim, 'we have alr~lo\dY hel_d
that (1) the trial court lacked sribjed"m'attei:
jurisdiction over Maged's constructive eviction counterclaim.in the.c,1,mtext -of the.µµ,lawful detainer action; (2) ,the trial court erred
ill concluding that, the ;'issue of legal posses~ion ~ the. [property] ["-'.as) not ,yet resolved" 68 11,S , of Aug\lst 15, 2008; (3) the tria1
.court lo~t its statuti?n: uni.awful detainer authority, oV\ff the limited property possession
issue .after August 15, when the trial ~qµrt
~xpressly restor~d to Angelo the right to
possess the property, which Maged had unequivocally ·relinquished the month before;
and (4) as such, the trial'·court lacked juris-

after ·

Auth. of the City .of Seattle ·v. Khadija Bin., 163
Wash.App. 367, 369, 373- 376, 260 P.3d 900
(2011); see"also Tacoma Rescue Mission v. Stew,
art, 155 Wash.App. :250, 254 n. 9, 228 P.3d 1289
(2010).
Division One's broad interpretation of the su. perior court"s·-retention •of unlawful detainer jurisdiction in- the ·,above situation. however, does
not squarely address the issue before us her~:
'tJnlik'e the procedurally' nbncompliant landlord
in Khadija Bin, Angelo properly ·commenced its

diction to issu~any further- orders; rulings, and factual determinations after this
date while 'purporting to retain unlawful detainer jurisdiction. For. the same ,reasons,
we vacate all of the trial 'court•s·· post-August
15, 2008 ·orders;rulings; and factual determinations, ·
·

·m: ,AIToRNEY

FEEs

,r 57 · Maged assigns en-or t? the tri:\.l
courti~ lfward 'to Angelo of attorney fees incurred belo"' after August ·15, 2008, by which
date he had clearly relinquished all possession df the :pl'operty to Angelo and, thus, ~he
trial court had lost jurisdiction to enter additional orders under chapter 59.12 RCW. We
agree. For the rl'!.asons ~lil-, have already
st;atea in _reversinlflne tnaLcourt's summary
judgment order and other post-August 15,
2008 orders, rulings, and factual determinations, we also vacate the trial court's award
to Angelo of attorney fees incurred after
August 1~, 2008.
11 58 Both Angelo ·and Maged · request attorney fees on appeal. ·We awM'd reasonable
attorney fees if allowed by statute, rule, or
contract, and if a party reql!ests such_fees in
his ' op~i4ng brief. ' RAP 18.l(a); , Malted
Mousse; Inc. v. Steinmetz, 150 Wash:2d 518,
535, 79 P.3d ii54 (2003). Here, secti9n 42 of
the lease agreement entitles. the prevailing
party to reasonable attorney fees for any
action or proceeding under the le'ase. Angelo's unlawful detainer action and Maged's
constructive eviction claim stem from the
parties' op)igations under their lease. ,Th_ere_fore, because Maged prevails on appeal, we
award him attorney fees and costs' on appeal
under RA:P0"I8.l, and we deny Angelo's request;
· ;.~l~wful detainer action and invoked th_e trial
·court'i; ·statutory· unlawful detainer jurisdiction
under chapter 59.12 RCW, which, as we have
already ~Jlplained, i~. a jurisdi<;tion lim_ited . _i_n
scope, at least at that point. Nor does ~had11a
Biti discuss a superior court's attempt ·to hybn..,dize'.' its unlawful detainer and general-civil actionjurisd.i ction as the trial c_ourt attempted here.
· A¢cordingly; Khadija Bin does not apply to the
issues bf!fore us in this· case. · ·
·
·
·
68. CP at 102.
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APPEAL OF WILLIAMS
Cite

In the Matter of the Appeal of David · R.
WILLIAMS d/b/a Industrial Communications From a Decision of the Wyoming Public Service Commission In
Docket No. 9661, Sub 1 Dated May 18,
1979, As Altered By Its Decision Dated
August 29, 1979.
David R. WILLIAMS, d/b/a Industrial
Communications, Appellant ·
(Petitioner),

v.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
WYOMING and Commercial Cornrnuni"cations, Inc., Appellees (Respondents).
No. 5410.
Supreme Court of, Wyoming,
April 10, 1981.
Rehearing,Denied r.iay 12, 1981.
Radio common carrier appealed from
an order of the District Court, Laramie
County, C. Stuart Brown, J., which affirmed an order of the Public Service Commission reducing its service area. The Supreme Court, Raper, J., held that: (1) Public Service Commission had jurisdiction to
regulate radio common carriers by imposing
restrictions on grant of certificates of public convenience and necessity and its exercise of such jurisdiction was not preempted
by Federal Communications Commission,
and (2) Public Service Commission, which
determined that operations of two radio
common carriers overlapped and were interfering with the other contrary to public
interest did not act improperly in reducing
radio common carrier's service area.
Affirmed.
1. Appeal and Error 111=>171(1)

Generally, parties are bound by theories they advanced below.
2. Appeal and Error <3=>23, 882(1)
Under doctrine of i!}vited error, if a
party induces action by a court or an agency, he will not be heard on appeal to argue
error based upon that action; however, a

challenge to a court's or a quasi-judicial
body's jurisdiction over subject matter can
never be waived and it is open to consideration by reviewing court whenever it is
raised by any party or it may be raised by
court of its own motion.
3. States <3=>4.10
Public Service Commission.had jurisdiction to regulate radio common carriers by
imposing conditions on grant of certificates
of public convenience and necessity and its
exercise of such jurisdiction was not preempted by Federal Communications Commission. W.S.1977, § 37-2- 205(a); U.S.C.A.
Const. Art. 6, cl. 2; Communications Act of
1934, § 22l(b), 47 U.S.C.A. § 221(b).
4. Public Service Commissions <U=6.6
Public Service Commission has continuing jurisdiction over public utilities and
thus the power to amend certificate of publk necessity and convenience.

5. Telecommunications 111=>406
Public Service Commission, which determined that operations of two radio common carriers overlapped _and were interfering with the other contrary to public interest, did not act improperly in reducing radio
common carrier's service area after. giving
it notice that it had burden of demonstrating that its certificate of public convenience
and necessity could not be revoked.
6. Public Service Commissions <3=>32
Ultimate weight to be given evidence
before Public Service Commission as trier
of fact is to be determined in light of expertise and experience of members of that
agency.
Michael A. Neider, Salt Lake City, Utah
(argued) specially admitted for purposes of
this case, and Walter P. Faber, Jr., Salt
Lake City, Utah, and Ward White of Guy,
Williams & White, Cheyenne, for appellant.
John D. Troughton, Atty. Gen., Thomas J .
Carroll, III, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Steven
R. Shanahan, Lawrence J . Wolfe, Asst. Attys, Gen., Cheyenne, (argued) for appellee
Public Service Commission.

as, Wyo., 626 P.2<J564

David H. Carmichael (argued) of Carmichael, McNiff & Patton, Cheyenne, for appellee Commercial Communications, Inc.
Before ROSE, C. J., and McCLINTOCK • ,
RAPER, THOMAS and ROONEY, JJ.
RAPER, Justice.
From an order of the district court affirming an order of the Public Service Commission (PSC), David R. Williams d/ b/a
Industrial C9mmunications (appella~t) feels
aggrieved and appeals. Several issues are
presented. Their focus is upon the PSC's
authority to regulate radio common carriers.1 Appellant states the questions raised
as follows:
"1. Whether the Commission exceeded
its authority in attempting to allocate
common carrier two-way radio telephone
channels when the allocation and granting of such channels is in the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
"2. Whether the Commission exceeded
its authority by requiring the parties to
obtain or relinquish radio channels ·and
otherwise comply within a cei,tain period
of time because the parties have no control over the FCC which has exclusive
jurisdiction of such matters.
"3. Whether the Comrriission exceeded
its authority in attempting to limit Industrial Communication's radio service area
when the grant of any common carrier
radio service area is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the FCC.
"4. Whether the Commission without a
basis in fact or law arbitrarily and capriciously reduced Industrial Communication's service area granted in 1977."
Appellee, Commercial Communications,
Inc. (Commercial), views the case more simply as asking:
"A. Whether the regulatory action taken by the Wyoming Public Service Commission, in the instant case, is prohibited
• Retired March 26, 1981, but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case
pursuant to order of the court entered March
30, 1981.

Wyo.
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because of the doctrine of 'federal preemption'?
"B. ·whether the Wyoming Public Service Commission exceeded its statutory
authority in modifying previously fosued
Certificates of Convenience and Necessity, in the instant case, by attaching· certain conditions to those Certificates and,
if so, may the Petitioner, David R. Williams d/b/ a Industrial Communications,
successfully assert reversible error at this
point in the proceedings?"
We will affirm the district court.
In January of 1977 Commercial filed its
application with the FSC for authority to
commence radio telephone service to the
cities of Rawlins and Evanston in southwestern Wyoming. This was done pursuant
to § 37- 2-205(a), W.S. 1977, which provides:
"(a) No public utility shall begin construction of a line, plant or system, or of
any extension of a line, plant or system
without having first obtained from the
commission a certificate that the present
or future public convenience and necessity require or will require such construction. This act shall not be construed to
require any public utility to secure a certificate for an extension within any city
or town within which it has lawfully commenced operation, or for an extension
into territory contiguous to its line, plant
or system for which no certificate is in
force and is not served by a public utility
of like character or for any extension
within or to territory already served by
it, necessary in the ordinary course of its
business. If any public utility, in constructing or extending its line, plant or
system interferes or is about to interfere
with the operation of the line, plant or
system of any other public utility already
authorized or constructed, the commission
on complaint of the public utility claiming to be injuriously affected, may after
hearing make such order and prescribe
the terms and conditions for the location
I. Radio common carriers generally provide mobile telephone service and · on occasion paging
services such as beepers.
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of the lines, plants or systems affected, as
to it are just and reasonable. The power
companies may, without the certificate,
increase capacity of existing plants." 2
Various parties, including appellant, ·filed
protests and sought to intervene in the proceedings conducted by the PSC upon such
an application.
Appellant filed its own application for a
certificate of copvenience and necessity in
February of 1977. In it, authority was
sought to provide radio telephone service to
all or parts of the southwestern Wyoming
Counties of Lincoln, Uinta, and Sweetwater. Protests were filed by various parties
including Commercial, and leave to intervene was requested.
On August 22, 1977, appellant petitioned
for leave to amend its application in order
to include Sublette and Carbon Counties.
As later found by the PSC:
" • • • The Commission denied the petition in an order dated August 25, 1977,
but in response to a motion made by
Industrial in the pre-hearing conference
held August 29, 1977, the Commission
allowed Industrial to present evidence
pertaining to Sublette and Carbon County."
All matters were consolidated for hearing
by the PSC. On August 29, 1977, a prehearing conference began. During this
conference settlement negotiations were
carried out by the parties. As a result a
stipulation was agreed to. This agreement
was dated September 1, 1977, and was incorporated by reference into the order issued by the PSC on November 29, 1977,
which provided in pertinent part:
"2) Each of the above applicants agrees
and stipulates that each shall and does
hereby withdraw as a protestant and/or
intervenor, as the case may be, in and to
the application and requested amendments of each of the others in the respec2. Radio common carriers are public utilities as
defined by § 37- 1-IOl(a)(vi)(B), W.S. 1977:
"(vi) 'Public utility' means and includes every person that owns, operates, leases, controls, or has power to operate, lease or control:

•

•
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tive Docket No. and case, and further
agrees and stfpulates that each could
have and is hereby considered as having
furnished sufficient evidence to justify
and warrant the complete granting of the
respective application and requested
amendments thereto by the Wyoming
Public Service Commission, except as specifically limited herein.

shall be equally the responsibility of
both. This shall not be construed to
require a change in effective radiated
power or antenna direction of any presently existing transmitters.
"(f) Each applicant shall receive authority as requested in each individual
application and requested amendments
thereto except as limited in this stipulation."
·

"9) Each of the above applicants agrees
and stipulates that the application and
requested amendments of each as stated
above should be granted under the following terms and conditions :

On August 2, 1978, Commercial filed a
complaint and petitioned for cancellation of
appellant's certification of public convenience and necessity. It alleged that appellant was blocking and obstructing Commercial's efforts to commence service in Rawlins and Evanston and that Commercial had
signed the September 1, 1977 stipulation
because of the coercion, threats, and business duress instigated by appellant. In the
alternative it asked that the PSC declare
that Sublette and Sweetwater Counties
were not included in appellant's certificate
as service areas. Appellant filed an answer
and counterpetition on August 29, 1978. In
it the claim was made that it was Commercial, not appellant, that had refused to cooperate in bringing radio telephone service
to southwestern Wyoming.

"(d) Commercial Communications, Inc.
and David R. Williams will jointly apply to the FCC for a construction permit and license for VHF channel 7 (frequency 152.120 MHz) for Carbon County, Wyo., and shall share equally in the
cost of obtaining and installing said
channel, operating said channel and the
use of said channel. Neither Commercial nor Williams shall use said channel
during any period so as to prevent the
use by the other of one-half of the
channel time during such period. None
of the other applicants shall protest
Commercial's and Williams' application
to the FCC for said channel.
"(e) Commercial and Williams shall
within three weeks from the date hereof arrange to meet in Evanston, Wyoming to study and determine if any
interference will occur to either because of the use of VHF channels 1 and
9 in that area. If it is determined that
undue interference will occur, Commercial and Williams agree to work out a
solution and agree that any such interference will be deemed to be caused
equally by the operations of both and

On December 1, 1978, the PSC entered an
order setting the matter for hearing and
listed the following issues as those to be
resolved:
"a) Whether Industrial has in any manner violated the Commission's Order of
November 29, 1977;
~'b) Whether there was fraudulent inducement upon any party to sign the
Stipulation of September 1, 1977; should
such be found to exist, what impact, if
any, does this ha:ve upon the Stipulation
and the parties who relied thereon;
"c) What is the scope of the Stipulation
with regard to the operating authority
provided therein; and
"d) To what extent, if any, has the public
been harmed by the inability of the parties to comply with the Commission's Order of November 29, 1977 and what action, if any, is required in the public

"(B) Any plant, property or facility for the
transmission to or for the public of telephone
messages, for the conveyance or transmission to or for the public of telegraph messages, or for the furnishing of facilities to or
for the public for the transmission of intelligence by electricity;"
:\'.

interest to alleviate such harm as may be
found to exist."
The PSC then directed :
· "c) Both parties shall be under the same
burden of producing sufficient evidence
to show why their respective certificates
of November 29, 1977 should not be revoked, altered or amended in any manner
as may be required in the public interest."
Finally, the order noted:
"5. The Commission shall not issue an
Order to Show Cause to either petit ioner
in this proceeding as to why their respective certificates should not be revoked or
amended in any manner, but _s.l.lall instead
proceed upon a formal complal'i1t basis.
However due to the nature of ~~ch party's petition in this matter, each. . party
shall consider their respective certificate
grants to be in question and shall direct
their evidence to include consideration of
this point."
·
Hearings on the matter commenced ,January 23, 1979. On May 18, 1979, the PSC
released its opinion and order. It provided
in part:
"14. Resolution of the present controversy between Industrial and Commercial
cannot be obtained without first examining and clarifying the certificated service area of each party. To the extent
this clarification may amend and redefine either party's present service area,
neither may thereafter complain for they
were specifically informed of this possibility in the Commission's Notice and Order Setting Hearing referenced hereinabove at paragraph eight (8).
"The certificated service areas of Commercial, as noted previously, would consist of: (1) that area encompassed by a 37
dbu contour eminating [sic] from Aspen
Mountain; (2) that area encompassed by
a 37 dbu contour eminating [sic] from
Hogsback Ridge; (3) a primary (90%) and
secondary (75%) service area, non-exclusive, radiating from Medicine Butte five
(5) miles northeast of Evanston; and (4) a
primary (90%) and secondary (75%) service area, non-exclusive radiating :from
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Nine-Mile Hill, nine (9) miles north of
Rawlins.
"The certificated service areas of Industrial would consist of: (1) a primary
(90%) and secondary (75%) service area,
non-exclusive, radiating from Marsh Peak,
Utah; (2) a primary (90%) and secondary
(75%) service area, non-exclusive, radiating from Medicine Butte, Wyoming; and
(3) a primary (90%) and secondary (75%)
service area, non-exclusive, radiating
from Nine-Mile Hill.
There has been a great deal of confusion concerning the areas certificated
to Industrial for RCC service, primarily
due to various ambiguities and errors in
Commission's Order of November 29,
1977. Industrial first petitioned for authority to serve all or portions of Uinta;
[,] Lincol,n and Sweetwater Counties, Wyoming. It later requested, and was denied, leave to amend its application to
include the Counties of Sublette and Carbon. Industrial renewed its amendment
request at the pre-hearing conference of
August 29, 1977 and was allowed to include Carbon County, but Sublette was
again refused due to lack of public notice.
The Order of November 29, 1977 incorrectly states, in paragraph four (4) of the
Findings of Fact at page five (5), that the
Commission allowed Industrial to present
evidence concerning Sublette County. To
the extent this Finding of Fact at paragraph four (4) of the Order of November
29, 1977 is inconsistent with the testimony and evidence of record, it is hereby
corrected by deleting Sublette County
from the last sentence thereof.
"15.

"The confusion surrounding the service
area of Industrial continues to exist however due to the various references
throughout the Stipulation of September
1, 1977 to the 'application and requested
amendments of each party.' Although it
may be argued this language has the
effect of including Sublette County, this
argument is devoid of any merit or substance as the parties cannot by stipulation usurp the jurisdiction specifically
vested in this Commission by statute. • • •

APPEAL OF WILLIAMS

"l(l. Each party to this proceeding has
essentially asked the Commission to resolve the differences between them either
by certificate cancellation or further directive. Each party has alleged the other
is responsible for failing to comply with
the terms and conditions of the Stipulation and that such other party is solely
responsible for the failure to provide service to the public as ordered on November 29, 1977. Each has alleged numerous
facts and produced certain testimony and
exhibits to substantiate their respective
positions. The only certain fact is that
both parties have not complied with the
order directing service be implemented to
and for the public. • • •

•

•

"Upon full and careful examination of
the testimony and evidence produced in
this proceeding concerning the various actions by each party herein, the Commission finds there is insufficient evidence to
support a finding that the Stipulation of
September 1, 1977 was a direct result of
undue duress and influence upon Commercial Communications. Accordingly,
the document shall remain in full force
and effect as between the parties of interest herein and the other signatories to
said document. Commercial was represented at all stages of the proceeding by
legal counsel and was under no obligation
to execute the document in question.
"The Commission has reviewed the record
at great length and must conclude the
public has indeed been harmed by the
inability of the parties to comply with the
Stipulation, but finds that it cannot attribute fault to either party individually;
both parties must bear a portion of this
responsibility. Each party has made
some effort to comply with the terms of
the Stipulation, but neither has approached the matter in good faith due to
the possible adverse business consequences that may result from the prospective relinquishment of VHF channels.
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!he ~rimary_ concern of the Commission
m this case 1s not the competitive interests of the parties, but the public interest
which is to be served by their respective
utility operations. Each party is fully
aware there are but a few VHF channels
presently authorized by the Federal Communications Commission and that all such
channels are presently in use in southwester~ Wyoming. Accordingly, each
party JS aware that pursuit of his own
best interest requires the authorization of
as many VHF channels as possible which
are free from co-channel interference
with another utility. Both parties to this
proceeding are aware of the channel
problem and both are reluctant to accommodate the other's operations. Industrial
presently utilizes five of the seven available channels and has petitioned the FCC
for authority to utilize the remaining
two. Commercial presently operates on
only two channels, and is unwilling to
execute any document whereby those
would be the only channels it may use
prospectively in the State of Wyoming.
It is apparent, neither party is concerned
with the public interest; both are seeking
to further their own business interest.
The Commission recognizes its responsibility in this matter and sees that resolution may only be obtained by a determination as to which utility shall be entitled
to use certain channels in specific locations in southwestern Wyoming. Based
upon the testimony and evidence of reco_rd and the previous attempts of the parties to comply with the terms of the
Stipulation, the Commission finds that
Commercial should be entitled to operate
on VHF Channels 1 and 9 in the Rock
Springs, Green River, Evanston and LaBarge areas, and that Industrial should
continue operations on its existing Channels 3, 5, 7, 11 and 13.
"17. The Commission recognizes the fact
it does not have jurisdiction over the allocation of radio frequencies, but it does
have jurisdiction over what is required in
the public interest. The aforementioned
Channel allocations are the result of the
Commission's determination as to what
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Channels would be acceptable to this
Commission in furtherance of the public
interest each utility is required to serve.
"18. The controversy herein centers
around two Wyoming cities, to-wit: Evanston and Rawlins, Wyoming. The application of Commercial specifically
sought to serve these cities while the
application of Industrial would seem to
include 'Such by implication. The aforementioned channel allocation shall resolve
the dispute in and around the Evanston
area, leaving only the Rawlins area in
dispute. Each party stipulated in 1977
they would share VHF Channel 7 and
that such a joint application would be
made to the FCC. The parties subsequently met in accordance with the terms
of the Stipulation, but due to various
problems alleged by each party, neither
was able to comply with the ierms of the
Stipulation. Industrial determined service could be rendered from existing
Marsh Peak facilities, and Commercial
determined that an independent application would be required due to the inability of the parties to comply with the terms
of the Stipulation.
"The Commission finds there is no testimony in evidence of record to support a
finding it is impractical or impossible for
either party to complete the terms of the
Stipulation as such concerns the Rawlins
service area. Accordingly, the Commission finds the Stipulation shall continue
to be in full force and effect and that
both parties shall hereafter be required to
jointly apply to the FCC for shared authority on VHF Channel 7.
"19. The final issue as framed by the
Notice and Order Setting Hearing which
requires resolution herein, is whether or
not either party should have their operating certificate revoked. As noted previously, it is difficult if not impossible for
this Commission to attribute fault to any
one party based upon the confusing and
often contradictory testimony and evidence of record. As noted hereinabove,
the Commission has found the Stipulation
to be in full force and effect and that
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each party is still bound by the terms and
certificate, because as long as these matters are tied up in the Federal Communiconditions contained therein. The Stipucations Commission, we are not going to
lation also provides that such will continhave service that is needed in the southue until otherwise ordered by this Comwest portion of Wyoming.
mission. Accordingly, both parties shall
"Now, what we would like to see is to
be ordered to obtain the FCC authority
come to some kind of a directive from
recommended herein within six months of
this Commission telling the parties, 'Look,
the date of this order, and to thereafter
you are going to have to do it this way so
provide service within nine months of
that our people can get the service that
FCC channel a,uthorization. Should eiyou tell us is needed.'
ther party fail to so act, either individually or jointly, the Commission shall immediately take steps necessary to revoke
"I would suggest to the Commission that
their respective certificate authorities
the Commission has the power, and I
granted in the Evanston and Rawlins serthink if we are going to resolve this matvice areas."
ter within the foreseeable future, this
Commission should act on it, and we, of
Both appellant and Commercial filed for
course, will supply the Commission with
rehearing and clarification. On August 29,
the authority and statistics and data that
1979, the PSC denied their petitions. Apwe believe it can act upon.
pellant then sought review of the PSC or"Thank
you."
der in th~ district court. Following the
In appellant's brief filed with the Comsubmission of briefs by appellant, Commercial and the PSC, on September 17, 1980, mission on April 27, 1977, it was argued
the district court judge affirmed the PSC's that:
"Each of the parties is presently operatorder.
ing on five mobile radio channels in
Appellant's first challenge to the PSC's
southwestern Wyoming. The fastest and
order claims that the "Commission exceeded
least expensive way to insure full interits authority in attempting to allocate comference free service to the public is to
mon carrier two-way radio telephone chanprevent the continuing dispute about innels when the allocation and granting of
terference in situations where two persuch channels is in the exclusive jurisdiction
sons have authority over the same chanof the Federal Communications Commission
nels in wide area coverage situations.
(FCC)." Appellant's second challenge atThus, although enforcing the Commistacks PSC's establishment of time limits.
sion's order based on the stipulation
However, as to these issues, appellant durwould be one solution to the present iming the PSC's hearings advocated that the
passe, the better approach appears to be
PSC both allocate channels and create time
to require the parties to operate on difrestrictions for compliance. Appellant's
ferent channels to avoid all interference
counsel stated during his closing remarks to
problems and require the parties to take
the Commission on March 7, 1979, that:
such action immediately under the risk of
"It seems to us that is the better way to
losing Commission authority to operate.
handle it, and we believe this Commission
"It is the position of Industrial that the
has the power and authority to do it is to
Wyoming Public Service Commission has
have these parties deal on muchly [sic]
the power to regulate RCC's [radio common carriers] operating in the State of
exclusive channels and that this CommisWyoming so long as such regulation does
sion order compliance with that kind of
not violate the applicable FCC rules in
an arrangement within a certain period
regard to the procedural granting of
of time.
channel licenses and the physical opera"In that period of time and within that
tion thereof. • • •
period of time they do not do it, it then
should be a question about revoking a
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"The exercise of the above described
authority in this case would not infringe
on the authority of the FCC. • • •
"As was proposed above, it appears
that the best way to obtain radio common
carrier service for the public in southwestern Wyoming on an interference free
basis, is for this Commission to take action within its powers and require .the
parties to provide service forthwith. • • •
The Commission could enforce its order
by revoking the certificate of any party
who failed to comply with the Commission's order within a fixed period. The
order would necessarily include the requirement that the parties settle their
disputes before the FCC and require that
Industrial withdraw its application for
channels 1 and 9 in Evanston. The Commission might also consider the limitation
of further applications by the parties to
the FCC for additional UHF channels
except on some equitable basis which
would insure interference free service to
the public. Commercial's own expert believes the Commission has the power to
invoke the above solution." (Emphasis
added.)
Thus it is clear that appellant asked the
PSC to do as it did. Now on appeal appellant challenges that action.
Appellant also alleges that the PSC exceeded its authority by prescribing his radio
service area. However, this issue was never raised before the PSC. In fact in appellant's Application for Rehearing and Clarification of Order, he argued that the Commission had failed to establish primary and
secondary service areas:
"2. The Commission's Memorandum
Opinion and Order failed to provide Industrial primary and secondary service
areas radiating from Aspen Mountain
and Hogsback Ridge, for service in Lincoln and Sweetwater Counties, Wyoming
which authority Industrial was granted
by the Commission's order of November,
1977. * * •"
[1, 2] As a general rule, parties as bound
by the theories they advanced below. Lara-

mie Printing Trustees v. Krueger, Wyo.
1968, 437 P.2d 856, 859. Further, under the
doctrine of invited error, if a party induces
action by a court or an agency, he will not
be heard on appeal to argue error based
upon that action. Weber v. Johnston Fuel
Liners, Inc., Wyo. 1974, 519 P.2d 972, 978.
However, there is an exception to that rule.
As noted in Matter of Various Water
Rights in Lake DeSmet Reservoir, Wyo.
1981, 623 P.2d 764, 767, a challenge to a
court's or a quasi-judicial body's jurisdiction
over the subject matter can never be
waived. "[I]t is open for consideration by
the reviewing court whenever it is raised by
any party, or it may be raised by the court
of its own motion." Gardner v. Walker,
Wyo. 1962, 373 P.2d 598, 599.
[3] In this case appellant's challenges in
essence question the jurisdictiol\ of the PSC
to grant conditional certificat~s of convenience and necessity. This is done on two
levels. First, it is contended that there is
no statutory authorization for the PSC's
action. Second, appellant argues that the
PSC's conduct infringes upon the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) and thus violates the
concept of federal preemption. Since appellant's challenges raise questions concerning the PSC's subject matter jurisdiction,
they must be addressed on their merits.
Jurisdiction may be questioned at any time.
Merritt v. Merritt, Wyo. 1978, 586 P.~1d 550,
555.
First, as to appellant's statutory argument that the PSC lacked jurisdiction to
impose conditions upon the grant of a certificate of convenience and necessity, the
language of § 37-2-205(a), W.S. 1977, indicates that he is erroneous. It states in part
that where a conflict between two utilities
may result, the PSC "may after hearing
make such order and prescribe the terms
and conditions for the location of the lines,
plants or systems affected, * * * [which]
are just and reasonable." Further, as observed by this court previously, "[t]he discretion vested in the commission by the
statute is broad indeed • * *." Big Horn
Rural Elec. Co. v. Pacific Power & Light
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Co., Wyo. 1964, 397 P.2d 455,458. Thus, we Nebraska PSC had jurisdiction to regulate
conclude that the statute granted the PSC radio common carriers. The Nebraska Suthe authority to impose the various condi- preme Court, after applying the threetions imposed in this case.
prong test, concluded no federal preemption
Next, we must consider whether the ex- had occurred and that the Nebraska PSC
ercise of this jurisdiction has been barred had good jurisdiction.
under the doctrine of federal preemptionWe agree with the conclusion that there
which results from the Supremacy Clause,
Art. VI, clause 2 of the United States Con- has been no federal preemption. First, the
stitution.3 In Florida Lime and Avocado parties can comply with both the PSC's and
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 1963, 373 U.S. 132, FCC's rules and regulations. Second, there
142, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248, it is no reason for federally imposed uniformwas observed by the Supreme Court that: ity in the regulation of radio common carri"The principle to be derived from our ers. As said by the Nebraska Supreme
decisions is that federal regulation of a Court, "it is clear that the mobile radio
field of commerce should not be deemed telephone paging service is local in nature
preemptive of state regulatory power in and there is no need for national uniformthe absence of persuasive reasons-either ity." ATS Mobile Tel. v. Curtin Call
that the nature of the regulated subject Comm., Inc., supra, 282 N.W.2d at 253. Fimatter permits no other conclusion, or nally, Congress had expressed an intent not
that the Congress has unmistakably so to preempt the area. In 47 U.S.C. § 22l(b),
it was stated:
ordained. • • •"
The Court in that case following its obser"(b) Subject to the provisions of section
vation then looked at three criteria in order
301 of this title, nothing in this chapter
to make its determination. First, it conshall be construed to apply, or to give the
sidered whether it was possible for one enCommission jurisdiction, with respect to
gaged in interstate commerce to comply
charges, classifications, practices, servwith both the federal and the state regulaices, facilities, or regulations for or in
tions. Second, it pondered upon the quesconnection with wire, mobile, or pointtion of how important it was that there be
to-point radio telephone exchange service,
national uniformity-without any state varor any combination thereof, even though a
iations-in the regulation of the subject
portion of such exchange service constimatter in question. Third, the Court investutes interstate or foreign communication,
tigated what Congress had intended when
in any case where such matters are subject
it established the federal regulation. Here,
to regulation by a State commission or by
the Court noted that the presumption was
local governmental authority." (Emphaagainst Federal preemption unless Congress
sis added.)
had manifested a clear intent to the contrary.
Courts have generally recognized that this
This case was followed in ATS Mobile language "is a clear statement that ConTelephone, Inc. v. Curtin Call Communica- gress did not intend to preempt state regutions, Inc., 1975, 194 Neb. 404, 282 N.W.2d lation of mobile carriers • • • ." Fields v.
248,4 where the question was whether the Davis, 1977, 31 Or.App. 607, 571 P.2d 511,

I
I
.

II, Art. VI, clause 2, United States Constitution:
''This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing In the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."

4. This case was overruled to the extent that it
applied to one-way paging devices in A TS Mobile Telephone, Inc. v. General Communications Co., Inc., 1979, 204 Neb. 141, 282 N.W.2d
16. However, for our purposes in dealing with
two-way radio telephone service (see appellant's statement of issues, supra), the case Is
still good law as to the question before us.
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?l~. ~s. a result we must ~phold the PSC's
Junsd1~tion ~ regula_tE; radio common carriers 1mposmg co~d1tions on the grant of a
~rt1f1cate of pubhc convenience and necessity.. See also Matter of Rule Radiophone
Service, Inc., Wyo. 1980, 621 P.2d 241.
AppeHant's final claim is that the PSC
"without a basis in fact or law arbitrarily
and capriciously reduced Industrial Communication's service area granted in 1977."
~owever the PSC, when it noticed the set~mg of the matter for hearing in 1979,
mformed both appellant and Commercial
that they would be required to bear the
"burden of producing sufficient evidence to
show why their respective certificates of
November 29, 1977 should not be revoked,
altered or amended in any manner as may
be required in the public interest."
[4-6] First, the PSC found that the order of November 29, 1977 mcorrec
·
tiy m.
eluded Sublette County in appellant's service area. It is clear that the Commission
has continuing jurisdiction over public utilities and thus the power to amend certificates of public necessity and convenience.
Big Horn Rural Elec. Co. v. Pacific Power
& Light Co., supra, 397 P.2d at 461. It is
only proper that the PSC should have the
ability to correct a previous order which
contained a mistake. Besl Corp. v. Public
Utilities Commission, 1976, 45 Ohio St.2d
146, 341 N.E.2d 835.
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As to other reductions in appellant's service area, the PSC had given notice that it
was reviewing appellant's certificate and
that appellant had the burden of demonstrating that it should not be revoked. The
evidence presented to the PSC was conflicting as to what interference might exist
between appellant's services and Commercial's. The Commission's conclusion that
the best way to resolve the matter was to
reduce the service areas was supported by
substantial evidence that appellant's and
Commercial's operations overlapped and the
operations of each were interfering with
the other contrary to the public interest.
Therefore, this court cannot substitute its
judgment on this issue for that of the
PSC's. Sage Club, Inc. v. Employment Security Commission of Wyoming, Wyo. 1979,
6?1 P.2d_ 1306. The ultimate weight to be
gwen. evidence before
. the. PSC as a trier of
fact JS_ to be deter~med m the light of the
expertise and experience of the members of
that _agency. Matter of Rule Radiophone
Service, Inc., supra.
Affirmed.
w..___ _ __
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thought or refere:nce regarding suicide, no
matter how obscure or remote in time the
thought may have occurred, in order to fulfill
the heightened duty to warn others."

i
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AB a final matter, the Carriers argue that
adopting a narrow definition of ."suicidal tendencies" would render LC. § 33-512B a nullity because liability would rarely be imposed,
and this the Court cannot do. However,
simply because the duty to warn would arise
less frequently does not make the statute a
nullity; it simply means that the statute creates a narrow, limited duty. Therefore;
based upon the Legislative history and public
policy this Court finds the Legislature intended the. term "suicidal tendencies" in ·LC.
§ 33-512B to mean a present aim, direction
or trend toward taking one's own life.

2. Brian's Essay
[11] Clearly, Brian's essay provided evidence that he had contemplated suicide in
the past. However, having determined the
meaning of "suicidal tendencies" in LC.
§ 33-512B, the Court mu.s t now examine
whether Brian's essay provrded evidence of a
present aim, direction or trend toward taking
his own life.
Brian's discussjons of his contemplating
suicide are all In' past tense. For instance,
Brian wrote "[f1or long time and .a lot of
reasons I was contemplating suicide" and
that he had suicidal thoughts "a lot during
my early teen years." · Conversely, when he
discusses the present and future, he explains
that the reasons for his d'epression and sqiddal ideation are gone and that he "can now
enjoy life and all its little pleasures witho~t
any guilt." Brian also wrote that he had
turned his life around . and that he was currently happy. None of this indicates a present or future intention to commit suicide. In

a

fact, with these words the opposite conclusi
is the only conclusion.to be inferred.
The only evidence of suicidal thoughts
areasonable teacher could read in that esa
is that those thoughts had all been in''
past, but were resolved. Any eviderice .tJljt
they might return or that Brian was con• ·
plating suicide when he wrote this
would be speculative. Additionally, none •
the expe1t affidavits filed by the Carri
showed these thoughts written by Brill
could· be connected to any pr~sent suiai
ideation. · McNulty could not have de
mined that Brian was currently or in ·
future contemplating suicide without
ulating about his intentions; Brian's cl
stated thoughts and feelings indicate that
wa& happy -a t that tirrie and was no Jon
contemplatirig suicide. There simply is(
sufficient evidence that Brian had a
aim or desire to commit suicide at the
he wrote the essay to trigger a duty to
AB a result, the Court need not address..
further issues presented by the parties. ·

V. • CONCLUSION
Th~ term "suicidal tendencies"
§ 33-512B is narrowly defined to
present aim, direction, or trend toward '
ing one's own life. Under this .de
Brian's essay did riot create inthe ·Appe
a duty·· to warn. We reverse and
Costs' ci:, Appellants.
.-: f.\
Cl{!/{'J~sti~.e SCHROEDER and Jua4
TROUT, EISMANN and JONES, con1
W'----
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6. Taxation e,:,3547

the Matter of the Appeal of PROFESIONAL

ENGINEERING CONSUL,
TS, P.A., from an Order of the Divilon of Taxation on Denial of Certain
Income Tax Credits.

··The Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) is a
cr~_ature of the legislature; its authority and
power is only such as is expressly or impliedly given by legislative enactment. KS.A.
74-2437(a), 74-2438.

No. 94,021.
Supreme Court of, Kansas.
April 28; 2006.
ound: Department of Revenue apdecision by the Board of Tax Ap·, (BOTA) granting corporate inco.me
cr,edit. Case was transferred.

ed

lding, The Supreme Court, Luckert,
h()ld that BOTA lacked jurisdiction to
't the credit, where the Department
.not rule on the credit for the tax year
question and taxpayer· never made the
' on its return.
~ ed.
~ ation e,:,3550
.oard of Tax Appeals (BOTA) orde.rs
°'11bject to review under the Act for JudiR.eview aNd Civil Enforcement of AgenGy
· , KS.A. 77-601 et .seq.
d1"inistrative Law and Procedure
I i=,7 49, 791
When revi~wing agency record to, deter. if there is substantial competent evito support the findings, the court must
·• the' record for evidence ,to support the
and, in. doing so, must consider the
nee in the light most favorable to the
· pr.evailing below.. K.S.A. 77-621(c).

T

T~ation e:=>3550
.,
µ the Board of, Tal\ Appeals (BOTA)
jurisdiction...to 'consider a credit,. so does
iut re~ewing BOT1\'.s acti()n.
Jipeal and Error >S=>23
-; An appellate court always has ' the ob lion to question jurisdiction on its own

not· apply
the error -is jurisdictional.

7. Taxation e:=>354 7
If the Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA)
attempts to exercise jurisdiction over a subject matter not conferred by the legislature,
its orders with respect thereto are without
authority of.law l}nd void. K.S.A. 74-2437(a),
74-2438.

8. Taxation e:=>3547
The Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA)
lacked jurisdiction to grant credit against
corporate .income tax, where the Department
of Revenue's written final determination did
not rule on the credit for the tax , year in
question and taxpayer never made the claim
on its return; no ruling or interpretation by
the director of taxation had been made with
regard to the credit, and no statute, expressly or impliedly, gave to BOTA the power to
grant a credit against corporate income tax
which the Department did not allow or disallow in any ruling, interpretation, finding, or.
der, decision, or final determination. KS.A.
74-2437(a), 74-2438, 79-32,160a.
9. Taxatioi:i ,s:,3547

The Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) does
not have jurisdiction to grant a corporat.E,
income tax credit against the tax owed by a
taxpayer if the Department of Revenue has
not allowed or disallowed the credit in any
ruling, interpretation, finding, order, decision, or final determination. KS.A. 74-2437(a), 74-2438.

Syllabus by the Court
The Kansas Board of Tax Appeals .does
not · have . jurisdiction to grant a corporate
income tax credit against the tax owed by, a
taxpayer if the Kansas Department of Re-\'enue has not allowed or disallowed the credit
in any ruling, interpretation, finding, order,
decision; or final determination.
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Michael D. Burrichter, of Legal Services
Bureau,. Kansas Department of Revenue, argued the cause and was on the briefs for
appellartt · Kansas Department of Revenue:
·. M~rk A. Burghart, ,9f 4Jderson, Alderson,
Weiler, Conklin, Burghart.& Crow, L.;L.C., of
Topeka, argued the cause and was on the
brief for appellee Professional Engineering
Consultants, P.A.

$94,617; penalty of $9,461; and interest
$24,904. The only ,mention?in ther.Audi~ ,
port of ~ credit ~nder K.S.A: 79-32,160:i,1
in disallow.ng. the claim for the tax ,
endil)g ;S~ptember 30, 1998,. which was;
second year of the audit period. ,

PEC timely appealed to the Secretary
Revenue by requesting an informal cod
ence pursuant td K.S.A. 7!f-3226 ahd paid,
tax amount as a deposit pqrsuant to K.
· The opinion was delivered by LUCKERT,
75--5153. PEC complained about th(!
.J.:
ings regarding the K.S.A. 79-32,160ii"
· This is an appeal by the· Kansas Depait - but did not ~ ention 'tf1e .fux year or y
ment of Revenue (KDR) from a final order of which it was disputing. · After' the'·
the Kansas Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) trative proceedings, the S!!cr'etary's .d ..
ruling that Professional Engineering Con_sul- issued a Written Final Determination'
tants, P.A. (PEC) qualified for a corporate holding tire assessment in, its .,entirety
income tax credit under K.S.A. 79-32,160a of explaining why PEC was not entitled.)
the Job Expansion. and Investment Credit K.S.A. 79-32,160a tax credit fQr the _tax
Act of 1976, K.S.A. 79-32,153 et seq., for the ending Septe,mber 30, 1998, the secon4 ,7
tax year ending September 30, 1997. While of the audit period. There was no rp.en ·
several issues are raised,' the determinative the credit either being allowed or disall
issue is whether BOTA erred in ruling that - for the first year of the audit period,. tlie
PEC qualified for the tax credit when PEC year ending September 30, 1997.
did not claim the credit on its income tax
PEC timely appealed to BO'i'A.
return and KDR neither allowed nor disallowed a claim for the credit in its Corporate held · that PEC qualified for the tax '
Income Tax Audit Report (Audit Report) or pursuant to K.S.A. 79-32,160a' for 'th
year ending September · 30, Y997, the1
its Written Final Determination,
year of the 3-y'ear audit period. Additil
FACTS
ly, BOTA upheld KDR's dete1!!1-ina~11;
PEC is a corporation headquartered in PEC did not qualify for the credit for the
Wichita which provides professional engi- year ending September 30, 1998; ~Y sta
neering services, including consultation ser: that PEC did not qualify for any per,io~ o
vices. PEC made significant capital expendi- than in the period from 1996 to 1997.
tures beginning in 1997 when · it. purchased ruling, thus, _covered the third year ?..
another engineering firm and hired new em- audit. Both "PEC and KDR filed peti.
ployees in connection with those expendi- for reconsideration, which BOTA denied.' .
tures. Based upon these expenditures, PEC
claimed certain income tax credits under the
Job Expansion and Inv~stment Credit Ac;t of
1976, ·K.S.A. 79-32,153, et seq., on its corporate income tax returns filed for tax years
ending September 30, 1997; September 30,
1998; and September 30, 1999.
KDR audited PEC for the tax years ending September 30, 1997; September 30, 1998;
and September 30, 1999. KDR issued a
Corporate Income Ta.x Audit Report. KDR
disallowed some of the claimed credits and
issued an assessment of additional corporate
income tax consisting of tax in the amount of

KDR timely appealed BOTA's-grant
credit for the tax year enping Septembef
1997. PEC did not appeal; thus, pos
credits for tax years ending Septembe1r
1998, and September 30, 1999, are no
issue. This court transferred the case ' ·
the Court of Appeals on its own motion1 P
suant to K.S.A. 20..-3018(c).
ANALYSIS

KDR argues that BOTA erred in granij
the .credit under KS.A. 7g....32,160a for
tax year ending September 30, 1997. Mo

cally, KDR ai·gues there was -not subti'ail . competent evidence to support
'A's 'findings tbat PEC had made a claitri
credit . or for .the finding that KDR
denied such a claim. KDR also argues
lacked jurisdiction to grant the credit
KS.A. 79-32,160a for the t ax year
g Septilmber 30, 1997, because the tax.had ·not made a claim for the credit
.KDR had ,not ruled, made a determina··or issued an order regarding the credit:
;;t-.
· Standard of Review

1 ' BOTA orders are subject to review

er

the Kansas Act for Judicial Review
· · ivil E~forcement of Agency Actions,
' ···77--601 et seq. In re Tax Appeal ·of
Communications -Co., 278 Kan. 690,
101 P.3d 1239 .(2004). K.S.A. 77-621(c)
out the scope and standard of review
·provides, as relevant to the parties' argu, · .that a court nray grant r elief if· it
· es ''(2) the agency has acted beyond
'!uilidicti0n conferred by any provision of
·or '\7) the agency action is based: on a
·nati:on of fact, made or implied by the
cy, that is not supported by evidence
· · Stjbstantial when viewed in light of the
~: as a whole." See In re GIG Field
:··' tPCo., :2'79 Kan. 857, 866, 112 P.3d 138
).

) · When reviewing the record to deter,if there is substantial competent evi·to support the findings, the court must
·,the record for evidence to support the
gs and·, in . d·oing so, must consider the
~ e ·1n the light most favorable to the
· prevaiiing below. In re Tax Appeal of
' · .. Interstate Gas Co., 276 Kan: 672,
1,o/,9'P.3d 770 (2003).

Mings Regarding Whether PEG Made
and KDR Considered the 1997 Tax
Credit Claim
the following BOTA
. · The Taxpayer ·claimed income tax
·dits under the Job E xpansion and Inastmerit Credit Act, K.S·. A 79-32,160a,
, three tax years ending September 30,
11197 through September 30, 1999. ·

Kan.
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"10. The Department of Revenue audited
the Taxpayer and disallowed the credits."
According to KDR, these •findings have no
support in the record with regard to the tax
year ending· September 30, 1997, because
PEC did not claim a tax credit pursuant to
K:S.A. 79-32,lo0a for that ·year. According
td KDR, for the tax year ending September
30, 1997, PEC filed claims for an income tax
credit under KS.A. 7g....32,153 b~sed upon an
investment made on August 1, 1989;- and for
a. second· credit-under the same statute for an
investment. made .on Oetober ·l,. 1996. PEC
did not; however, · file - a claim for the · tax
credit .at issue ,in ,this'· case, a claim. pursuant
to K !S.A. 7g....32;160a-,for the: tax year ending
September 1, 1997': ,;P;EJC . ,does- not dispute
that it did not claim -a tax credit pursuant to
K.S.A.. 79-32,160a . on .its,1i'nco:me-·,tax return
filed for the tax year endh;ig;September 30,
1997.
However, PEC argues that :it' made the
claim during the audit and infornial conferenc·e before KDR. The record does not support PEC's assertion. When KDR a udited
PEC ani:l disallowed some of its claimed tax
credits, KDR issued a Corporate Income Tax
Audit Report which specifically informed
PEC that "(t]he enhanced credit claimed under K.S.A. 79-32,160a for ·tax year ending
9/30/98 has been , disallowed'.' ·because, in order t0 qualify for the er.edit, at least 20 new
employees must be hired in positions relating
to headquarters funchons (Ind "(f J or tax
year 9/30/98 ther e was only an increase of
eleven ·employees and no indication of the
type of positions filled." (Emphasis .added.)
In its,r equest for an informal conference with
the , Secretary of Rev~nue, the document
which PEC specifically point/; to as evidence
it made the claim, PEC questioned . KDR's
conclusion that it did not qualify for the
crediti however, PEC made no mention of
the time per,iod for which the credit was
claimed. Then, when PEC's appeal was denied, the Secretary's designee issued a Written Final Determination upholding KDR'.s
assessment and explaining why PEC was not
entitled to a K.S.A. 79-32,160a tax credit .for
the Jax, year ending September 30, 1998.
The ·record makes clear that KDR's contention is correct: PEC did not claim a tax

664

Kan.

134 PACIFIC REPO.RTER, 3d SERIES

IN RE PEC \) .

Kan.

665

Cite as 134 P .3d 66 I (Kan. 2006)

credit pursuant to KS.A.-·79-32,160a for the
tax year ending Septei:nber 30, 1997. Additiqnally, the record reflects that. KDR did not
~tiow -or disallow: a credit .under . KS.A. 7~82,160a for the tax year ,encjing September·
ao, 1997. Basically, there was ,no mention of
the credit relating to tax year 1997 by either
PEC or KDR; •there is nothing in the documents mentioned above whi_ch reflects the
credit was being claimed or was being .allowed or ,disallowed.
· However, PEC contends that KDR was
precluded from raising this issue before
BOTA in its petition for reconsideration and
is similarly precluded from ,raising the issue
before this court because it is bound by .the
stipulated issues on appeal, citing Manhattan
Bible College v. Strit;esky, 192 Kan. 287, 29091, 387 P.2d 225 (1963) (parties are bound by
stipulations fixing the issues). The parties
stipulated to the following issues on appeal
before BOTA:
"A. Whether the headquarters facility facilitated .the creation of at least twenty (20)
new full-time positions required by_ KS.A.
74-50,114(g) and/or K.S.A. '19-32,160a(a).
"B. Whether PEC's job: expansion and
investment credit should be computed using employment"·and investment monthly
averages for those months after -which the
-investments have .- been made and employees, engaged or must the credit be comput- ed using twelve month averages."
(3, 4) As KDR notes, the stipulations do
hot reference the specific years of the credit
claims. Stipulated issue A merely identifies
the point of contention between the parties,
which was whether PEC qualified for the tax
credit under the specific applicable statutory
provisions. This issue was raised in both the
Audit Report and the W1itten Final Determination, but only with r egard to the tax 'year
ending September 30, 1998. Stipulated issue
B was also specifically tied to the 1998 year
in both those documents. Thus, according to
KDR, it was not until the BOTA dedsion
that there was a need for clarification· arid,
consequently, the motion for reconsideration
was the appropriate procedural step for raising the issue. KS.A. 77- 529(a)(l) (petition

for reconsideration is jurisdictional prerequisite for seeking judicial review); see Kansas

lndustrial,.·Consumers v. Kansas C
tion Comm'n, 30 Kan.App.2d 332, 338; ,·
P.3d 110 (2002). (purpose of requiring a pe
tion for re<::onsideration is to permit
agency "to correct errors which are called.
its attention and thereby perhaps avoid _
cial review''). Additionally, if _BOTA I
jurisdiction to consider the credit,, so d
court.- Feviewing .BOTA's action. An ap
late court always.has the obligation to qu
tion jurisdiction on -its own • motion.
Donald v. Hannigan, 262 Kan. 156, Sy!.
936 P.2d 262 (1997). Therefore, the ar
ment was not untimely, at least from a p_ ·
dural standpoint.
·
·' ·

: -rule, "valid though it may be where
'ons, of fact are conaerned," did not
y to court'.s determination of questions of
, see also -In re Estate of Broderick, 34
1~pp.2d 695, Sy!. 1! 10, 125 P.ad 564
) ("[w)here a party procures· a court to
ed in a particular way thereby inviting
·cular, ruling, that party is precluded
· ·assailing such proceeding and ruling on
!late review"). Even. if the . confusion
ii _by KOR amounted to invited error,
Invited error rule does not apply where
· error is jurisdictional. Thompson v.
· ·, 208 Kan. 658, 661, 493 P.2d 1259

PEC argues, however, it ·was un ·
from a substantive standpoint because
had placed the issue of the credit for !before BOTA through the arguments,
dence, and proposed findings of fact
conclusions of law KDR submitted to BO,
As a ,result, PEG argues KDR preclu
PEC from "introducing evidence that wo
show that the Department routinely ta
exemptions, credits and- even refunds ,.
account during the audit and appeals · ·
cesses when the same may not have
reflected on ·a tax return" in order to-com
with KS.A. 79-3226 which requires the :;
rector of taxation to examine ·each return·.
"determine the correct amount of the -

'e; therefore, examine whether BOTA ob-

Although we agree that KDR qears .sq
responsibility for-the confusion in this
even if PEC had been given the oppo
to present...evidence that KDR does cal\!
exemptions, credits, and refunds during),
audit based .on -information not l'.~flec,te.q
the taxpayer's return, at most this ev:i<½
would have bolstered PEC's argument .·_
the claim could have been made during :
audit period. Such evidence does not chan
the fact that KD R did not calculate the c
during its audit of tax year 1997.
(5) In ·addition, PEC argues that KD
invited the eri·or. PEC relies upon the '·
era! rule that parties who invite error:'
stipulating to questions of fact that misle
the trial court into an erroneous finding)
fact are prevented from complaining on ,

peal. See State, ex rel, v. Masterson,
Kan. 540, 550, 561 P.2d 796 (1977) (invi

}.

jurisdiction to allow _a credit under
79-32,160a for the tax year ending
hlber 30, 1997.
I

Jurisdiction

',7~ BOTA" 'is a creature of the legisla. · Its authority and power is only such as
·ressly or impliedly given by legislative
ent. · If it attempts to exercise jurisn over a subject matter not conferred
e legislature, its orders with respect
are without authority oflaw and void.
tions omitted].'" Board of Johnson
~ y Comm'rs v. Duffy, 259 Kan. 500, 508,
iF'!2d 716 (1996) (citing Vaughn v. Mar226 Kan. 658, 660, 603 P.2d 191 [1979) ).

OTA's statutory authority to hear apfrom decisions of KDR has two. sources.
·. 74-2437(a) provides that BOTA has
6wer and duty "[t]o hear appeals from
director of taxation and the director of
rty valuation on rulings and intei-preby said directors." (Emphasis add. KS.A. 74-2438 provides that "[a]n ap·may be taken to [BOTA) from any
ng, ruling, order, decision, final deter..ion or other final" action
on any
'. of the secretary of revenue or the secres designee by any per son aggrieved
by." (Emphasis added.)
) _KDR's Written Final Determination
•not rule on any claim for a KS.A. 79llOa tax credit for the tax year ending

the -audit, the only year speciiiically referenced regarding a credit pursuant to KS.A.
79-32,160a .is the year ,imding September 30,
1998. Moreover, the Written Final Determinat-ion notes the review is based upon the
letter of final assessment dated August 17,
2001, i~ which KDR specifically stated that
''.[t]he enhanced credit claimed under ~.S.A.
79-32,160a (or tax year ending 9/30/98 hl}S
been dis~l_owed." There was no reference to
a · credit"'.._pursu:µit , to KS.A. 79-32,160a for
any other:tax year,
Additionally, :,,the silence regarding the
year ending ,Septemb!!r 30, 1997, cannot be
read as implicitly allowing the credit because,
as ·prevjoui,ly dis~ussed, the claim had not
been made on PEC's retl)I'n. Thus, to have
been either allow~d or dis;tllqwed, th_e credit
would ha:ve had to be raised and . considered
during ~he audit. _ Yet, the audit did not
allow or disa\Iow the <:!laim. See Angle v.
United States, 996 F.2d 252, 254 (10th _Cir.
1993) (district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over a taxpayer's refund claim
where the taxpayer alleged new and different
grounds for allowing the refund from those
asserted "in ·its timely filed refund claims with
the IRS); see also·K.S.A. 79-3230 (referring
to credit which is claimed -by taxpayer).
Consequently, there 'was no ruling or interpretation by the director of taxation with
regard to whether PEC was entitled to a
KS.A. 79--32,160a tax credit in the 1997 tax
year for .BOTA'to review.
Moreover, when, PEC filed its Notice of
Appeal with BOTA, it asked BOTA to
"reverse the final determination of the Secretai-y's Designee and find that PEC is
statutorily entitled to the credits claimed
on its returns for tax years ending September 30, 1997 through September 30,
1999, abate the assessment is.sued by the
Department arid refund -the deposit made
by PEC with statutory interest." (Emphasis added)
Thus, PEC did not claim the cr edit in the
pleading upon whldh BOTA's jurisdiction is
based. See generally State v. Woodling, 264
Kan. 684, Syl. ~ 2, 957 P.2d 398 (1998) ("An
appellate court obtains jurisdiction over the

tember 30, 1997. Although the Written

rulings identified in the notice of appeal.

Determination refers to the 3 years of

Grounds for jurisdiction not identified in a
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notice o.f appeal may not be considered by
the court.").
As the Court of 'Appeals stated ih In re
Applicati6'n of Park Comm'rs for Ad Vala ~
rem Ta:x E xemption, 14 Kan.App.2d 777, 799
P.2d 505 (1990),' when considering whether
BOTA had jurisdiction to r evoke a city's
exemption from ad valo'rein taxes for stables
on certain park property, where the 'city's
application for exemption only listed ii residence, and "'the 'residence . and the ~tables
were not so intertwined . as to constitute one
subject of dispute: "No statute, ·expressly or
impliedly, gives BOTA power to investigate
property which is not- the ·subject of a dispute
before it." 14 Kan.App.2d at 782, 799 'P .2d
505; see also Salina Airport Authority v'
Board of Ta:x Appeals, 13 Kan.App.2d 80, 87,
761 P.2d 1261, rev. denied 244 Kan. ·' 738
(1988) (BOTA has no powerto order county
appraiser t(> investigate pro petty which is not
subject of · controversy brought before
BOTA:).
[9J A 1997 tax credit under K.s.A: 7932,160a was no~ part of the dispute which
. was brought befp,r e BOTA. No statute, expressly or impliedly, gives BOTA the ppwer
to grant a credit ,against corporate income
tax which KDR did not allow or disallow in
any ruling, fotjerpretatio~. finding, order, de~
cision, or final determi;nation. BOTA did not
have jurisdiction to grant PEC a credit under KS.A. 79-32,160a against the corporate
income tax owed by PEC for the tax year
ending September 30, i997.
Reversed.
w·-._.__ _,

0 ~ Kn NUMBfll SYSTEM

T

driving under ·the influence of al ·
(DUI). Defendant appealed. After a
trial, defendant was convicted: in the .
trict Court, Riley County, Paul E . Mill
J., of second-offense DUI. Defimdant.
pealed.
'
· ·
:,,

Holdings: The Court
quardt, J., held that:

toustJ:ie corroborated by other evidence
to. show that the crime was commit\It it need not be corroborated as to the
n· who committed the crime, since identhe perpetrator is not a part of the
·, delfcti and may be established by an
upicial confession alone.

o!

of Appeals, ·

l! 'there is any evidence te~ding to

(1) identity of the perpetrator is ribt

· '· · of the corpus delicti · of driving
the influence, and

uh

h,,the · corpus delicti of the offen.s e

'

!!f the trial court to submit the question

v.

Carl W. FERIL, Appellant.
No. 94,525.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.
May 19, 2006.

Background: Defendant was convicted, in
the Municipal Court, of second-offense

13. Criminal Law =412:2(2)' '
A "custodial interrogation," for Miranda
purposes, occurs when a person who has
been taken into custody or otherwise de 0
prived of his or het freedom is q~estione? .
See publication Words and Phrases,
for 6ther judicial coristructiorls and definitions.

'' against the accused, then it is the

(2) defendant's encounter with officer.

Syl/:abus by ·the Court

!~ther the offense occuned to the jury.

not a custodial interrogation, for :M
Officer's t estimony that he received r a·•htact from neighboring jurisdiction,
· t hat white truck with extended cab
T~ plates was driving without head1,s'atisfied the corpus delicti of driving,
tion for driving under the influence
mXansas.

Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law e=>1139, 1158(4)

When reviewing a motion to sup
the appellate court determines whethei:·
factual underpinnings of the trial .court's\
cision are SU pported by .substantial com·
tent evidence; however, the ultimate . I~
conclusion drawn from those facts is a 1 .
question requiring the appellate coi,rt to
ply a de novo standard of review.

Officer's testimony that he detected an
a! . alcohol while talking to defendant,
.efendant's eyes were bloodshot, and
defendant failed to complete the field
tests, satisfied the corpus delicti of
tion, in prosecution for driving under
_ue'nce (DUI).

2. Criminal Law e=>l158(4)
The appellate court does not reweigh
evidence, when reviewing a motion to ..·
press.
3. Criminal Law e=>l159.2(7)
On appeal, the r,eviewing court must
cide whether a rational factfjnder could ha
found the accused guilty beyond a reaso ·
doubt.

The standard of r eview on a motion f.
judgment of acquittal in a criminal
·
sufficiency of the evidence.
5'. Criminal Law e=>552(1)

When reviewing a motion to suppress, the appellate cdurt determines whether the factual und~tpjnrifugs of . the trial
court's decision ate supf8rted by sub~tantial
competent eviaerice'. How~ver, the ultimate
legal conclusion dra:wn frdn'l 'thbs.e facts is a
legal question requiring the' appellate court
to apply a de novo sfaridard o{ :t'eview. '
1.

randa purposes.

4. Criminal Law = 1134(8)

CITY OF MANHATTAN, Appellee,

es-

had not been taken into custody, and motorist was not deprived of his freedom.

2. The standard of review on a motion
for a judgment of ~cquittal in a criminal case
is sufficiency of the eviderice.
.
··,··
3. A conviction of even the gravest offense may be sustained by .c ircumstantial
evidence.
4. If there is any evidence tending to
establish the · cor pus delicti · of the effense
charged against the accused, then it is the
duty of the trial court to submit the question
of whether the offense occurred to ·the jury.
5. Identity of the perpetrator is not
part of the corpus delicti: '

l)efenda:iit's extrajudicial confession to
/; that defendant had been driving, did
· · ·uire independent corroboration with
bt to establishing the identity of the
.er, in prosecution for driving under the
uence (DUI).

,

6. A custodial interrogation occurs
when a person who has been · taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his or her
freedom is questioned.

John W. Thurston ~~d Troy V. Huser, of
Huser Law Offices, P ..f\., of Manhattan, for
appellant.

'/

A conviction of even the gravest offe ·
may,be sustained by circumstantial evide
6. Criminal Law e=>535(2)_

In order to establish corpus delicti,
extrajudicial . confession of a criminal deti

Officer's conversation with motorist at
venience stor e was not a custodial interroon, for Mir.anda purposes; motorist's r e·se . to officer's comment, that a report
, been received about someone driving
out heaalights, was voluntary, motorist

Katharine J . Jackson, assistant city attorney, and Matthew Richter, city p1;osecutor,
for appellee.

Before RULON, C.J., MARQ.UARDT and
HILL, JJ.

